I ^TFT 3^TfT TTGfta STCU^ ST^fft
L.B.S. National Academy of Administration
ngrt
MUSSOORIE
gW^idif
LIBRARY
arerfer
Accession No.
Class No.
xmj
Book No.
ven locfH
_55IZ
Kut
A SHORT HISTORY
OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
UNDER INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
UNDER INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM
Vol. I.
Vol. I.
Vol. IL
Vol. III.
Vol. IV.
Great Britain and the Empire, 1750 to the Present Day. London,
1942.
2nd edition. Part 1, Great Britain, 1750 to the Present Day.
London, 1945. French edition in prepara¬
tion. Italian edition in preparation.
Part 2, The Empire, 1800 to the Present Day.
London, 1945. French edition in prepara¬
tion. Italian edition in preparation.
3rd edition, Part 1, Great Britain, 1750 to the Present Day.
London, 1946.
The United States of America, 1789 to the Present Day. London,
I 943*
2nd edition. London, 1946.
Part 1, Germany, 1800 to the Present Day. London, 1-945.
Part 2, Germany under Fascism, 1933 to the Present Day. London,
1944. American edition, New York, 1945.
France, 1700 to the Present Day. London, 1946.
A SHORT HISTORY
OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
UNDER INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM
VOLUME TWO
THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1789 TO THE PRESENT DAY
by
JURGEN KUCZYNSKI
Formerly Statistician, American Federation of Labor
LONDON
FREDERICK MULLER LTD
29 GREAT JAMES STREET
W.C.i
FIRST PUBLISHED BY FREDERICK MULLER LTD.
IN I943
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
UNWIN BROTHERS LTD.
LONDON AND WOKING
Second , enlarged edition , ig^.6
V
THE RANK AND FILE
OF THE
AMERICAN TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
WHOM I ONCE SERVED
AS STATISTICIAN
“The people’s revolution is on the march,
And the Devil and all his angels cannot prevail against it.”
Henry A. Wallace
Vice-President of the United States
May 8th , 1942
CONTENTS
FAGE
Preface and Introduction to Second Edition. . . 9
Chapter I, The Period of Primitive Exploitation:
1789 to 1840.15
Chapter II, The First “Golden Age,” 1840 to i860 . 40
Chapter III, The Ripe Years of American Capitalism,
i860 to 1900.70
A. The Economic Background 70
B. The Labour Force 74
C. Wages and Purchasing Power 77
D. Hours of Work and Unemployment 88
E. Productivity and Intensity of Work 95
F. “Colonial Labour” and Immigration 101
G. Health and Accidents 108
H. Summary of Labour Conditions 111
I. Labour’s Fight for Better Working Conditions 115
Chapter IV, The Decay of American Capitalism, 1900
to 1941.124
A. Monopoly-Capitalist Background 124
B. The Labour Force 132
C. Unemployment and Short-Time 137
D. Wages, Hours of Work and Purchasing Power 145
E. Productivity and Intensity of Work 161
F. Accidents and Health , 172
G. Social Insurance 177
H. Summary of Labour Conditions 182
I. Labour’s Fight for Better Working Conditions 184
8
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
PAG1
Chapter V, Conditions before the War . . .200
A. Wages and the Minimum Health and Decency
Budget 200
B. Nutrition and General Health Conditions 205
Chapter VI, The War and After .213
Appendix, Accidents and the Trade Cycle . . 225
Index.238
Tables - Names - General
ERRATA
Page 12, line 8, read realistic for realisitc.
„ „ line 22, read significant for singificant.
Page 30, table, read Oct . 1831 for 1931.
„ „ second footnote, read 1839 f° r 1893.
Page 99, footnote, line 2, read 1863 for 1859.
Page 102, line 10, read gives for give.
Page 122, line 4, add: (see table p. 121).
Page 131, line 4, read actually . Even for actually, Even.
Page 162, footnote, line 8 from bottom, read total for tota.
Page 212, line 15, read important , when for important to-day
when.
Page 214, line 25, read than for that.
PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND
EDITION
The first edition of this volume has been out of print since 1944,
one year after publication. Although issued as the second volume
of the Short History of Labour Conditions under Industrial Capitalism ,
it was written first. In the meantime, the history has grown to
six volumes, and I have learned much in treating the problems.
Some of the things I have learned, will be found in this new and
enlarged edition; for others I have not yet been able to gather all
the material, and it may take years until I can write about them.
Furthermore, in addition to more material on former times I
have been able, thanks largely to the relatively very good
statistical information on war-time conditions in the United
States, to bring up to date the survey of labour conditions during
the recent war.
* ★ *
The new material added for the period from 1789 to/1900 is
not based on the results of new research in the United States. In
fact, little work of importance has been done in this connection.
In particular, there is still no cost of living index available for the
years prior to i860. While our knowledge of the development of
wholesale prices in the years before i860 is continuously being
bettered, none of the many universities and research foundations
has yet initiated a study of retail prices and the cost of living.
More thorough work also needs to be done on the development
of wages before 1840. Especially is it desirable that a definitive
consolidated index of wages be computed, an index about which
we have more information than about that of Tucker’s, used in
the first chapter.
However, while not able to report improvements on the basis
of more recent research in the United States, I hope I have
improved the first three chapters by incorporating additional
evidence from contemporary records. More flesh has been given
IO
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
to the statistical bones, and where figure^ are missing, contem¬
porary text sources have been used to fill the gap to a greater
extent than previously. In this connection, I found of special
value a renewed perusal of the reports of the various State labour
statistical bureaux during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, a source of information to which too little attention has
been paid.
But I believe that milch more study is needed before we can
have a really satisfactory history of two aspects of labour con¬
ditions. For both I have found some additional information, and
incorporated it; but it is still far too scanty to be satisfactory.
The first problem is a careful study, over time, of the changes
in the technique of production, and, in connection with this, of
the development of productivity. Such a study would especially
further the understanding of the first two phases of the history of
industrial capitalism and labour conditions. The transition from
extensive exploitation with long hours of work, child labour, and
declining or stable real wages, to that of intensive exploitation
with increasing real wages, shortening of the working day, etc.,
would have been rendered much more easily intelligible, were
there such a study. This becomes markedly clear if we turn to
the treatment of this problem in the volume on labour conditions
in Germany.* Although the material for such a study is not as
abundant in the case of the United States as in that for Germany,
it ought to be possible to give an outline of the history of produc¬
tion technique in the United States, say between 1810 and 1890,
with special reference to a possibly different development in the
textile industry, on the one hand, and the heavy and mining
industries, on the other. Here we would have to answer the
question whether in the United States, as in Germany, technical
progress was at first confined mainly to the. textile and related
industries, and whether, even here, progress was slow after an
initial spurt. Here too we would have to say whether it was only
around the middle of the century, with the growing importance
of heavy industry and mining, that technical progress became
more universal, and productivity rose generally in industry as a
whole, the second phase of exploitation (the phase of intensive
* Cf. A Short History of Labour Conditions under Industrial Capitalism, vol. iii,
part 1, Germany, 1800 to the Present Day. London, 1945.
PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION
II
exploitation) thus coinciding with and being closely related to
the change in methods of production. A small step forward in the
study of these questions has been made in the second edition by
including an index of productivity in mining and manufacturing
since 1827.
The second problem which requires a much more detailed
scrutiny than has hitherto been devoted to it,’ is the development
of housing conditions. What we need is a first attempt at a con¬
nected history of housing in the United States, similar to that of
real wages. An enormous amount of material is available. Yet it
has never been tapped in an attempt either to construct some
kind of index of housing conditions, or even to attempt a sequence
of’ evaluations of the conditions of housing, decade by decade,
during the last 150 years. The importance of housing has usually
been underestimated in the history of labour conditions (although
Friedrich Engels gave such an inspiring example in his survey of
labour conditions in England in 1844, where he collected an
enormous amount of evidence on this subject). While, in this
second edition I have given more space to it than in the first, and
while already in the first edition I tried to impress the reader
with the importance of housing conditions as an element of
labour conditions in general, the state of our knowledge is still
very unsatisfactory. True, there are some monographs on special
aspects of housing, such as tenements. Moreover, there are ad¬
mittedly some studies on the development of housing in some
cities. But no general history exists. The importance of such a
study of housing becomes perhaps clear when we quote a pioneer
monograph, dealing with a small section of the large field await¬
ing investigation. James Ford, in his great study of housing con¬
ditions in New York from the earliest times to the present comes
to the following conclusion*: “It is possible that in the first
century of New York’s history (that is the seventeenth century—
J. K.) a larger percentage of the poor dwelt under wholesome
conditions than in the present century. For then the servants and
labourers lived, for the most part, in the homes of their employers,
but now they are generally condemned to dwell in the relatively
poor homes which they can rent with their meagre wages.” A
* James Ford, Slums and Housing , with special reference to New York, vol. i,
p. 248. Harvard University Press, 1936.
12
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
cpnclusion which may irk those who do not believe that
the condition of the working class has deteriorated under capi¬
talism; which may strike a discordant note in the ears of those
who have “approached” Marx so far as to believe in the theory
of absolute deterioration—yet only as “a tendency which is
counteracted and overcompensated for by opposite tendencies.”
But a conclusion of the very greatest interest to all those who
have a clear and realisitc concept of the course of labour condi¬
tions. *
* * *
I must mention one further aspect which is neglected still in
this second edition. I believe that the book would have gained—
as has the German volume—if I had, at least in short footnotes,
taken more notice of contemporary developments in the field of
literature. The picture of the economic background as well as
specific descriptions of labour conditions would definitely have
been more vivid.
It is significant that in the early period of the growth of the
national economy, after the victory over England, letters to the
press begin to be signed “A Virginia Slaveholder,” “A New
York Workingman,* 5 or simply “Jonathan,” instead of such
refined importations as “Brutus” or “Cicero.” It is equally
singificant if after the reunion of the Nation a reviewer of Artemus
Ward’s travels turns against the too outspoken local development
of the funny story and writes: “Let them seek to embody the wit
and humour of all parts of the country, not only of one city where
their paper is published; let them force Portland to disgorge her
Jack Downings and New York her Orpheus C. Kerrs, for the
benefit of ail. Let them form a nucleus which will draw to itself
all the waggery and wit of America.”!
* A conclusion, furthermore, which we find, for a shorter period, drawn
already a hundred years ago in respect of conditions in Germany, and for
the same reason; formerly, in the eighteenth century, the journeyman lived
in the house of his master, to-day—in 1845—“it is much cheaper and easier
to throw journeymen out of the house than to keep them. In the house it is
not possible to feed them as badly as they now often have to eat; nor could
room and bed be so poor.” (J. G. Hofmann: Die Macht des Geldes , Eine Unter-
suchung der Ursachen der Verarmung und des sittlichen Verfalls so vieler unserer
Mitmenschen nebst Mitteln zur Abhilfe. Leipzig, 1845. See also vol. iii, part 1,
p. 36 of this Short History of Labour Conditions.)
f North American Review , April, 1866.
PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION
13
Nor is it an accident (and it is helpful to our understanding of
the role of the North before the Civil War), that the call for a
national literature and a national science comes from New
England, from the two generations led by Channing and Emer¬
son. Emerson’s famous Address on the American Scholar is an
event of national significance. When, in his address, he says:
“Our day of dependence, our long apprenticeship to the learning
of other lands, draws to a close,”* then he foreshadows the pro¬
gressive victory of the industrial North with its independent
industry over the slaveholding South which, as raw material
producer, was so closely tied to manufacturing England; then
too he ushers in the second phase of industrial capitalism, with
its new and more refined methods of exploitation based on more
advanced industrial technique and higher productivity per hour
of work.
Undoubtedly the description of the economic changes that
came about after the Civil War would have gained by short
references to the democratic optimism of Whitman, and his
Democratic Vistas might have been contrasted with Henry
Adam’s Democracy and Mark Twain’s The Gilded Age, which both
describe the moral decay of democracy, coinciding or even pre¬
ceding the formation of large-scale monopolies. A quotation from
Hamlin Garland’s A Spoil of Office : “There is no war between the
town and the country. The war is between the people and the
monopolist wherever he is”f might have testified to the degree of
political clarity on some fundamentals even outside the labour
movement.
Mention should also be made of the widespread reflection
which specific economic conditions find in the novels of the
day. Amanda Douglas in her Hope Mills (Boston, 1880) and
Henry Francis Keenan’s The Money Makers (New York, 1885)
give graphic descriptions of the crisis of the seventies, while
Robert Barr’s 'The Victors (1901) is virtually a documentary
account ol the development of the crisis of the nineties. The
problem of occupational diseases and accidents is dealt with in
Agnes Maule Machar’s Roland Graeme , Knight (1892); in R. L.
Makin’s, The Beaten Path (1903); Gwendolen Overton’s, Captains
of the World (1904) ;and Elizabeth Stuart Phelps’s, The Silent Partner
* August, 1837. t 1892 edition, pp. 121-22.
14 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
(1871). In fact, there are few problems and facts in the life of the
worker which have not been dealt with in the many good novels
which appeared between 1865 and 1914. While the United
States have not produced, neither during this nor during the
following period, a first-rate novelist writer on the life of the
worker, there are an unusual number of excellent second-class
novelists who can help us to illustrate the conditions under which
the workers had and have to live. And it would, in my opinion,
definitely enhance the value of a history of labour conditions if
the relevant literary history of a nation could be incorporated
alongside.
Unfortunately, my knowledge of the history of American
literature is not yet wide enough to enable me to incorporate
such a “side-light history” of the reflection of economic, and
especially of labour trends, in contemporary literature.
The incorporation of all these suggestions, however, which I
have made would not fundamentally change the trend of the
history as it is related here. It is for this reason, that I think it
justifiable to publish in its present state this, I hope improved,
second edition, which is still far from what I would regard as a
really satisfactory history of labour conditions in the United
States.
JURGEN KUCZYNSKI
London
November 1945
CHAPTER I
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION
1789 TO 1840
English policy towards the American colonies was based on the
principle: to get as much out of the colonies as possible and to
hamper and impede any development within the colonies which
might, in the course of time, lead to competition with English
industry or to some kind of economic independence.
Expressed in terms of economic policy this meant:
Firstly: that the colonies were to be regarded as raw material
sources for English manufactures, and sources of food for the
population of England.*
Secondly: the colonies were regarded as a market for English
manufactured articles only.f
Thirdly: Inter-colonial trade was reserved for English ships
and English pierchants (Act of 1673).
Fourthly: not only was the export of manufactured articles
from the colonies forbidden, J but in the course of time Acts of
* Through Acts of Parliament (the first of importance is the Act of 1660)
exports from colonies were regulated in such a way that all the raw materials
and foodstuffs which England needed had to be sent to England—trade in
such articles with any other country was fdrbidden. In case some of the raw
materials were produced in England, too, and would thus compete with
English produce, Parliamentary Acts provided that these products had to be
exported to any other country but England; subsequently (in 1766) when
there was a danger that these exports might help England’s competitors, the
exportation of these goods was confined to territories which had almost no
manufactures.
t Through Acts of Parliament (the first of importance is the Act of 1663)
imports of manufactured articles into the colonies were confined, through
prohibitive duties, to imports laden and shipped in England on to English-
built English-manned vessels. If a ship carried exports from the colonies to a
Country other than England, being prevented from importing the articles into
England because of competitive reasons, it had afterwards to go to England
in order to find a cargo for the return journey to the colonies, since only
imports of manufactures from England to the colonies were allowed, except
on the payment of prohibitive duties.
t Beginning with the Act of 1699.
1 6 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
Parliament began to forbid the manufacture of products in the
colonies themselves.*
The question arises, how was it possible for the North American
colonies to develop under such conditions into an economic
organism which, after the revolutionary wars of independence,
could stand on its own feet (if still rather wobbly) and, without
any important outside help, develop so quickly into one of the
greatest capitalist States?
The solution is a fairly simple one: American economic
society lived and strove and grew up illegally. Until quite early
in the eighteenth century, most of the Acts of Parliament were
implemented after a fashion without seriously damaging the
colonies, then still very backward. When the colonies began to
grow in economic strength, population, and productive capacity,
England was too much occupied with European affairs to be
able to enforce the Acts dealing with the economic status of the
colonies.
When, at the end of the Seven Years War, England againf
turned seriously to the economic exploitation of the colonies—
that is, turned from a perfunctory collecting of profits to the
adoption of all those means for enforcing the collection of profits
which the position of a “mother-country” usually provides—it
was too late. The colonies had grown economically too strong,
the economic interests within the colonies which depended
upon a continuation of the contravention of the Acts of Parlia¬
ment were too strong to suffer such an economic defeat without
putting up the most desperate resistance.
Since England had not the necessary military strength to
suppress the rising of the colonies, she was beaten; and the
colonies, for a long time colonies in name only, became a free
country.
* * *
* The Act of 1750 forbade, for instance, the erection of rolling-mills and
steel-furnaces.
| “Again**—Josiah Tucker: Four Tracts together with Two Sermons on Political
and Commercial Subjects (1774, p. 124-25) is perfectly correct from the point
of view of “pure logic’* when he writes: “Why, some of you are exasperated
against the mother country, on account of the revival of certain restrictions
laid upon their trade: I say, a revival; for the same restrictions have been
the standing rules of government from the beginning; though not enforced
at all times with equal strictness/*
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE , EXPLOITATION, 1789 TO 1840 17
How far had the industrial independence of the colonies
advanced when they declared themselves independent and had
made good their declaration by beating the English and consti¬
tuting themselves a free republic?
Our knowledge of the state of industry in the eighteenth cen¬
tury is rather limited. And the author of American Husbandry* is
quite right when he says: “Nothing is more difficult than to
discover the amount of their manufactures for sale.” But we do
know that the foundations of industry already existed, and that
there was a basis sufficiently broad to build on. We also know
that it was just during the war of independence that manufac¬
tures developed not inconsiderably. So impressed was Brissot de
Warvillef with the change in the situation in the course of the
war that he could write: “It is impossible to enumerate all the
articles to which they have turned their attention; almost one-
half of which were unknown before the war. ...” Then follows a
long list of articles produced and industries busily at work. At the
end of this enthusiastic and surely somewhat exaggerated
description comes one very significant sentence: “They built
ships here before the war; but they were not permitted to manu¬
facture the articles necessary to equip them; every article is now
made in the country.” This certainly applies not only to ships
but to a considerable number of other products. Further proof
for the growth of manufacture and the increasing weight of
industrialists in American society may be found in the fact that
at the end of the revolutionary wars, the interests of the manu¬
facturing industries were propagated in numerous declarations,
pamphlets, and resolutions of public meetings. The outcome of
this campaign was the second Act to be passed under the new
Constitution, on July 4, 1789. The preamble of this Act begins:
“Whereas it is necessary for the support of the government, for
the discharge of the debts of the United States, and for the
encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be
laid on goods, wares and merchandise imported; be it enacted ..”
It would have been disastrous to enact protective measures
against foreign manufacturing competition if there had not been
* By an American. London, 1775, ii, p. 259.
t New Travels in the United States of America , performed in 1788. Dublin,
1792, PP- 465* 4 66 -
VOL. H. B
1 8 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
a sufficient basis for a manufacturing industry; that is, if there
had not already been something which needed protecting.
It is not surprising, therefore, to read two years later, in the
Report on Manufactures , by Alexander Hamilton: “The expediency
of encouraging manufactures in the United States, which was not
long since deemed very questionable, appears at this time to be
pretty generally admitted.” And all those who still have doubts,
are answered by him: “To all the arguments which are brought
to evince the impracticability of success in manufacturing estab¬
lishments in the United States, it might have been a sufficient
answer to have referred to the experience of what has been
already done. It is certain that several important branches have
grown up and flourished with a rapidity which surprises, afford¬
ing an encouraging assurance of success in future attempts.”
Hamilton then enumerates seventeen industries which provided
a considerable part of the articles in use; the most important
products which manufacture produced (though domestic work
also provided a substantial amount) were: iron and iron products,
including tools and some machinery, textile goods, pottery ware,
means of transportation, and armaments.
The census of 1810 estimated the total value of manufactured
goods already at about 200,000,000 dollars, over one-third of
which were accounted for by textiles and iron and steel and other
metals and their products. From the beginning of the century to
1810 the number of spindles in the cotton industry had increased
about thirty times, and in the following five years it increased
again more than six times to reach the truly enormous figure of
about half a million. The total value of the capital invested in
the textile industries was estimated as high as 50,000,000 dollars
for 1815. In 1830, cotton consumption had exceeded that of
every other country except England.
The total amount of iron manufactured at the end of the
eighteenth century was less than 30,000 tons annually. Yet
already in 1825 more than 100,000 tons of pig iron were being
produced, and fifteen years later production had increased by
about 200 per cent, being about 300,000 tons.*
If we compare the development of the individual manufac-
* Only France and England produced more pig iron than the United
States (France about 10 per cent more, England about 350 per cent more).
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION, 1789 TO 1840 19
turing industries, then we find, like in all capitalist countries at
that time, a great preponderance of the consumption goods
industries. According to the 1840 census, the number of people
employed in the three chief manufacturing industries was: cotton
goods, 72,000; woollen goods, 21,000; machinery, 13,000.
These few figures are sufficient to show that by the end of the
thirties the United States had taken its place beside the greatest
and most advanced European countries as a first-rate industrial
power.* But though a first-rate industrial power, agriculture and
agricultural interests were, of course, still predominant, and only
a minority of the people of the United States were engaged in
industrial work, whether manufacturing, transportation, mining,
or construction.
While manufacturing industry grew and a great system of
transportation was in the process of development, while America
was forging ahead to become one of the great capitalist countries,
how did labour fare?
There are no trustworthy statistics available of the number of
workers before 1850. It is extremely difficult to arrive at an
estimate of the number of people engaged in manufacturing,
construction, transportation and mining. About 1800, the total
industrial population, including women and children, dependent
upon wages and salaries, amounted to probably less than half a
million, that is, less than 10 per cent of the population. By 1820,
the number had probably trebled, while in 1840 manufacturing
alone employed over 700,000 workers, and the total industrial
wage-earning population, including dependents, can be esti¬
mated to have passed the three million mark, thus constituting
more than one-sixth of the total population of the country, f
Then as now the ruling classes tried to get as much out of the
workers as possible. But at that time general conditions, and,
* England, France and Prussia are the only countries which had a larger
per capita industrial production.
t P. K. Whelpton, “Occupational Groups in the United States, 1820-1920”
(Journal of the American Statistical Association, September, 1926), estimates the
number of persons occupied in 1840 to be as follows: Manufacturing, 792,000;
Trade and Transportation, 207,000; Mining, 15,000.
20
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
therefore, the technique of exploitation, differed in many
respects from present-day methods. In the following pages we
shall try to find out what were the chief methods of exploitation
of the American working class in the period from the end of the
revolutionary wars until about 1840.
* * *
One means of exploitation was exactly the same 150 years ago
as it is to-day: The employers of labour tried to pay as little as
possible for as much work done as possible. A considerable
variety of wage data have come down to us. But, unfortunately,
these items are usually not comparable with each other, and
furthermore our knowledge of the cost of living at that time is so
small that we cannot accurately estimate just how badly off a
worker really was, for instance, if he got 50 cents a day.
We must, therefore, look with all reserve at the following
table which gives ten year wage averages for a number of occu¬
pations and industries in Massachusetts.*
WAGES PAID IN MASSACHUSETTS
Dollars Per Day
Tears
Carpenters
Masons
Painters Millwrights
Machinists
1791-1800
o -74
—
—
1-09
—
1801-1810
1-09
i‘ 4 i
1*15
—
—
1811-1820
1*13
1-52
i *34
1 * 13
—
1821-1830
1-07
I • 22
1-25
I -21
—
1831-1840
1-40
1 ’37
1-32
i *39
i *35
Metal
Ship and
Wooden Goods
Cotton Mill
Woollen Mill
Tears
Workers
Boat Builders
Makers
Operatives
Operatives
1791-1800
—
—
—
—
—
1801-1810
—
—
o-66
—
—
1811-1820
1-05
1-25
1 *26
—
—
1821-1830
1*23
1*40
1*25
°*44
1 * 12
1831-1840
i '54
Clothing
1*33
1 -36
0-90
I ’OO
Tears
Makers
Shoe Makers
Glass Makers
Printers
Labourers
1791-1800
—
o *73
.—
—
0-62
1801-1810
—
—
—
0-82
1811-1820
I -oo
—
—
1-13
o-Qi
1821-1830
1-27
1 *06
1*13
1 *25
o-8o
1831-1840
0-90
0*87
1 *62
1 38
0-87
* Data taken from Sixteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor ,
Massachusetts, August, 1885; the figures were compiled by the greatest nine¬
teenth century American labour statistician, Carroll D. Wright.
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION, 1789 TO 184O 21
If we combine the wages of different occupations and branches
of industries into average wages for some industrial groups and
then construct wage indices, we get the following results:
WAGE INDICES FOR VARIOUS INDUSTRIAL GROUPS*
( 1831-1840 = too)
Tears
Building
Metal
Textiles ,
Clothing
Ship, Boat ,
Wooden Goods
1791-1800
1801-1810
(54)
( 72 )
(84)
—
89
( 49 )
1811-1820
98
74
(1T1)
93
1821-1830
87
83
106
99
1831-1840
100
100
100
100
Tears
Printers
Glass
Labourers
Wholesale Prices
1791-1800
—
—
72
u6
1801-1810
—
—
94
12 5
1811-1820
82
—
105
142
1821-1830
9 i
70
9 i
97
1831-1840
100
100
100
100
With equal caution we must look at the following figures
giving the year to year changes of money wages, “cost of living,”
and real wages for the years under review :f
MONEY WAGES, “COST OF LIVING” AND REAL WAGES,
1791-1840
(1900 —- 100)
Tear
Money
Wages
“Cost of
Living”
Real
Wages
Tear
Money
Wages
“Cost of
Living”
Real
Wages
I 79 i
23
42
55
1794
29
53
55
1792
25
46
54
1795
33
61
54
1793
27
49
• 55
1796
33
65
51
* Wage indices for individual occupations and branches of industries were
combined without weighting. The wholesale price data are taken from G. F.
Warren and F. A. Pearson, Prices , p. 10. Wholesale prices can offer here
nothing but a very rough indication of the trend of retail prices; any attempt
to compute “real wages” would be futile.
t As to wages cf. Rufus S. Tucker, Real Wages under Laissez-Faire , Barron’s
The National Financial Weekly , October 23, 1933. The “cost of living” figures
were computed by using the method recommended by Tucker in the article
quoted; the wholesale price index used for this computation is that given by
G. F. Warren and F. A. Pearson in their book on Prices , with interpolations
for 1792 from H. M. Stoker, Wholesale Prices at New Tork City , 1720 to 1800
(Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, Memoir 142) and A.
Bezanson, R. D. Gray and M. Hussey, Wholesale Prices in Philadelphia , / 784-1861.
I have put “cost of living” in quotes in order to indicate that it is no genuine
cost of living index based on an actual study of retail prices.
22 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
MONEY WAQES, “COST OF LIVING** AND REAL WAGES,
1791-1840
(igoo — 100)
Money
“Cost of
Real
Money
“Cost of
Real
Tear
Wages
Living ”
Wages
Year
Wages
Living ’*
Wages
1797
3 i
60
52
1819
45
73
62
1798
33
60
55
1820
44
66
67
1799
29
57
5 i
1800
34
63
54
i8ai
44
65
68
1822
44
66
67
1801
37
89
54
1823
50
7 i
70
1802
34
60
57
1824
48
68
7 i
1803
36
61
59
1825
47
68
69
1804
4 i
68
60
1826
42
63
67
1805
48
78
62
1827
50
70
7 i
1806
47
75
63
1828
45
65
69
1807
44
72
61
1829
45
65
69
1808
42
67
83
1830
47
65
72
1809
50
77
65
1810
48
76
63
1831
50
69
72
1811
1832
5 1
7 i
72
44
7 i
62
"833
51
7 i
72
1812
50
75
67
1834
53
7 i
75
1813
50
85
59
1835
5 1
72
7 i
1814
47
86
55
1836
51
75
68
1815
48
85
58
1837
5 i
75
74
68
1816
50
83
60
1838
5 1
69
1817
5 i
84
61
1839
53
76
70
1818
48
80
60
I84O
55
74
74
In order better to be able to survey the above figures we
compress them into averages for decades, and from 1821 on¬
ward into averages for trade cycles :*
AVERAGE REAL WAGE RATES FOR FULLY EMPLOYED WORKERS
1791-1840
(1 goo ~ 100)
Decades and
Decades and
Trade Cycles
Index
Trade Cycles
Index
1791-1800
54
1821-1826
69
1801-1810
61
1827-1834
72
1811-1820
61
1835-1842
72
According to these figures, real wages seem to have increased
not inconsiderably during the period under review. The first
increase from 1791-1800 to 1801-1810 is still part of the re¬
covery from the effects of the Revolutionary Wars. If we had
* On the advantages of trade-cycle averages see my Labour Conditions in
Western Europe , pp. 55-56.
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION, 1789 TO 1840 23
sufficient statistical material for the years beforq 1791 we would
probably find that real wages in the first decades of the nine¬
teenth century were no higher, or were even lower than before
the Revolutionary Wars. During the second decade of the nine¬
teenth century wages remained stable; the next six years brought
a material increase in real wages, to be followed by sixteen years
of little change.
On further deliberation, we must, however, say that the con¬
clusions we have drawn above do not really mean what they
seem to imply. What we have done, has been to investigate the
wages of a certain group of workers, separately or combined, and
to see how they moved. But we have forgotten to take note of the
following poijit:
If the wage of a male textile worker, for instance, increases in
the course of time, and if, during the same period, the wage of a
female textile worker also increases, we seem to find a general
increase in wages. But if, during the given period, the wages of
the female workers were considerably below those of male
workers, and if, in the course of time, the number of female
workers increased much more rapidly than that of male workers,
the wages of each of them may increase, but average wages of
male and female workers can decrease. * And this is just what
happened in the United States during the period from 1791 to
1840.I The number and proportion of female and child workers
* The following table shows this clearly:
10 male textile workers get $7.00 each per week,
total payroll for male workers .. .. $ 70.00
10 female textile workers get $4.00 each per week,
total payroll for female workers .. .. $ 40.00
20 textile workers get.. .. .. $110.00
1 textile worker gets.. .. .. $ 5.50
20 male textile workers get $7.50 each per week,
total payroll for male workers .. .. $150.00
40 female textile workers get $4.40 each per week,
total payroll for female workers .. *. $ 176.00
60 textile workers get.. .. .. $326.00
1 textile worker gets.. .. .. $ 5.43
Wages of male textile workers have increased; wages of female textile workers
have increased. But average wages of all textile workers have declined.
| Just as it happened at the same time in Great Britain. See vol. i of the
Short History of Labour Conditions , pp. 27 f. In all our references to the first
24 A SkORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
among the American workers increased rapidly during the half-
century under review.
While in the eighteenth century women’s work outside the
home was a rare occurrence, in 1820 there were at least 75
manufacturing occupations in which women worked; by 1830
the number had grown to over 90 and by 1850 it was about 175.
But even more important than the employment of a con¬
stantly increasing percentage of women was the rapid spread of
child labour. An investigation of child labour in Paterson, N.J.,
for 1832, for instance, showed that about one-sixth of all children
under sixteen years were engaged in manufacturing.* And in
many other textile towns the percentage was at least as high.
The parents were forced, because of their terribly low wages
or by threat of dismissal from the employer, to send their children
to work. In a report on conditions in Philadelphia we read :f
“We have known of many instances where parents who are
capable of giving their children a trifling education one at a time,
were deprived of that opportunity by their employer’s threats,
that if they did take one child from their employ (a short time
for school) such family must leave the employment—and we
have even known these threats put in execution.”
In this way the employers recruited a whole army of children
who had to work at wages which did not even amount to decent
pocket money but which had the great advantage of driving
labour costs down and reducing the average wages paid to the
workers.
Those relatively few who fought against the evils of child-
labour had to argue not only against the employers but also
against many sincere humanitarians who believed in progress
through child labour. The attitude of many employers is well
summarized in a reporVof the Massachusetts House Committee
on Education^;: “Labor being dearer in this country than it is in
any other with which we are brought in competition in manu¬
facturing, operates as a constant inducement to manufacturers to
volume the pages refer to the first edition; for the second edition the reader
should add 18 to each page figure, and refer to Part 1 of the first volume.
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. v, p. 64.
t Ibid., p. 62.—The situation was exactly the same in Great Britain, see
vol. i of the Short History of Labour Conditions , p. 22.
J Massachusetts, House Document 49, 1836, p. 10.
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION, 1 789 TO 1840 25
employ female labor, and the labor of children, to the exclusion
of men’s labor, because they can be had cheaper.” It is funda¬
mentally the same argument which the British employers used
against the shortening of the working day for children, when
they pointed to the long working day in German factories, and
which Macaulay answered so magnificently. *
The attitude of the philanthropists is aptly summarized by
Edith Abbott as follows :f “The employment of children in the
early factories was regarded from much the same point of view
as the employment of women. Philanthropists who still cherished
colonial traditions of the value of an industrious childhood, sup¬
ported statesmen and economists in warmly praising the estab¬
lishment of manufactures because of the new opportunities of
employment for children. They pointed out the additional value
that could be got from the six hundred thousand girls in the
country, between the ages of ten and sixteen, most of whom were
‘too young or too delicate for agriculture,’ and in contrast called
attention to the ‘vice and immorality’ to which children were
‘exposed by a career of idleness.’ The approval of child labor was,
in short, met with on all sides.” Including so many unfortunate
parents whose wages had been cut down to such a degree that
they were partially dependent upon the meagre earnings of their
children! They did not realize that it was partly the employ¬
ment of children which made possible such cuts into their wages.
* * *
Another way of cutting wages was the over-employment of
apprentices. In a report of 1825, we read:{
“There are men in this city who have from 15 to 20 appren¬
tices who never or very seldom have a journeyman in their
shops.”
Another trick was the increasing use made of convicts who
were made to work for private employers. A communication
dated May 17, 1823, reads :§
“Let no man who is a mechanic think himself safe, because
his business is not conducted in the prison; for he knows not
* Cf. vol. Ill, part I, of this Short History of Labour Conditions , p. 38.
f Women in Industry, New York, 1910, pp. 58-59.
{ A Documentry History of American Industrial Society , vol. v, p. 70.
i Ibid., p. 51.
26
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
how soon an attempt may be made to wrest from him what
must be ever dear, to him, a fair opportunity of supporting his
wife and children, by the labor of his hands and the profit of
his trade.”
And finally, especially in the clothing trades, sweat-shops were
set up where wages were incredibly low and work intense.
These various methods of forcing down average wages are not
taken into account in the above wage tables. And when we do
take these factors into account we find that the average pur¬
chasing power per employed worker in the fifty years from 1791
to 1840, can, at best, have risen only very slightly.
The working day, if it was a short one, stretched usually from
sunrise to sunset. In the summer, therefore, it was fourteen hours
and more, in the winter over eleven hours. * This long working
day applied equally to men, women and children.
Though no accurate figures are available, one gets the im¬
pression that until late into the thirties there was a tendency to
lengthen rather than to shorten the working day.f This, un¬
doubtedly, was the case as regards women and children who in
the beginning usually did not work such long hours as the men.
At the end of the period under review, however, children, just
like grown-up men, had to work twelve, thirteen and fourteen
hours per day.
And because the number of hours worked per day was in¬
creased, on the whole, until the late thirties, the amount of work
per day naturally increased also, and the workers became more
and more exhausted.
Material as to the state of health of the worker at this period is
fairly plentiful and forms a most damning indictment of labour
conditions in the early stages of American capitalism.
A moving and tragic Appeal of the Working People of
* Harriet Martineau, Society in America , London, 1837, ii, p. 249, says after
visiting the Waltham Mills in Massachusetts: “The time of work varies with
the length of the days, the wages continuing the same.”
| Just as in Great Britain. See vol. i, Short History of Labour ConditionSy p. 28*
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION, 1789 TO 1840
Manayunk to the Public describes conditions among male
workers: *
4 4 We are obliged by our employers to labor at this season of
the year, from 5 o’clock in the morning until sunset, being four¬
teen hours and a half, with an intermission of half an hour for
breakfast, and an hour for dinner, leaving thirteen hours of hard
labor, at an unhealthy employment, where we never feel a
refreshing breeze to cool us, overheated and suffocated as we are,
and where we never behold the sun but through a window, and
an atmosphere thick with the dust and small particles of cotton,
which we are constantly inhaling to the destruction of our
health, our appetite, and strength.
4 ‘Often do we feel ourselves so weak as to be scarcely able to
perform our work, on account of the over-strained time we are
obliged to labor through the long and sultry days of summer,
in the impure and unwholesome air of the factories, and the
little rest we receive during the night not being sufficient to
recruit our exhausted physical energies, we return to our labor
in the morning, as weary as when we left it; but nevertheless
work we must, worn down and debilitated as we are, or our
families would soon be in a starving condition, for our wages are
barely sufficient to supply us with the necessaries of life. We
cannot provide against sickness or difficulties of any kind, by
laying by a single dollar, for our present wants consume the
little we receive, and when we are confined to a bed of sickness
any length of time, we are plunged into the deepest distress,
which often terminates in total ruin, poverty and pauperism.
“Our expenses are perhaps greater than most other working
people, because it requires the wages of all the family who are
able to work (save only one small girl to take care of the house
and provide meals) to furnish absolute wants, consequently the
females have no time either to make their own dresses or those of
the children, but have of course to apply to trades for every
article that is wanted.”
A ghastly picture of the effects upon women of the factory
system, with its long hours and insufficient wages, is drawn in a
report on a discussion of the condition of females in manufac-
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. v, pp. 330-331.
Quoted from Pennsylvanian , August 28, 1833.
28
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
turing establishments by the National Trades 5 Union Conven¬
tion in September, 1834 :*
“Mr. Douglass observed that in the single village of Lowell,
there were about 4,000 females of various ages, now dragging out
a life of slavery and wretchedness. It is enough to make one’s
heart ache, said he, to behold these degraded females, as they
pass out of the factory—to mark their wan countenances—their
woe-stricken appearance. These establishments are the present
abode of wretchedness, disease and misery; and are inevitably
calculated to perpetuate them—if not to destroy liberty itself!”
And a report of the “committee on female labor” by the
same Union in 1836 says:f
“It has been shown that the number of females employed in
opposition to male labor, throughout the United States, exceeds
140,000 who labor on an average from 12 to 15 hours per day,
without that pure air and wholesome exercise which are neces¬
sary to health, and confinement with the consequent excess of
toil, which checks the growth of the body, destroying in effect
the natural powers of the mind, and not unfrequently distorting
the limbs.”
Even more terrible is the aspect of labour conditions if we think
of the children:}:
“If children must be doomed to those deadly prisons,” said
the New Haven delegates to the 1833 convention, “let the law at
least protect them against excessive toil and shed a few rays of
light upon their darkened intellects. Workingmen! bitter must be
that bread which your little children earn in pain and tears,
toiling by day, sleepless at night, sinking under oppression, con¬
sumption and decrepitude, into an early grave, knowing no life
but this, and knowing of this only misery.”
* * *
Another factor which, in the course of time, contributed to a
deterioration of labour conditions was the growing insecurity of
employment^
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. vi, p. 217.
t Ibid., pp. 285-286.
{ Quoted from Address to the Workingmen of Massachusetts, 1834, in
History of Labor in the United States , by John R. Commons and others, vol. i,
p. 32°-
§ Just as in Great Britain. See vol. i of this study, p. 23.
TfcE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION, 1789 TO 1840 29
In the early stages of the development of manufacture, labour
had been comparatively scarce. Skilled workers had a compara¬
tively secure position, unskilled labour was almost non-existent
since the productive processes were not yet sufficiently mechan¬
ized to allow its use to any great extent. With the beginning of
the nineteenth century, that is, with the rapid spread of mechani¬
zation in some industries, however, the situation changed. Many
types of work lent themselves to unskilled labour now, and new
workers, untaught in any industrial craft, came in to the factory
towns. The influx of unskilled labour is graphically described in
two documents from which we quote: “In 1832, Lowell was little
more than a factory village. Five ‘corporations’ were started, and
the cotton mills belonging to them were building. Help was in
great demand and stories were told all over the country of the
new factory place, and the high wages that were offered to all
classes of workpeople; stories that reached the ears of mechanics’
and farmers’ sons and gave new life to the lonely and dependent
women in distant towns and farm-houses. Into this Yankee El
Dorado these needy people began to pour by the various modes
of travel known to those slow old days. The stage-coach and the
canal-boat came every day, always filled with new recruits for
the army of useful people. . . . Troops of young girls came from
different parts of New England, and from Canada, and men
were employed to collect them at so much a head, and deliver
them at the factories.”
This description, written many years later by a one-time
cotton mill worker, * illustrates well the rush to the cotton towns
partly increased by rumour, partly organized through paid
agents. It also emphasizes one important point which gave
special impetus to this movement: among the unskilled workers
women played a very considerable role. The new factory work
gave a chance to many young girls “to become independent”
from home, or from charity, and to find work outside of agricul¬
ture and domestic service. The other side of the picture is well
drawn in contemporary statement, j*
* Fourteenth Annual Report , Bureau of Statistics of Labor , Massachusetts,
Boston, 1883, p. 380,
t Quoted from Address to the Workingmen of Massachusetts, 1834, * n
History of Labor in the United States , by John R. Commons and others, vol. i,
P. 4 « 9 -
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
30
“Within the last few years,” a delegate to the 1834 Convention
of the National Trades’ Union pointed out, “the sons of our
farmers, as soon as they are of sufficient age, have been induced
to hasten off to the factory where for a few pence more than they
could get at home, they are taught to become the willing servants,
the servile instruments of their employers’ oppression and ex¬
tortion !” And the same holds true of the daughter who may earn
a little more in the factory than at home “but as surely loses
health, if not her good character, her happiness!”
At the same time, immigration from Europe increased, especi¬
ally in the decade from 1831 to 1840. The following table shows
the development of immigration from 1820 to 1840: *
ANNUAL IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES, 1820-1840
THREE-YEAR AVERAGES
* ( Thousands)
Period Number Period Number
Oct. 1819 to Sept. 1822 81 Oct. 1931 to Dec. 1834 56 -8
Oct. 1822 to Sept. 1825 8*2 Jan. 1835 to Dec. 1837 67-0
Oct. 1825 to Sept. 1828 19*0 Jan. 1838 to Dec. 1840 63-7
Oct. 1828 to Sept. 1831 22-8
The very high level of immigration in the thirties as compared
with the preceding decade is obvious. The annual immigration
figure *in the early thirties was about seven times as high as the
figure for the early twenties; and the high level in the beginning
of the thirties was well maintained throughout the decade.
The standard of living and working of many of the immigrants
was pitiful. Even so enthusiastic a reviewer of labour conditions
in the United States as Murray f is forced to describe conditions
among immigrants: “Among the thousands and tens of thousands
whom the tide of emigration annually pours into the Atlantic
seaports, and many of whom arrive without money or friends, or
health, or skill wherewith to procure subsistence, great numbers
suffer the extremities of hardship and want, especially in the
neighbourhood of the towns where they are set ashore.”
The question may be asked, following Turner’s frontier theory, J
* Cf. Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census , 1860.
f Charles Augustus Murray: Travels in North America, London, 1893, vol. 2,
p. 298.
$ Cf. F. J. Turner: The Frontier in American History.
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION, 1789 TO 1840 31
whether the “conquest of the West” did not absorb the immi¬
grants or a corresponding number of Americans so that there
would be continued labour scarcity, and a corresponding con¬
tinued increase in the standard of living. The answer to this
question is given in a few sentences at the end of the first volume
of Capital by Karl Marx when he writes: “On the one hand, the
enormous and ceaseless stream of men, year after year driven
upon America, leaves behind a stationary sediment in the east of
the United States, the wave of immigration from Europe throw¬
ing men on the labour market there more quickly than the wave
of emigration westwards can wash them away.” While, of course,
a considerable number of people were absorbed by migration to
the West, the mobility of labour, although considerable, was not
great enough to relieve conditions in the East to such a degree as
to eliminate the depressing influence of immigration upon the
standard of living of the industrial workers. What Mitchell*
observed in i860 begins to apply in the thirties already: “While
the West has been calling for labourers, workmen, and agricul¬
turists of all grades, there have been large numbers of super¬
fluous young men hanging about in the large eastern cities, com¬
peting for poorly paid employment.”
With the development of manufacturing industry and banking
the national economy assumed that structure and aspect which
led to a rapid growth of industry, rapid accumulation of capital,
large-scale employment of low-paid labour and to development
in trade cycles, starting with a rapid growth of business to be
followed after a number of years by a severe crisis.
From the beginning of the nineteenth century on, therefore,
we see a constantly growing labour force, large enough to fill the
employers 5 needs in time of high business activity, but too large
by far in times of crisis. Hence, when a crisis occurred, thousands
of workers were thrown out of employment, dependent on the
mercy of charity or on their relatives in the country.
In fact, one has the impression that the percentage of unem¬
ployment during these early crises was considerably higher than
later on. As the number of industrial workers was relatively
small, however, the percentage of the total population affected
was not large. An old report of a Philadelphia committee des-
* D. W. Mitchell: Ten Tears in the United States , London, 1862, p. 193.
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
3 *
cribes the extent of unemployment in that town during the crisis
of 1816. According to this report employment had developed as
follows:
NUMBER OF EMPLOYED WORKERS IN PHILADELPHIA
Category
1814
1816
Cotton manufacture
• • 2,325
149
Book printing
241
170
Potteries
132
27
Woollen manufacture
1,226
260
Iron casting
1,152
52
Paper manufacture
950
175
Another citizens’ committee, studying conditions in Pittsburg*
reports: “The whole number of hands employed in that town and
vicinity in 1815, to have been 1,960, and the value of their
manufactures $2,617,833. In 1819 the hands numbered only 672
and the value of their manufactures was $832,000. In the steam
engine factories the workmen were reduced from 290 to 24, and
the value of their work from $300,000 to $40,000.” At the end
of the thirties another severe crisis shook the country, and the
Editor of the New York Commercial Advertiser wrote in January,
1829:!
“It makes the heart bleed to look at the hundreds and thou¬
sands of shivering, hungry applicants for charity, who have
thronged the old alms house in the Park this forenoon, pleading
their cause in the most woeful and supplicating terms. . . . There
is unquestionably more intense suffering at this moment, than
there has been for many previous years, if ever.”
And the next great crisis, that of 1837, showed the same
picture, except that the number of workers out of employment
was still higher than in the previous one, for the total number of
workers had increased. In the building trades of New York alone
6,000 men were discharged. :£ Horace Greeley describes the
children of New York workers in 1837 33 “ a P re Y to famine on
* The Philadelphia and Pittsburg reports are quoted from Sixteenth Annual
Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor , Massachusetts, 1885, P- ! 79*
t Quoted from History of Labor in the United States , pp. 170-171.
} Ibid., p. 457. Norman Ware in his book The Industrial Worker , 1840 to i86o 9
writes: ‘‘The depressions of 1837-1839 left one third of the working popu¬
lation of New York City unemployed’* (p. 26).
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION, 1789 TO 184O 33
the one hand, and to vermin and cutaneous maladies on the
other.”*
Unemployment, another factor which, unfortunately, does
not enter our wage statistics above, greatly contributed to a
lowering of the average wage per worker, and therefore to a
lowering of the purchasing power per worker.
While, as we have seen above, the instability of the job in¬
creased during the period under review—the workers being fully
employed in times of great business activity and largely unem¬
ployed in times of crisis and depression—the purchasing power
through the whole period of review was extremely unstable.
This instability was not caused so much by constant fluctuations
in wages as by severe fluctuations in prices. These fluctuations, in
their turn, were caused largely by the instability of the currency
and banking system.
The index of wholesale prices (1910-1914 equals 100) moved,
for instance, from 85 in 1791 to 146 in 1796, declined to 122 in
1798, rose again to 142 in 1801, declined within one year to 117,
and reached the 1801 level again in 1805, then declined within
three years to 115 to rise in the next year, 1809, to 130, and
reached a new record height of 182 in 1814; in 1824 the index
stood at 98, in 1830 at 91, but by 1839 it had increased again to
112, only to decrease the following year to 95.
These extraordinary fluctuations of prices caused hardly less
extraordinary fluctuations in the standard of living; for wages
were considerably less flexible—a certain advantage for the
workers in a period of falling prices, but a severe burden when
prices are rising. And since wages at best were usually just
sufficient to keep the wolf from the door, it does not need any
great exercise of imagination to grasp what a rapid rise in prices
must have meant for the working class.
Taking into account all the factors influencing labour condi¬
tions, the conclusion is inescapable that from 1791 to 1840 they
tended to deteriorate. The means by which the employers tried
* Recollections of a Busy Life , 1868, p. 145.
G
VOL. H.
34
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
to obtain as much work as possible out of the workers for as little
pay as possible, were as follows:
Keeping wages at the lowest possible figure. Since wages
usually were fixed by the day and not per hour, to lengthen the
working day as much as possible. Since women’s and children’s
wages were lower than men’s, to employ as many women and
children as possible. Since apprentices got less than full workers,
to employ as many apprentices as possible. Since prison labour
cost almost nothing, to increase the amount of work done by
convicts. And the introduction of the sweat-shop.
Additional factors which helped to worsen the standard of
living of the workers, not especially introduced by the employers
but due to the structure of the capitalist system at that time, are:
marked insecurity of employment because of high unemployment
during periods of crisis and depression without any proper pro¬
vision for the unemployed worker; and considerable instability
of the worker’s purchasing power because of steep fluctuations in
prices.
Some of these factors contribute much less to-day than a
century ago to the deterioration of working-class conditions. The
working day is now much shorter—the employers, induced by
changes in the technique of production, have become more
subtle: the rapid increase in the speed of the process of produc¬
tion takes more and more out of the worker per minute, so that a
shortening of the working day does not mean a lowering of the
degree of exploitation. Again, the percentage of children em¬
ployed is now much lower than a century ago—partly because
over-strain has such a terrible effect upon their health* that their
future efficiency as objects of exploitation is seriously impaired;
partly because the increased complexity of industrial machinery
requires more skill than children usually have.
Comparing the methods of exploitation applied to-day with
those of one hundred years ago, we get the impression that the
latter were more primitive: let the workers work as long as
possible per day;* let the workers start as young as possible,
* The decreasing curve of efficiency during the last hours of the day was
usually not taken into account, just as the possibility of getting much more
out of the worker by increasing the intensity of work per minute or hour was
usually not thought of, in part because of the still comparatively low technical
standard.
the period of primitive exploitation, 1799 TO 1840 35
even before what we would regard to-day as the school-
age.*
Just as the methods of agriculture have changed and the
farmer to-day does not necessarily think it an advantage to
cultivate more and more acreage but often prefers intensive to
extensive methods, getting more from every square foot rather
than cultivating more square feet, so have the methods of ex¬
ploitation changed. As contrasted with present-day methods,
which concentrate on getting as much*as possible out of every
worker per hour, the employers of a hundred years ago used
extensive methods, such as prolonging the working day.j*
One may, therefore, call this half-century from 1789 to 1840
the period of primitive exploitation of the working class, a period
of brutal rather than subtle exploitation, a period of ugly misery
rather than of refined hellishness.
Our conclusions as to the development of labour conditions
during the first half-century of industrial capitalism are shared
by most students of that time. Norman Ware, in his valuable
The Industrial Worker , 1840-1860 , writes: +
“It is commonly supposed that the dissatisfaction in the forties
with the character and results of the Industrial Revolution was
the result of purely temporary maladjustments. It is admitted
that a temporary maladjustment lasting over one’s working life¬
time is sufficiently permanent for the one concerned ...”
Whatever historians think about the second half of the nine¬
teenth century, whatever may be their judgment about the
advantages gained or disadvantages suffered by labour during
the century, 1840 to 1940—there is little disagreement among
them that the period up to 1840 was one of deteriorating labour
conditions.
Perhaps it is instructive to close our survey of labour conditions
during this period with an interesting sidelight on the state of the
poor just around the middle of the period under review. In a
* Just as in Great Britain. See vol. i of this study, p. 33.
t The reader must be warned not to draw from this comparison of the
methods of exploitation any conclusions as to the relative standard of living
of the industrial workers (relative to that of other classes of the population).
This problem can be discussed only after a thorough investigation of the
development of labour conditions in the following chapters.
t Introduction, p. x.
36 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
book published in 1818,* John Bristed complains that “our
favourite scheme of substituting a state prison for the gallows is a
most prolific mother of crime.” This complaint is not based on
the theory that if punishment would be severer there would be
fewer crimes. Bristed is not interested so much in crimes as rather
in the motives which lead people to go to prison. People commit
crimes because they want to go to prison. But why do people
want to go to prison? Why do they commit crimes in order to
achieve this seemingly supreme ambition of going to prison? The
reason which Bristed gives is: “During the severity of the winter
season, its lodgings and accommodations are better than those of
many of our paupers, who are thereby incited to crime in order
to mend their condition.” One might perhaps also argue that
instead of substituting gallows for the prison one ought to sub¬
stitute better living conditions for those actually prevailing. Such
an argument, however, would probably have been regarded as
subversive, and thus never have entered the mind of a man like
Bristed and his numerous colleagues in the survey of the con¬
ditions of the people.
How did labour react to these changes in labour conditions?
The first strike of wage earners took place in Philadelphia in
1786 when the printers fought for a weekly minimum wage. The
first general strike, that is the first strike of a considerable number
of workers in a large number of trades in one big strike movement,
took place in 1827, again in Philadelphia.
During these years many trade unions arose and local and
regional bodies were formed, often being dissolved after a very
short time. By the middle of the thirties the trade union move¬
ment reached its peak. There were about 300,000 trade union
members. The crisis of 1837, however, causing a fall in wages
combined with severe unemployment, brought about a collapse
of the movement from which it took quite a time to recover.
The first real strike, that of 1786, concerned the question oi
wages, and the last big strike wave in the period here under
review was also concerned with the wage question; it occurred
during the years 1835 and 1836. In 1836 the number of strikes
* America and her Resources ,
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION, 1789 TO 1840 37
solely for an increase in wages amounted to 34, and in 1836 50
per cent more, or 51 strikes were fought for,an increase in wages.
There is nothing peculiar to these strikes which makes them
essentially different from similar ones during the last hundred
years. The principal arguments on both sides, and the strike
strategy were, on the whole, the same, although, of course, in
the following century the technique used on both sides, and
especially the large-scale use of legal means to combat the
workers, have been refined.
Somewhat different is the situation so far as the strikes for a
shorter working day are concerned. As far as I have been able to
find out, the first strikes for a shorter working day occurred in the
early eighteen-twenties. The workers usually demanded the ten-
hour working day, exclusive of breaks for meals. *
The following quotation, reprinted in the often-quoted History
of Labor , by Commons (vol. i, pp. 159-161), embodies all the
more important arguments used at that period on the side of the
employers. It concerns the famous strike of the Boston House
Carpenters in 1825 for the ten-hours day in which close on 600
journeymen carpenters participated:
“ ‘We learn with surprise and regret, 5 reads the masters’ declara¬
tion, ‘that a large number of those who are employed as journey¬
men in this city, have entered into a combination for the purpose
of altering the time of commencing and terminating their daily
labor, from that which has been customary from time im¬
memorial.’ They considered such a combination ‘fraught with
numerous and pernicious evils’ . . . They furthermore considered
that the measure proposed would have an ‘unhappy influence’
on apprentices ‘by seducing them from that course of industry
and economy of time’ to which they were anxious to ‘enure
them,’ and would expose the journeymen themselves ‘to many
temptations and improvident practices’ from which they were
‘happily secure’ when working from sunrise to sunset. ‘We fear
and dread the consequences,’ they said, ‘of such a measure, upon
the morals and well-being of society.’ Finally, they declared that
they could not believe ‘this project to have originated with any
* The first resolution (without a strike following it) for a shorter working
day seems to have been that of the Philadelphia journeymen carpenters who
in 1791 demanded that a working day should not last longer than from six
o’clock in the morning to six o’clock in the evening.
38 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
of the faithful and industrious Sons of New England, but are
compelled to consider it an evil of foreign growth, and one which
we hope and trust will not take root in the favoured soil of
Massachusetts.’ ”
Two arguments here are of interest. The one, that any leisure
time the workers might have would be used by them for im¬
moral purposes, and that they could not be better safeguarded
from all kinds of vice than by having to work from early morning
until so late that they simply dropped exhausted on arriving
home. This argument we find also repeated again and again by
the British employers at that time. * The other contention is that
the idea of combination could not have originated in the minds
of decent Massachusetts men—and, for the first time in the
history of labour, there appears the “foreign agent” whom we
have known so well in our time as the “Moscow-paid instigator
of trouble in a formerly peaceful and contented community.”
While some readers may be surprised that the “Moscow
agent” makes so early an appearance, most readers will think
that the argument that long working hours keep the worker
virtuous is abandoned to-day. This is by no means the case.
The claim that the workers should be kept from opportunities to
think, learn and compare experiences has been a constant
favourite with the employers. One outcome of this is, for in¬
stance, that many factories in Germany under Fascism had
provided a radio set to play music during the lunch-hour and
other intervals. The workers were compelled to listen to music or
some sort of entertaining recital, while private conversation
between the workers was frowned upon. The chief purpose, of
course, is to keep the workers from talking together during the
working-day, and thus from planning any kind of opposition.
In many of the strikes women took part. Some concerned
women workers almost solely. Children, too, bravely took their
place in the picket line, and in one case a strikebreaker was
prevented from working by the children, against whom he
brought an action. It is of interest to quote the reminiscences of
somebody who witnessed such a strike :f “One of the first strikes
* See vol. i of this study, pp. 28-29.
f Quoted from Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor ,
Massachusetts, Boston, 1883, p. 391.
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE EXPLOITATION 1789 TO 1840 39
that ever took place in this country was in Lowell in 1836. When
it was announced that the wages were to be cut down, great
indignation was felt, and it was decided to strike or ‘turn out’ en
masse. This was done. The mills were shut down, and the girls
went from their several corporations in procession to the grove
on Chapel Hill, and listened to incendiary speeches from some
early labor reformers. One of the girls stood on a pump and
gave vent to the feelings of her companions in a neat speech,
declaring that it was their duty to resist all attempts at cutting
down the wages. This was the first time a woman had spoken in
public in Lowell, and the event caused surprise and consterna¬
tion among her audience. One of the number, a little girl eleven
years old, had led the turn-out from the room in which she
worked.’’
CHAPTER II
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 to i860
Ernest Ludlow Bogart in his Economic History of the United
States writes as follows of the period here under review: *
“There is general agreement among all writers as to the great
industrial advance made in the United States during this period;
it was a time of solid prosperity and steady, continuous progress.
Sumner calls it ‘the golden age.’ The wealth of the country
increased 126 per cent, and with it the general well-being of the
people, so that comfort was widespread and pauperism almost
unknown.”
There can be no doubt that Bogart is right in his description
of the progress of industry, and especially of manufacturing
industry, which was really remarkable. Within ten years, from
1840 to 1850, the value of manufactured products doubled and
reached the first thousand million dollars, and ten years later the
second thousand was almost attained. At the same time the
number of establishments increased comparatively little while
the increase in employment stood about midway between these
developments.
In 1850 the total value of manufactured products surpassed,
by a few millions that of agricultural products—but ten years
later agricultural products were worth a few millions more than
manufactured products.
In observing the development of individual industries we
discover something which many of us would not have expected
to find until several decades later. In a number of industries
there is a decided trend towards the elimination of small estab¬
lishments, and the creation of large factory units only. This
process was going on with such rapidity that in a number of
industries there were, in fact, fewer establishments in 1850 than
in 1840, and fewer still in i860 than in 1850—a unique industrial
experience at that period.
* Page 160.
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i 860 41
In cotton manufacture the number of establishments declined
from 1,240 in 1840 to 1,094 * n 1850, and in i860 only 1,091
establishments were counted. At the same time the total capital
invested had been doubled, the amount of raw cotton consumed
more than trebled, and the number of workers employed in¬
creased by about 70 per cent. In the woollen industry the number
of establishments declined between 1850 and i860 by more than
10 per cent, although the value of the output increased during
the same time by 50 per cent. A similar development can be
observed in the iron industry.
This process did not necessarily mean that the widespread
formation of trusts and other combines had already begun. It
did not signify a correspondingly rapid increase in the number
of factories owned by one single capitalist. For the most part, it
simply meant that factories generally became bigger and that
smaller units had to go out of business because they could no
longer compete with the larger ones. Since that period, produc¬
tion—especially that of textiles, and iron and steel—has been
carried on chiefly in large factories.
While industry grew upwards it also spread outward. As it had
been for a century past, New England was still the most active
and intensive manufacturing area, but among the individual
states New York now took first place, followed by Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania. The fourth place was now taken by Ohio, a
state which at the beginning of the century had practically no
manufacturing. Then followed, according to the value of output,
Connecticut, New Jersey, California, Illinois and Virginia. The
country had indeed changed in character; manufacturing indus¬
try had spread from coast to coast, and wherever sufficient
capital was invested the entrepreneur could expect a large
return.
Side by side with manufacturing, a vast system of transporta¬
tion developed. After the war of 1812 a network of canals began
to spread across the country, speeding up and cheapening
transportation. By the end of the thirties about 60 million
dollars had been invested by the various states in canals. And,
although railroad building only seriously began in the thirties,
by the end of this decade the states had already borrowed over
40 million dollars in all for this purpose. Between 1840 and i860
42 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
the total railroad mileage increased from less than 3,000 to over
30,000 miles. But it was still some years before railroad traffic
could exceed in importance canal, lake and coastal traffic.
Between 1840 and i860, for instance, the tonnage of vessels on
the Great Lakes alone increased more than eight times from
75,000 to over 610,000 tons. The total shipping tonnage engaged
in the inland waterway and coastal trade was between 1820 and
i860 about as great as that engaged in foreign trade. From about
500,000 tons in 1815 the inland waterborne and coastal shipping
tonnage increased to over 1 million in 1840, and to more than
millions in i860. In i860 the total tonnage engaged in home
and foreign shipping reached the enormous figure of 5 millions.
At the end of the first period under review, industry had
developed so rapidly that the United States had advanced into
the ranks of the foremost industrial powers.
At the end of the second period under review industry had so
far spread and expanded, and its importance had grown to such
an extent, that the United States was on the eve of becoming a
predominantly industrial country—the first after Britain to enter
the ranks of the predominantly industrial countries.
The employers in manufacturing industry, mining, building
and transportation really did live in a golden age. Sumner was
right. There seemed to be no limit to industrial expansion and no
limit to the increase in profits. Occasionally a severe crisis
occurred, but it was not long-lived and it was quickly forgotten.
But how did the workers fare? Did they enjoy a golden age, too?
The total number of workers engaged in manufacturing
industry, which had about doubled between 1820 and 1840,
increased during the following decades by only about 70 per
cent, that is from approximately 800,000 to about 1,300,000;
between 1840 and 1850 the increase amounted to almost 25 per
cent; while the following decade showed an increase of some¬
thing like 35 per cent.
The material available for the investigation of the living and
working conditions of these workers is considerably better than
that for the previous period under review. Since 1850, a reliable
census of manufactures was taken every ten years; for the period
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 43
since 1840 sufficiently accurate wage statistics were obtained by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For the same period, decidedly
less reliable, but in some ways significant, statistics of working
hours are available, and a great quantity of other data bearing
on the life of the workers. It is, therefore, much easier to com¬
press the history of labour conditions in this period into statis¬
tical tables, into comparative statistics, and hence into a form
which yields more accurate conclusions regarding the develop¬
ment of labour conditions than could be derived from any other
method.
* * *
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ index of hourly wages, 1840
equalling 100, has, during the period under review, developed as
follows: *
HOURLY WAGES (ALL WORKERS), 1840-1860
Tear
Hourly
Wages
1840
100
1841
103
1842
100
1843
100
1844
97
1845
100
*846
103
(1840 = 100)
Tear
Hourly
Wages
1847
103
1848
106
1849
109
1850
106
1851
103
1852
106
'853
106
Hourly
Tear
Wages
1854
112
1855
115
1856
118
1857
121
1858
118
•859
118
i860
118
Hourly money wages remained pretty stable between 1840
and 1853. In the following four years they increased rapidly,
and again remained fairly stable between 1857 and i860. The
stability of the hourly wage data is due in part to the fact that
they are figures for rates and for large establishments, and this
combination makes them more rigid than hourly wages actually
have been.
Moreover, the above figures do not tell the whole story. For
they reveal only the development of hourly wages. But during
the whole period under review hours of work had the tendency
to decline.
In the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of wages and hours
* Most of the shortcomings of the wage index are pointed out by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics itself.
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
44
since colonial times,* we find in the following trades and occu¬
pations at the beginning of the forties a working week of more
than 60 hours, which was modified up to the beginning of the
sixties as follows:
Hours per Week in the beginning
Trade or Occupation
of forties
of sixties
Carpenters and Joiners, Mass.
65
83
Engineers, stationary, Mass, and New York..
n 4
68
Firemen, stationary, Mass.
84
70
Firemen, stationary, New York
72
72
Laborers, Mass.
81
66
Blacksmiths, Mass.
69
68
Machinists, Mass.
83
64
Machinists, Connecticut
66
60
Pattern-makers, Mass.
72
62
Miners, iron, New Jersey
72
60
Drawers-in, Cotton goods, Mass.
78
74
Speeder tenders, Cotton goods, Mass.
84
72
Spinners, Cotton goods, Mass.
78
73
Weavers, Cotton goods, Mass.
84
72
Knitters, Hosiery and Underwear, Mass.
78
78
Dressers, Woollen and Worsted goods, Mass,
78
67
Brakemen, Railroad, Mass.
70
70
Conductors, Passenger, Railroad, Mass.
70
70
Conductors, Freight, Railroad, Mass.
70
70
Engineers, Locomotive, Railroad, Mass.
7 °
7 °
Firemen, Locomotive, Mass.
70
70
Teamsters, Mass.
82
62
Cabinetmakers, New Jersey ..
72
60
Woodworkers, Mass. ..
78
63
It would be wrong to draw any conclusions from these figures
as to the actual time worked per week. Only a very limited
number of establishments reported, and many did not report the
actual time including overtime, but only what employers to-day
would call the “normal” working time. In addition, no sweat¬
shops and only a few small establishments reported, and they
usually worked considerably longer hours than the big establish¬
ments.! Furthermore, for many industries, trades and occupations,
no figures at all are available. It would be quite wrong, there¬
fore, to conclude from the above table that (because they are not
mentioned) in a considerable number of industries the 60 hours
week was usual at the beginning of the forties, or that the above-
quoted industries and occupations are the most important ones in
* Cf. History of Wages in the United States from Colonial Times to 1928. Bulletin
of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 604.
t The New York Daily Tribune reported, for instance, in i860 a working
day of ao hours for shirt-sewers.
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 45
which more than 60 hours per week was usual, or that the number
of industries, branches of industry and occupations where the 84-
hours working week prevailed in the beginning of the forties was
not much greater than the above figures indicate. However, one
conclusion can safely be drawn from the above table: there was
a decided tendency towards a shortening of the working week.
As further proof of the reduction of hours worked per day, we
quote a table taken from the 10th Census , vol. xx, p. xxviii:
ESTABLISHMENTS WORKING HOURS PER DAY, 1830-1860
Total Number 8 to less than it 11 to less than 13 13 to less than 14
Tear
Reporting
Number
Per cent
Number
Per cent
Number Per cent
1830
37 *
18
48-7
14
37*8
5
i 3*5
1835
48
24
50-0
18
37*5
6
12*5
1840
69
38
52-2
25
36-2
8
11 *6
1845
103
60
58-2
33
32-0
10
9*7
1850
173
104
60 • 1
83
38*4
6
3*5
1855
250
161
64-4
84
33*6
5
2*0
i860
350
235
67-1
107
3 °‘8
8
2*3
While it would be wrong to draw any conclusion from these
figures as to the actual working time which can be regarded as
normal during the years reviewed, we are safe in using the above
table as a farther indication of the general development of the
number of hours worked: since the forties, there is a definite
trend for the hours of work per day and week to decline f—just
as there was at that period in Great Britain^
If we relate this conclusion to the above table of hourly wages
we may draw the further conclusion that the total purchasing
power earned per employed worker each week developed un¬
doubtedly less favourably, or more unfavourably, than any
figures relating to hourly earnings indicate. If, for instance,
hourly wages remain stable while the number of hours worked
per week declines, then, of course, weekly wages decline also.
* In the original misprinted as 34; there are a number of other misprints
which I have here corrected.
t According to the Aldrich Report on Wholesale Prices, Wages and Trans¬
portation, and Bulletin 38 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, hours of work per
week increased from 1840-1844 to 1845-1849 by 0-9 per cent; they declined
from 1845-1849 to 1850-1854 by 0*7 per cent and from 1850-1854 to 1855-
1859 by 2-5 per cent; average hours per day according to these reports are:
1840, 11*4; 1850, 11-5; and i860, 11-o hours.
X See vol. i, pp. 53-55-
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
46
Fortunately, in addition to general hourly wages for all
workers, we can, for the period under review, also compute daily
wage data for a considerable number of individual industries
and for industry as a whole (though unfortunately no reliable
data on agricultural wages are available). In the following table
we give indices of actual daily money wages per fully employed
worker. *
* All statistics based on the data on daily wages given in History of Wages
in the United States from Colonial Times to 1928, Bulletin No. 604 of the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Building: Wages of bricklayers in New York; wages of carpenters and
joiners in New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania; wages of masons in
New York and Massachusetts; wages of painters in New York, Massachusetts
and Maryland; wages of hod carriers in New York and Massachusetts. Un¬
weighted average for wages in different states for each occupation; unweighted
average for all occupations. *
Glass and Clay Products: Wages of glass blowers, bottles, in New Jersey.
Iron and Steel Industry: Wages of rollers, bar mills, in Pennsylvania; wages of
puddlers, puddling mills, in Pennsylvania; wages of furnace keepers in Penn¬
sylvania; wages of fillers, pig iron, blast furnaces, in Pennsylvania. Unweighted
average of all occupations.
General Laborers: Wages in Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania;
unweighted average for all states.
Metal Trades (other than Iron and Steel): Wages of blacksmiths in New
York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania; wages of machinists in New York,
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania; wages of millwrights in New York and
Pennsylvania; wages of moulders in New York and Massachusetts. Unweighted
average of states within occupation. Unweighted average of occupations.
Mining: Wages of miners, coal, in Pennsylvania.
Printing and Publishing: Wages of press feeders, book and job, in Connecticut
and Pennsylvania; wages of compositors in Connecticut, New York and
Pennsylvania. Unweighted average of states within occupation. Unweighted
average for occupations.
Textiles: Wages of speeder tenders, cotton goods, men and women; wages
of spinners, cotton goods; wages of weavers, cotton goods; wages of knitters,
hosiery and underwear; wages of dressers, woollen and worsted goods; all
data for Massachusetts only. Unweighted average.
Transportation: Wages of brakemen, railroad; wages of conductors, passenger,
railroad; wages of conductors, freight, railroad; wages of engineers, locomotive,
railroad; wages of firemen, locomotive. All data for Massachusetts only.
Unweighted average.
Woodworking: Wages of woodworkers in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
Unweighted average.
As to the statistical methods of weighting, etc?, it might be argued that I
have been rather primitive. It is true that there are many refined methods of
computing such indices but it is not worth while to apply them to such rough
material as the above figures present. Applying a careful weighting system,
etc., would simply make the above statistics appear much more accurate than
they actually are.
47
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 184O TO i860
INDICES OF DAILY WAGES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES,
184O-1860; ( 184O — IOO)
Year Building Textiles Mining Iron and Steel Metal Trades
1840 100 100 100 100 100
1841 105 100 83 98 95
1842 106 102 83 96 96
1843 118 97 77 96 91
1844 121 90 83 102 91
1845 III 87 97 no 93
1846 107 94 97 no 96
1847 112 90 97 116 100
1848 113 98 97 115 99
1849 in 106 97 no 103
1850 112 in 97 103 102
1851 in 103 97 104 103
1852 114 96 97 99 108
1853 120 99 90 ”5
1854 121 97 104 117 118
1855 123 99 97 120 120
1856 118 in 104 116 119
1857 121 117 97 127 121
1858 122 112 75 108 119
1859 120 113 97 no 121
i860
129
116
97
116
121
INDICES
OF DAILY WAGES
1840-1860;
IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES,
(1840 -=■ 100)
Wood¬
General
Printing and
Glass and
Transporta¬
Year
working
Laborers
Publishing
Clay Products
tion
1840
IOO
IOO
IOO
IOO
IOO
1841
IOO
106
IOO
IOO
IOO
1842
IOO
97
IOO
IOO
99
1843
IOO
98
102
IOO
IOO
1844
IOO
IOO
102
124
98
1845
IOO
94
102
* 129
IOO
1846
IOO
94
102
129
102
1847
107
96
102
136
IOI
1848
IOO
96
102
136
IO3
1849
103
95
*13
121
106
1850
IOO
97
1 13
121
IO3
1851
116
98
113
12 I
102
1852
109
IOO
i 11
120
IO3
*853
127
107
113
120
IO4
1854
131
101
121
120
I IO
1855
127
IOI
121
I I I
I IO
1856
121
104
110
11 I
I I I
*857
120
104
IIO
I I I
I IO
1858
122
104
110
I I I
”4
1859
117
105
I IO
IO4
116
i860
125
118
I IO
IO4
116
48 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
The development of daily wages varied considerably in the
different industries. Wages in building, iron and steel, the metal
trades and the woodworking industry—all key industries at that
period—increased above the average. In most other industries
wages were relatively behind-hand, conspicuous among them
being mining. Of great importance also is the relative decline in
the wages of textile workers. At the beginning of the century
textile workers were still paid the rate of skilled mechanics; at
the end of the period under review they were definitely degraded
to “generally lower paid workers. 5 ’*
A better comparative survey of the figures can be achieved by
computing average wages by decades for the individual indus¬
tries:
AVERAGE DAILY WAGES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES BY DECADES
(1840 — 100)
Industry
1840-1849
1850-1859
Building
110
118
Textiles
96
106
Mining
91
96
Iron and Steel
105
112
Metal Trades
96
”5
Woodworking
IOI
1 *9
General Laborers ..
98
102
Printing and Publishing
103
113
Glass and Clay Products
118
115
Transportation
IOI
108
Cost of Living
92
IO5
If we compare the development of prices and of wages in
selected industries we find an even more varied development—
for a comparison of money wages showed almost generally only
a difference in the amount of the increase; a comparison of real
wa^es, however, shows for some industries increases and, at the
same time, for other industries falls in real wages.
From 1840-1849 to 1850-1859 prices increased by 14 per cent.
There are only two industries in which wages increased as much
or more: the metal trades and the woodworking industry.
If we compute an (unweighted) average of daily wages in all
* Cf. on textile wages in the beginning of the century, J. L. Bishop, A
History of American Manufactures , ii. pp. 213-214.—A similar change in the posi¬
tion of textile workers took place in Great Britain.
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 49
industries taken together, and if we use Tucker’s* “cost of living
index” we arrive at the following data for real wages:
MONEY WAGES, COST OF LIVING AND REAL WAGES OF INDUS¬
TRIAL WORKERS, 1841-1860
(.1 goo *» 100)
Money
Cost of
Real
Money
Cost of
Real
Tear
Wages
Living
Wages
Tear
Wages
Living
Wages
1841
54
72
75
1851
59
70
84
1842
54
68
80
1852
58
72
81
1843
54
64
84
1853
61
78
78
1844
56
64
88
1854
83
81
78
1845
56
68
82
1855
62
85
73
1846
57
69
83
1856
62
84
74
1847
58
73
79
1857
63
87
72
1848
58
89
84
1858
61
79
77
1849
58
68
85
>859
61
76
80
1850
58
70
83
i860
63
76
83
It is easier to survey the development of real wages if we group
them into averages per trade cycle:
AVERAGE REAL WAGE RATES FOR FULLY EMPLOYED WORKERS,
1791-1860
(igoo =s 100)
Decades and
Decades and
Trade Cycles
Index
Trade Cycles
Index
1791-1800
54
1827-1834
72
1801-1810
61
1835-1842
72
1811-1820
61
1843-1848
83
1821-1826
69
1849-1858
79
The first trade cycle in the period under review witnessed a
renewed rise in real wages. The hungry forties in Europe did not
have a parallel in the United States. But the next trade cycle
brought for the workers in the United States the first decline in
real wages (for an identical group of fully employed workers).
This decline in real wages was due chiefly to an increase in the
cost of living. If we anticipate the development in the following
years we find that during the following trade cycle, 1859 to
1867, rea l wages declined again, reaching the level prevailing
between 1827 and 1842.
While these figures inform us about the movement of wages,
* Cf. l.c. p. 7, table on Money Wages, Cost of Living, and Real Wages,
Cost of Living A.
VOL. II.
D
50 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
we have some data at our disposal which make it possible to get
a rough picture of actual living conditions. In the Daily Tribune
(New York)* a cost of living budget is published which amounts
to $10.37, a week, for a family of five. Beside food, clothing, rent
and fuel the only other expenditure provided for is “furniture
and utensils, wear and tear” $0.25 and “newspaper” $0.12.
Horace Greeley remarks upon this budget:
“I ask have I made working-man’s comforts too high? Where
is the money to pay for amusements, for ice-creams, his puddings,
his trips on Sunday up or down the river in order to get some
fresh air, to pay the doctor or apothecary, to pay for pew rent in
the church, to purchase books, musical instruments?”
We see, Greeley thinks that the budget is a very meagre one
and provides for a very poor living. And now let us turn to some
figures on actual wages paid during the year for which this
budget is computed.!
DAILY WAGES IN NEW YORK IN 1851
Building
Bricklayers ..
. $1.88
/row, Steel and Metals
Catchers, bar mills
$0.61
Carpenters
$1.74
Roughers, bar mills
$1.63
Joiners
$1.74
Labourers ..
$0.89
Engineers
$1.38
Blacksmiths..
$1.56
Hod carriers
$1.00
Boiler makers
$1.28
Masons
$1.60
Machinists ..
$i -37
Painters
$i -73
Millwrights
$1.63
Plasterers
$i -75
Moulders ..
$1.41
Plumbers
$1.90
Pattern makers
$1.41
Stone cutters
Printing and Publishing
$2.00
Miners
Miners, iron
$1.00
Compositors
Pressmen
. $1.50
. $1.67
Transport
Clothing
Dressmakers
• $ 1*33
Teamsters ..
. $1.23
The majority of these workers get less per week than the
admittedly poor cost of living budget, prepared by the Daily
Tribune , requires. If we multiply the daily wage by six (assuming
that none of the workers concerned work a few hours less on
Saturday, we find that with the exception of a few groups of
* May 27, 1851.
t Cf. the often quoted History of Wages published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
5 *
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 184O TO i860
building trade workers, all workers earn less than this minimum
budget. In one case even a doubling of wages would be insuffi¬
cient to pay for the expenses provided for in the budget, and in
nine cases wages have to increase by a quarter or more in order
to reach this poor budget.
While, as we shall see later on, the intensity of work is increas¬
ing, and health conditions are deteriorating, wages are moving
on a level which is quite inadequate even from the by no means
pro-labour point of view of the Daily Tribune .
Moreover, the food which the workers were able to buy was
very often adulterated and of poor quality. Cummings describes
food conditions at that time as follows: *
“But increased use of country milk did not mean an end to
swill milk, and the latter was estimated to constitute more than
half the milk supply of New York City in 1853. This milk was
very bad. Descriptions are given of stables within the city limits
where cows fed on distillery mash were kept indoors until death.
It was said that their horns and tails sometimes rotted away. . . .
Unscrupulous dealers watered their product and added such
things as chalk, plaster of Paris, and molasses to give it a more
saleable appearance.”
Even if the composition of the diet of the workers improved in
the course of time, this did not necessarily mean that the diet
itself improved. Or, as Cummings expresses it:f
“More milk had not meant pure milk, and suffering from
diseases carried by this and other foods—scarlet fever, diphtheria,
and other ailments—was very great.”
We have seen above that the period from 1840 to i860 brought
to the American workers a distinct reduction in the number of
hours normally worked per week. This reduction was partly
effected by a large popular movement for shorter hours. During
the late forties this movement succeeded, after many set-backs,
in having several laws passed which tended to restrict the number
* The American and His Food, A history of food habits in the United States, by
Richard Osborn Cummings, Chicago, 1941, p. 55. For the same phenomenon
in England at that time, see vol. i, pp. 25 and 61.
t L.c. p. 90-
52 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
of hours worked per day. During the fifties a reduction of hours
was effected partly by State legislative measures and partly by
trade union agreements.
The first teiwiour law was passed by the legislature of New
Hampshire in 1847—a law which left many loopholes, but at
last a law on this pressing problem! This law is not only of
importance because it was the first to be enacted; it is also of
great interest because of one argument the legislative com¬
mittee used in favour of the reduction of hours. The committee
was of the opinion that a shortening of the working day was
advantageous to the employers who 4 ‘would realise a greater
profit, even in less time, from laborers more vigorous and better
able to work, from having had suitable time to rest.”*
Behind this argument lies the fact that the continuous opera¬
tion of a twelve- to fourteen-hours working day had, in the course
of time, undermined the health of the working population in
such a way that a serious menace to the supply of efficient
factory labour existed. It is true, the hours of work would not
have been shortened without the energetic action of all kinds of
labour bodies—but the comparative success of these efforts
could not have been achieved by such peaceful means had the
employers not begun to envisage certain advantages for them¬
selves from a shorter working day and week.
The New Hampshire Act was followed by similar more or less
elastic ten-hour acts, often applying only to a restricted number
of workers, in Pennsylvania (1848), Maine (1848), New Jersey
(1851), Ohio (1852). Rhode Island (1853), New York (1853),
California (1853). None of these Acts effectively established the
ten-hour day for all the working population; none of them even
guaranteed to a small number of workers—for instance, children
—the ten-hour day under all circumstances.
In connection with the agitation for the shorter working day,
a number of studies of health conditions were made which
reveal the appalling plight of the workers.
In 1845 the first official investigation of labour conditions was
made by a Special Committee of the Massachusetts Legislature.
* New Hampshire House Journal, 1847, p. 479.
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 53
The results of the questioning of one of the operatives appearing
before the committee is transcribed as follows:*
. . She complained of the hours for labor being too many,
and the time for meals too limited. In the summer season, the
work is commenced at 5 o’clock a.m., and continued till 7
o’clock p.m., with half an hour for breakfast and three-quarters
of an hour for dinner. During eight months of the year, but half
an hour is allowed for dinner. The air in the room she considered
not to be wholesome. . . . About 130 females, 11 men, and 12
children work in the room with her. . . . Thinks that there is no
day when there are less than six of the females out of the mill
from sickness. Has known as many as thirty. (This is almost 25
per cent!—J. K.)”
Another operative’s examination gave the following facts :j
“She has lost, during the last seven years, about one year from
ill health.”
A most interesting discussion arose about a table of diseases
which for the years 1840 to 1844 shows the incidence of death
from selected causes. The table gives the following figures: J
Death from Diseases
Number of Deaths
in Lowell
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
Consumption
.. 40
54
70
73
77
Inflammation of Lungs
•• 17
20
38
16
24
Cholera Infantum ..
12
30
34
27
3 1
Scarlet Fever
7
43
32
6
3
Measles
0
4
12
0
10
Dysentery
47
18
17
11
2
Inflammation of Brain
7
11
6
8
4
Croup
7
10
12
6
11
Others
.. 289
266
252
216
200
Total
.. 426
456
473
363
382
While the total number of people in Lowell (21,000 in 1840
and 25,000 in 1844, among them 15,600 females of whom about
7,000 worked in the mills) increased by about 20 per cent from
1840 to 1844, the total number of deaths declined. The city
physician ascribes this improvement in health conditions to
“the enlightened policy of city government, in directing the
construction of common sewers, and the enterprise of individuals
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society, vol. viii, pp. 134-135.
t Ibid., p. 137. X Ibid > PP- ' 44 -J 45 -
54 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
in multiplying comfortable habitations, the establishment of a
hospital, supported by the liberality of the corporations, for the
accommodation pf the sick in their employ. The more general
diffusion of a knowledge of the laws of health, is also conductive
to the same end.”*
Had there really been an improvement in health? The figures
probably are correct, if not to the decimal, at least as to the
trend. But this does not necessarily mean that health conditions
of people working in Lowell improved. Quite rightly the opera¬
tives pointed out:f
“The petitioners thought that the statements made by our
city physician, as to the number of deaths, were delusive, inas¬
much as many of the females when taken sick in Lowell do not
stay there, but return to their homes in the country and die.”
As jungle animals, mortally wounded, retire to the solitude of
far places, so the factory workers, exhausted by overwork,
mortally hit by sickness and worry, withdraw to the country to
die—away from the factory, from the city, and what they stand
for.
Hence, the above table cannot be significant for the general
development of health conditions. And yet, we can learn much
from it.
All the deaths together declined, and this may be an illusion
due to the fact that so many workers left the city before they
died; it may also be partly due to the fact, mentioned by the
physician, that sanitary improvements had been effected in the
city. For there can be no doubt that in some places sanitary
conditions were now being improved, and this without much
pressure by the working class. The reason for this voluntary
improvement was the increasing congestion within the cities, and
the ensuing greater danger of contagious diseases. It was in the
interests of the ruling class to lessen the danger of epidemics, for
epidemics often do not recognize class distinctions and, therefore,
may also attack the rich. In this way, the working class profited
from their rulers’ fear of epidemics and the measures they took
against them.
It would, therefore, not be astonishing if the number of deaths
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. viii, pp. 144-145.
t Ibid., p. 145.
55
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860
from epidemic diseases declined in Lowell, just as it had the
tendency during these and ensuing decades to decline in the
whole of the United States. But this is not the most important
story the table tells. The important story is contained in the first
line of the table, giving the number of deaths from consumption.
Consumption is the factory disease in particular. In all capitalist
countries, consumption spread, especially among factory workers,
and mostly at times when labour conditions deteriorated more
than usual. The above table is, therefore, most significant as an
indicator of the development of working conditions: they must
have deteriorated rapidly, as the virtual doubling of the number
of deaths from consumption indicates.
Five years later another investigation was made by the Massa¬
chusetts legislature, and during this investigation a letter was
produced which throws all the needed light on the state of
health of the factory workers:*
“Office of Norfolk County Health Insurance Company, Lower
Floor, Merchants’ Exchange, Boston, July 2 J, iS 4 g.
“Mr. C. V. N. Brundige,
“Sir,—We have determined not to take any more applica¬
tions, especially from the factories. Such places have been the
graves of other companies, and we mean to avoid them. From
what few policies we have there, we are constantly receiving
claims. Doubtless there may be some good subjects there, but,
from past experience, it would seem there was not more than a
grain of wheat to a bushel of chaff, we can’t distinguish them.
“Yours,
“Steph. Baley.”
The factories are the “graves” of the health insurance com¬
panies!—because sickness is so widespread among the workers.
That they are something vastly more appalling: the graves of
the workers, is apparently a matter not worth mention.
Before concluding this short survey of health conditions, let us
take one last look at the factory villages through the eyes of
Orestes A. Brownson, who wrote in 1840 in an article in the
Bostqn Quarterly Review :
* Cf. ibid., p. 169.
56 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
“The great mass wear out their health, spirits and morals
without becoming one whit better off than when they com¬
menced labor. The bills of mortality in these factory villages
are not striking, we admit, for the poor girls when they can toil
no longer go home to die. . . . We know no sadder sight on earth
than one of our factory villages presents, when the bell at break
of day, or at the hour of breakfast or dinner, calls out its hun¬
dreds or thousands of operatives.”
* * *
We have seen that during the half-century from 1790 to 1840
the employers tried to increase the rate of exploitation of the
workers chiefly by a lengthening of the working day. During the
period here under review they changed to another method of
increasing exploitation: instead of lengthening the working day
in order to get more out of the worker they intensified the pace
of the work per hour. * This method was to be applied during the
following century more and more, until to-day in every large
capitalist country there is a whole army of speeding-up experts,
who in turn are threatened with dismissal if they are not inten¬
sively enough engaged in devising ever new means of intensifying
the working process.
For the period under review little direct or indirect evidence
is available on the increase of the intensity of work. However,
there is more than sufficient to let us guess what was happening.
The Voice of Industry , September 11, 1846, wrote:
“Be assured that if you do not live to witness it, the time is not
far distant when those who labour in the mills will (as is the case
with many now) earn barely enough to purchase the necessities
of life by working hard thirteen hours a day; recollect that those
who worked here before you, did less work and were better paid
for it than you are, and there are others to come after you. ...”
Three years before this warning was issued the first strike
against the increase in the intensity of work occurred. In 1843
the workers of the Chicopee Mills struck against increased work
without increased pay (Norman Ware, l.c. p. 122).
The best authority on labour conditions between 1840 and the
Civil War, Norman Ware, writes:
* The same tendency can be observed in Great Britain at about the same
time; sec vol. i, pp. 43-48.
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 57
“In the mills, for instance, the girls toward 1850, were tending
four looms where they had previously tended two, and the speed
of the machines was being increased as greater mechanical per¬
fection was achieved. ... In addition to the increased effort
required by the speeding-up of the machines and the addition of
looms and spindles, the premium system began to develop in the
forties, to stimulate production. Overseers and second hands
were paid bonuses for getting out more work than was com¬
monly required of the operatives, ‘or, in other words, for driving
them up.’ Voice of Industry, January 8, 1847” (l.c. pp. xii and 124).
The great change which characterizes the exploitation methods
in the first period of industrial capitalism and during the follow¬
ing periods and phases was taking place during the period under
review; not everywhere and not very rapidly, but irrevocably;
the worker was being exploited more and more by increasing the
intensity of his work per hour instead of by an extension of the
working day which by then had reached proportions which made
a further lengthening a physical impossibility.
An old textile mill worker, visiting after many years the town
of Lowell where she had worked in the thirties, reports about the
change in the intensity of work and its effect upon the mill girls: *
“Though the hours of labor are less, they are obliged to do a far
greater amount of work in a given time. They tend so many
looms and frames that they have no time to think. They are
always on the jump. They have no time to improve themselves,
nor to spend in helping others.” While it is difficult to see how
the girls had much time to “improve themselves” in the thirties
when according to the same witness the working day “extended
from five o’clock in the morning until seven in the evening, with
one half-hour each, for breakfast and dinner,” the contrast in
the change of the intensity of work is so striking that the author
reverts to it again when she describes conditions in the thirties:
“Though their hours of labor were long, yet they were not over¬
worked. . . . They were not driven.” It is the constant drive to
produce more and more per hour which characterizes the"new
methods of exploitation.
Anthony Trollope described the drive for greater and greater
* Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor , Massachusetts,
Boston, 1883, pp. 382, 383, 399.
58 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
intensity qf work as follows: u . . . And, moreover,—which aston¬
ished me,—I have seen men driven and hurried,—as it were
forced forward at their work in a manner which to an English¬
man would be intolerable. This surprised me much, as it was at
variance with our—or perhaps I should say with my—precon¬
ceived ideas as to American freedom. I had fancied that Ameri¬
can citizens would not submit to be driven; that the spirit of the
country, if not the spirit of the individual, would have made it
impossible.”* While Trollope may have exaggerated the differ¬
ence between the United States and Britain, while perhaps there
was no difference at all, it is significant how eloquently he
describes the impression of haste and drive which the manufac¬
turing process makes. And it is equally significant that the first
report of the new Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor
(1870) reproduces this passage as a true picture of conditions.
In addition to these eyewitness remarks on the increased
intensity of work, we have interesting information in the following
index of productivity: f
PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING, 1827 to 1858
(1 goo=100)
Trade Cycle Index Trade Cycle Index
1827-1834 15 1843-1848 34
1835-1842 22 1849-1858 37
Although these figures are no more than a rough indication of
the trend, they are of the greatest interest because they reveal so
* Travels of Anthony Trollope , 1861.
t The index is constructed as follows: For the years 1839 to 1858 I used
the index of production of minerals and power (including pig-iron production)
computed by G. F, Warren and F. A. Pearson ( The Physical Volume of Production
in the United States , Cornell University, Agricultural Experiment Station,
Memoir 144), and added an index of Cotton consumption based on the data
given in Bureau of the Census , Bulletin 134. For the years 1827 to ^39 I used
the sources given in Warren and Pearson’s study and the above-mentioned
cotton consumption data. Employment was computed by assuming that in
intercensus years, there was a straight-line increase; for Census data I used
the corrections made by P. K. Whelpton, Occupational Groups in the United
States, 1820-1920, Journal of the American Statistical Association , 1926, pp. 335-343.
The development of normal hours of work was assumed to have been as
described in the Aldrich Report; for years previous to 1840 I made estimates.
The index of productivity does not take into account changes in unemployment.
But as we give trade-cycle averages only, these changes play a role only in
so far as average unemployment changed from trade cycle to trade cycle.
The production index was chained to that published in Investigation of Con¬
centration qf Economic Power , Hearings before the Temporary National Economic
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 59
well what is happening: up to the forties the old means of ex¬
ploitation are sufficient to drive up productivity rapidly. But
then the situation changes. True, many employers are going over
to intensive exploitation; but many others continue in the old
way, and the net result is relative stability of productivity.
Although production continues to increase rapidly, produc¬
tivity for the first time in the history of industrial capitalism,
begins to become stabilized. Only when the new methods of
exploitation have been accepted by industry as a whole, when
the period of transition has passed, will we find that productivity
begins to increase again rapidly.
* * *
The worker often did not receive even the little he earned in
money. Instead, he was given a sort of company check which he
could only use to buy the necessities of life at super-prices in
company stores. An English Owenite, who visited the United
States in the beginning of the forties, described these conditions
as follows: *
“I was talking with some of the workmen, spinners, in the
largest jean manufactory in Steubenville, in the state of Ohio,
Committee , Congress of the United States, 75th Congress, Part 1, Economic Prologue,
Washington D.C., 1939, p. 200. This, in turn, is a re-computation of the
McLeod-Persons-Day-Thomas-Joy-Kolesinkof index on the basis of 1899
equalling 100. The annual data of production for the years 1827 to ^63 (the
McLeod, etc., index begins in 1863) are:
INDEX OF PHYSICAL VOLUME OF PRODUCTION IN
MANUFACTURING AND MINING, 1827-1863
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
(1899
Tear
= 100)
Index
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
1827
o -7
>835
i *5
1843
3.6
1850
6*o
1857
9-0
1828
o -7
1836
i *7
1844
4*3
1851
7 -o
1858
9*8
1829
o-8
1837
i-8
1845
4-8
1852
7*6
'859
io-6
1830
1 • 1
1838
2‘ I
1846
5*4
'853
7*9
i860
10*3
1831
1 • 1
1839
23
1847
6-o
1854
8-4
1861
10*0
1832
i '3
1840
2-8
1848
6*4
1855
9*2
1862
10*4
ffi 33
i *4
1841
2-9
1849
6*2
1856
9*7
1863
11 ‘7
1834
i -4
1842
32
The hours of work per normal working week were assumed to be the same
from 1835-1842 as from 1843-1848; for the latter period we have the Aldrich
investigation; for the years 1827-1834 we assumed the normal working day
to be about 2 per cent shorter than during the years 1835-1842.
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. vii, p. 54.
6o
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
who were telling me of the recent reductions in their wages, and
of the rascally truck system, which is universally practised in that
town and neighbourhood—the workmen are generally paid by
notes on the shops, by which they lose at least 25 per cent, in
price and quality; but they are frequently paid in pieces of jean
of their own make, charged at high prices, by which they often
lose 50 per cent, which reduce their actual wages to about 2s.
per day, English money.”
The truck system was at that time considerably more wide¬
spread than it is to-day, and the wage losses incurred thereby
must have been very heavy—wage losses which are not taken into
account in the above wage figures.
* * *
The employment of child and female labour did not, at least
noticeably, diminish during the period under review; possibly it
even increased. True, we find a widespread movement for the
exclusion of children from industry. Some States passed legisla¬
tion to mitigate the effects of employment upon the development
of the children, or even forbade the employment of children. The
Connecticut legislature had passed a law as early as 1813 which
required employers to provide some education for children in
their employment. In the forties, again Connecticut and then
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania established by law the ten-hour
day for children or even forbade their employment below a cer¬
tain age; New Jersey and Rhode Island followed suit in the
fifties. But as no provision was made to ensure the enforcement of
these laws, they remained “a bark without a bite.”*
But even more important than the continued large-scale em¬
ployment of women and children is the fact that the available
wage data suggest that wages of women and children declined
relatively to those of men, so that it became even more profitable
for the employers to replace male by female labour. Or, when
the gap between the wages of the two sexes did not widen, men’s
wages in industries employing a high percentage of women and
children declined in relation to men’s wages in other industries.
The employment of convict labour spread even beyond the
* First Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor , Massachusetts, Boston,
1870, p. 140.
6i
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860
scale reached at the end of the thirties, thus affording the em¬
ployers further possibilities of cutting labour costs and exerting
pressure upon the wages of ordinary workers.
The* employment of an undue proportion of apprentices—a
policy on the same lines as that of employing as many women
and children as possible—continued, and even seems to have
increased.
A means already used extensively of getting more work for no
pay at all, was the prolongation of the working day by 30 minutes
or more beyond the usual time, thus getting more work out of
the worker who was paid a daily wage.
At the same time, as mentioned above, the employers set
about the intensifying of the working process. A decline in the
number of hours worked per day was accompanied by an
increase of production per day.
Furthermore, during the crises which occurred during the
period under review, when unemployment was high, employers
forced down wages more systematically than before, trying to
make as much use as possible of this “national calamity” by
getting back from the workers all, or if possible more than the
wage increases they had had to concede during the upswing of
business activity; so that the workers, during the next period of
increasing business activity, would have to start their fight for
higher wages from an even lower level.
However, the most important factor influencing the develop¬
ment of American labour conditions, apart from those inherent in
all capitalist economy during the period under review, was the
change in the extent and character of immigration.
Within the short period from 1845 to 1855, about 3 million
people immigrated into the United States, three times as many
as during the preceding half-century.
A considerable number of these immigrants did not penetrate
far into the country, but remained in the Eastern States, while
those who did travel further inland for the most part found
employment similar to that of those staying in the East—in
industrial establishments. Although agricultural areas still sup¬
plied a considerable number of new industrial Workers, it would
not be surprising to find that considerably more of them now
came from overseas.
62 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
But not only did the number of immigrants increase rapidly.
The type of immigrant changed. This change interests us here
chiefly in so far as it influences labour conditions in industry.
The great change in the character of immigration was from
skilled to unskilled workers.
This phenomenon can best be studied by considering the
figures which W. J. Bromwell gives in his History of Immigration
to the United States (pp. 135, 163), for the important period of
1847 to 1853. These seven years constitute a decisive period
because they show the combined effect of the famine years in
Ireland and the suppression of the revolution on the European
continent upon the character of immigration into the
States.
During these seven years the annual number of immigrant
farmers increased by little more than 25 per cent, from 44,000 to
56,000. At the same time the number of immigrant unskilled
workers increased by over 100 per cent, from 36,000 to 83,000.
But the number of immigrant skilled workers declined by about
one-third, from 25,000 to 17,000.
The unskilled worker had begun to arrive in the United
States. But not the unskilled worker who comes to a free country
to become a skilled worker and live happily thereafter in a little
house outside the city. This dream-picture of many an immigrant
unskilled worker was realized by very few of them. They were
admitted into the country and were welcomed by the employers,
because they were expected to remain unskilled and to live, if
possible, at the low standard to which they were used in their
native country—whence they had fled in order to improve their
living conditions! They were expected to act, consciously or un¬
consciously. as factors to enable the employers to lower the
wages and standards of the American workers. They were ex¬
pected to act as strikebreakers and pace-makers, to the detriment
of the masses of the workers.
The fact that many of them actually did somewhat improve
their living standard, as compared with that in their former
home country, and that many became loyal members of workers’
organizations, was due to the activity of the native American
workers, and to the solidarity which developed between native
and immigrant workers, as well as to the activity of the immi-
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 63
grant workers themselves. Yet there can be no doubt, that the
employers’ scheme was successful at least partially.
* * *
It was after this period of mass immigration that housing
conditions in the United States became definitely and for many
decades one of the worst features of the life of the American
worker. The American employers were able to impose a housing
standard on the American worker which would never have been
achieved without the pressure put on all workers by the influx of
unskilled immigrants. It is due to the mass immigration at the
end of the forties and the beginning of the fifties that the Ameri¬
can workers for the rest of the nineteenth and the opening years
of the twentieth century lived under worse housing conditions at
exorbitant rents than the industrial workers of many other
countries. In comparing labour conditions in the United
States before and after the late forties, one must never leave
out of account the great difference in the state of housing
conditions.
The “Report of the Committee on Internal Health” has tfie
following to say on housing conditions in Boston in 1849, in
discussing the “wretched dirty and unhealthy condition of a
great number of the dwelling-houses occupied by the Jrish
population”: *
“These houses, for the most part, are not occupied by a single
family, or even by two or three families, but each room, from
garret to cellar, is filled with a family consisting of several per¬
sons, and sometimes with two or more families.”
The report finds the sanitary conditions in these houses beyond
description. An investigation by the Police Chief of New York
found that in 1850 about 3 per cent of the population of that city
lived in cellars with no other rooms.
“There are cellars devoted entirely to lodging, where straw at
two cents, and bare floor at one cent a night can be had. . . .
Black and white, men, women and children are mixed in one
dirty mass. Scenes of depravity the most horrible are of constant
occurrence. ”f
* Quoted from Commons’ History of Labor in the United States , vol. 1, p. 490.
t Ibid .
64 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
Within a few years the housing conditions of the immigrants
had become those of many native American workers.
The worsening of housing conditions was, however, only one
of many aspects of this process of lowering the American standard
of living through pressure to that of the immigrants. For the
“melting pot,” at that time at least, served to a considerable
degree in melting down the standard of living of the American
worker. The role which the immigrant was intended to play as
strike-breaker and depresser of wages and the general standard of
living, is aptly described in an article called “Progress of Mono¬
poly,” in the Voice of Industry (Fitchburg, Mass.) :*
“We copy the following item from the Lowell Journal: ‘Two
hundred workmen from England arrived at the Iron Works at
Danville, Penn., where they are to be employed.*
“The above few lines contain an important lesson for every
workingman and woman in America, they clearly exhibit to the
unbiassed, investigating and reflecting mind, the onward rapid
strides of the great, deep-rooted inhuman monster system oi
capital against labor, which is fast devouring every tangible
and valuable right that belongs to the working classes of this
country, as moral, physical and intellectual beings, capable oi
filling the land with an abundance, and generating peaceful
industry, virtue and happiness. . . . The democratic republican
capital of this country, which has been so amply fortified against
foreign despotic capital by the suffrages of American working¬
men (‘all for their especial benefit 5 ) says there are not enough
‘free, independent and well paid 5 workingmen and women ir
this country; consequently foreign operatives and workmen musi
be imported—no tariff on these! no, no, it won’t do to proteci
the capital of American workingmen and women (their labor}
against foreign competition! for this would be anti-republican
But, ‘protect the rich capitalist and he will take careof the laborer.
“Now the capitalists of the Danville Iron Works wish tc
protect themselves against these ‘disorderly strikes,’ by importing
a surplus of help; the Lowell capitalists entertain the sam<
republican idea of self protection, the Pittsburgh and Allegheny
city capitalists, whose sympathies (if they have any) have beer
recently appealed to, wish to secure themselves against ‘turn-
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society, vol. vii, pp. 88-89.
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 65
outs 5 by creating a numerous poor and dependent populace.
Isolated capital everywhere and in all ages protects itself by the
poverty, ignorance and servility of a surplus population, who will
submif to its base requirements—hence the democratic or whig
capital of the United States is striving to fill the country with
foreign workmen—English workmen, whose abject condition in
their own country has made them tame, submissive and ‘peace¬
able, orderly citizens’; that is, work fourteen and sixteen hours
per day, for what capital sees fit to give them, and if it is not
enough to provide them a comfortable house to shelter their
wives and children and furnish them with decent food and
clothes, why, they must live in cellars, go hungry and ragged!—
and for this state of things, capitalists are not answerable. O! no
they (the laborers) ain’t obliged to take it—they are free to go
when they please!’ . .
♦ * *
During the half-century from 1791 to 1840 labour conditions
had the tendency to deteriorate. While real wages on the whole
probably increased slightly, the working day was lengthened,
and women and children were drawn into the factories, where
working conditions grew worse and worse.
Nor did labour conditions improve during the two decades
from 1840 to i860; on the contrary, they continued to deteriorate.
Norman Ware (l.c.) writes: “During the period 1840-1860 the
industrial workers as a class were rapidly losing ground.”
But the course of the separate factors influencing the develop¬
ment of labour conditions was not the same. In contrast to the
former period real wages of fully employed workers during part
of the time had a tendency to decline. While the working day at
the end of the thirties was longer than at the beginning of
America’s industrial history, at the end of the second period
working hours were shorter than in the thirties and forties.
The shorter working week was accompanied by more intensive
work per hour*—but at the same time there were quite a number
* Norman Ware, l.c., summarizes as follows: “In the factories, hours were
reduced. . . . But these reductions do not represent a clear gain because the
tendency of the new industrialism was constantly to speed up production and
add to the effort and attention required of the worker.’*
VOL. II E
66
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
of factories which did not shorten the working day and which at
the same time drove their workers harder; and finally there
were factories which prolonged the working day.
At the same time immigration became a weapon in the hands
of the industrial employers against labour. Numerous other more
or less important ways and means were devised by the employers
in their endeavour to get more and more out of the workers.
The important things which we must note are:
Firstly, that labour‘conditions had a tendency to deteriorate
for a period of seventy years. Seventy years of increasing misery
for an increasing number of workers—men, women and children.
Seventy years of growing oppression or increasing hunger or
failing health or increasing exhaustion from work, or a com¬
bination of these things. And this during a period which not
only saw the making of great fortunes but which brought riches
to an increasing number of people.
Secondly, that labour conditions deteriorated in the first
period while real wages of fully employed workers increased, and
in the second while they declined. * This observation is important
because it shows that it is not sufficient to judge labour conditions
solely by studying real wages.
Thirdly, that the employers had many means at their disposal
for exploiting the workers, the truck system, immigration,
lengthening the working day without paying more, using convict
labour, over-employment of apprentices, recruiting children for
the factories, and so on.
Only those who grasp points two and three will be able
properly to study the development of labour conditions and
interpret the results of such a study. And only those who realize
point one can understand what the capitalist system must have
meant to the workers of the past.
* * *
The chief objectives of the labour movement during the period
under review, as in every phase of the history of industrial labour
in the United States, were better wages and the shorter working
day.
The movement for higher wages was customarily at its height
* In contrast to Great Britain, see vol. i, p. 50.
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 67
during years of increasing trade acitivity. No new arguments for
higher wages were advanced—and indeed the old argument,
relating to the terrible misery in which workers had to live,
could not have lost in vigour and point, since living conditions
had deteriorated rather than improved as compared with the
former period investigated here.
The movement for shorter hours had given rise to one new
argument which we have already indicated: that shorter hours
of work meant less exhaustion, or, in other words, more strength
per hour, more efficiency per hour, and therefore, also a certain
advantage for the employers. Another new argument was put
forward at the meeting of the delegates of the New England
Industrial League in 1851. This was that a diminution in the
number of hours worked would also lead to an increase in wages.
The call to the convention said:
“Wages are governed by the great law of trade—the law of
supply and demand. . . . There is a certain amount of the pro¬
ductions of labor demanded by the wants of the community,
and there are a certain number of laborers ready for employ¬
ment to supply the demand. As the demand for the supply of
laborers is in excess, wages‘will rise or fall.”
Since, the argument continues, a shortening of the working
week is identical with a shortening of the supply of labour, and
since a shortening of the supply of labour would mean an in¬
crease in the price of labour, namely wages, a shortening of the
working week would lead to an increase in wages.
There is a grain of truth in this argument—but it does not
take into account a number of facts which must in this con¬
nection be considered. For, firstly, a shortening of the working
week is usually accompanied by an increase in productivity per
hour, that is, the amount of products produced is often even
greater during a shortened working week than during a longer
one. Furthermore, the supply of labour can easily be increased
and is constantly increased: through importation of labour,
through the natural increase of the population, through a ten¬
dency of manufacturing industry to absorb an increasing share
of the total population, or through new inventions which throw
workers out of one particular form of employment so that they
may be absorbed by other branches. While, therefore, nobody is
68
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
justified in doubting that a shortening of the working week tends
to reduce the supply of labour we must not forget that there are
many factors active in capitalist economy which tend to increase
the supply of labour, and which outweigh the influence of a
shortened working week upon the supply of labour.
Other labour activity was directed against the redundant
employment of apprentices and to secure the abolition of night
work, regularity in the payment of wages, the abolition of the
trucking system and of competitive prison labour.
In connection with these aims the Trade Unions began to
make investigations of labour conditions on their own behalf.
The fifties really witnessed the first phase of extensive research
activities by Trade Unions; and, on the whole, it must be
admitted that not much progress has been made since then.
The investigation of the Benevolent Society of the New York
printers in 1850 covered, among others, the following points:
Weekly earnings per person.
Wages of boys.
Number of hours of work.
Number of men employed.
Prices paid for differe it kinds of work.
Time and method of payments.
Time lost in waiting or copy.
Amount of proof coirected in proportion to composition.
Number of proofs and revises required.
Prevalence of favouritism in giving out copy.
Alterations, how many, and whether any are not paid for.
Working conditions in the office (order, comfort, etc.).
The inquiry covered 82 offices, employing 850 journeymen
and 300 boys, that is about 50 per cent of the total people em¬
ployed in printing in New York.
On the basis of this investigation the Printers’ Union made a
careful report upon general working conditions and drew up a
series of recommendations for improving them. An excellent
piece of work, equalled only rarely, and not at all during the
last twenty-five years, by the much more powerful union which
to-day represents the interests of the printers.
During the fifties the trade union movement gained strength
chiefly among the craftsmen. Already in the fifties, we find the
beginning of the movement for the closed shop. We find, too, the
THE FIRST “GOLDEN AGE,” 1840 TO i860 69
first attempts at collective bargaining; we also find in the late
fifties unions which, on a limited scale, pay unemployment
benefits^. In short, we find unions not very different from many in
existence to-day.
Here we should finally settle one question which may fre¬
quently be asked when considering the history of labour condi¬
tions in the United States, as in other countries.
We have found that during the years under review in this
chapter, labour conditions deteriorated. What, some may ask,
was the use of fighting in Trade Unions for an improvement of
conditions if, in spite of all the efforts of the workers, conditions
not only failed to improve, but deteriorated?
The answer is: firstly, the workers undoubtedly succeeded in
improving certain features of labour conditions for a limited
number of their fellows. Secondly, without the formation of
Trade Unions and other forms of labour organization, working
and living conditions would have deteriorated considerably
more; thirdly, later generations of workers have made use of the
experiences of these earlier fights, and have done better in a
number of cases, because they have learned from the mistakes of
former battles; fourthly, the whole morale of the working class is
improved immensely if it learns to think and act in terms of
organized opposition, organized advance, and an organized
progression towards success and a better life.
Workers of all countries and of all times have fought for a
better world to live in, and in some countries they have had
more success than in others; but nowhere has the least success
been achieved without organization, organization in Trade
Unions, in political parties, in numerous progressive movements.
If, therefore, in spite of the organization of an increasing part
of the working class in Trade Unions, labour conditions did not
improve in the period 1840-1860 as compared with the previous
half-century, this was not due to the fact that “organization in
Trade Unions doesn’t help,” but rather to the fact that, at that
time, just as during the following decades, the workers’ organi¬
zations were not strong enough and their tactics were not always
the best. We can assert, however, without hesitation that without
the workers’ organizations both working conditions and living
conditions would have been worse in many respects.
CHAPTER III
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM
i860 TO I9OO
A. The Economic Background
The Revolutionary Wars safeguarded and broadened the
foundations of American industry. But nobody could say that
it was fought in the interest of the industrial section of the
population. While the industrial section of American society
profited enormously from the Revolution and its results, and
succeeded surprisingly well in looking after its own interests
during and immediately after the Revolution, industry was only
one of several factors.
The Civil War, on the other hand, was fought for the sake of
industry.* For more than a decade before war broke out in
earnest industry and (plantation) agriculture had been con¬
tending to decide which interest should finally determine the
future development of the American economic system. The war
ended in an unqualified victory for American industry, whose
interests from now on determined the direction of American
affairs.
Marx wrote :f
“The present struggle between the South and North is, there¬
fore, nothing but a struggle between two social systems, between
the system of slavery and the system of free labour. The struggle
has broken out because the two systems can no longer live peace¬
fully side by side on the North American continent. It can only
be ended by the victory of one system or the other. 5 *
The Civil War was a progressive war; True the big capitalists
of the North and the big farmers in the West made enormous
profits out of it. True, labour conditions did not improve as a
result of the defeat of the System of slave labour. True, one
* Though the farmers in the West also profited considerably by it.
t Karl Marx, The Civil War in the United States, Die Presse, November 7, 1861.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 71
system of exploitation took the place of another in the South, and
in the North the same system of exploitation became even more
effective than it had been. Yet at the same time, important
barriers in the way of the development, not only of Northern
industrialism and Western agriculture, but also of the labour
movement and the progressive development of labour activity
were swept away.
It is not surprising that after the victory of the North industry
developed with fresh vigour, breaking all records and surpassing
all other sections of the national economy as well as the rest of
the world, in the rapidity and virility of its progress and ex¬
pansion.
Between i860 and 1870 the total value of manufactured
products increased more than 100 per cent, from 1*9 to 4 • 2
billion dollars; in the following decade the increase was less, a
mere 25 per cent, from 4-2 to 5 • 4 billion dollars; ten years later
the value had increased again, this time by 75 per cent, and by
1900 the total value of manufactured products had mounted to
13 billion dollars, almost 40 per cent more than in 1890 and was
about seven times higher than in i860.
The United States had become the greatest industrial power
in the world, and the value of its manufactures was more than
double that of its nearest competitor In his Industries and Wealth
of Nations Mulhall shows the development of manufactures in a
number of countries:
MANUFACTURE IN THE GREAT INDUSTRIAL POWERS
OF THE WORLD
{Million Dollars)
Countries
1820
1840
i860
1894
United Kingdom
.. 1,411
1,883
2,808
4,263
France ..
1,168
1,606
2,092
2,900
Germany
900
1,484
i >995
3-357
Austria ..
5 11
852
1,129
«,596
Other European States
• • 1,654
2,516
3>455
5,236
Europe ..
• • 5,644
8 , 34 i
11 >479
17,352
United States ..
268
467
i> 9°7
9,498
Between i860 and 1894 the United States outstripped all
72 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
countries in the race for first place, producing in 1894 about
one-third of the world output of manufactured goods.
The increase in the amount of capital invested in manufac¬
turing industries was even more rapid than the increase in the
value of manufactured goods. The means of production—
machinery, buildings, etc.—became relatively more and more
expensive as compared with labour power, and played an in¬
creasingly greater role. The following table shows this clearly by
indicating the rate of growth in the value of manufactured goods
and in the amount of capital invested in manufacturing indus¬
tries :
RATES OF GROWTH OF VALUE OF MANUFACTURES AND
CAPITAL INVESTED IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Percentage Growth of
Periods Value of Manufactures Capital Invested
1860-1870 124 no
1870-1880 27 32
1880-1890 75 134
1890-1900 39 51
1860-1900 590 874
Equally interesting and significant is another structural
change, the beginnings of which we could already observe in
the previous period under review: the total number of manufac¬
turing establishments, tended to grow at a less rapid rate than
the total value of their products; furthermore, not only did the
production of every establishment, on the average, tend to
increase, but the big establishments developed faster and became
more efficient than the small ones, and indeed often drove them
out of business.
While the value of manufactures between i860 and 1900
increased about seven times, the total number of establishments
producing manufactured goods increased by about half as much
only. In the cotton industry, the number of establishments by
the end of the century was lower than in 1850. In the iron and
steel industry in 1900 there were 40 per cent more concerns than
in 1850, but fewer than there had been in 1870. Large-scale
industry was, then, firmly established at the end of the sixties;
by the end of the century small-scale operation had been defi-
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 73
nitely forced down to a position of unimportance in many
manufacturing industries.
The spread of manufacturing over the country as a whole made
rapid -progress during, the period under review. The Middle
West became one of the greatest industrial centres in the world.
The South began its rapid industrial development during the
last two decades of the period under review. Between 1880 and
1*900 the value of manufactured products increased in the South
about 3 1 times, while the national average increase was less
than times.
Even more rapid than the development of manufactures was
that of transportation. In 1869 the ^ rst transcontinental railroad
route was finished; between i860 and 1870 the total railroad
mileage, in spite of the hiatus of the war years, increased by
almost 80 per cent. Again, in 1880, 80 per cent more railroad
mileage was available; within the next ten years this rate of
progress was maintained, and, though the crisis of 1893 severely
checked railroad development, by 1900 the total mileage
amounted to almost 200,000 and the people of the United States
were better served with railroads than any other industrialized
country.
With this growth of the mileage the number of large railroad
companies grew too. In 1867 there was only one railroad com¬
pany which controlled over 1,000 miles—less than seven per cent
of the total mileage. In 1900 the number of railroads having a
mileage exceeding 1,000 had increased to 48, and their control
extended over nearly two-thirds of the total mileage. Already, by
1880, the great trunk lines had been formed which we have
to-day. *
Not quite so rapid was the development of waterborne com¬
munications. But this was chiefly due to the rapid falling-off of
foreign shipping. Between i860 and 1900 the total tonnage
engaged in foreign trade declined from about 2£ million tons to
less than 1 million tons. But at the same time the coastal trade,
practically a monopoly for United States shipping lines, increased,
after a period of stagnation from i860 to 1880, from <z\ million
tons to about 5 million tons in 1900. The use of canals and
* At the end of the century about two-fifths of the railroad mileage was
controlled directly or indirectly by Morgan.
74 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
rivers as means of transportation declined both relatively and
absolutely during the period under review.
Mining developed more rapidly than all other industries.
Thus, between i860 and 1880 alone, the capital invested in
mining increased by more than twenty times, while the total
value of the output increased from 90 to 250 million dollars.
Again, twenty years later, the total value of mining production
exceeded the gigantic sum of 1,000,000,000 dollars.
Thus, the United States having been, almost from the very
beginning of its existence as an independent country, the greatest
agricultural power in the world, and having also reached first
place as a manufacturing power, had also attained first place as
a mining country before the nineteenth century came to a close.
The development of industry between i860 and 1900 presents
the picture of a strong and vigorously growing organism, an
organism which from time to time is overcome by severe and
sometimes lengthy crises, but which is strong enough to recover
quickly from them, and to begin anew with fresh endowments of
strength and power.
The production of wealth, of necessities, luxuries—goods and
services of every kind—increased rapidly. The dollar millionaire
represented success—but he was by no means unique. Thousands
had far more money than they could ever hope to spend. Hun¬
dreds of thousands could live very comfortably on the income
they received.
But how did the working class fare in these ripe years of
American capitalism? Did their lot improve? Did their standard
of living attain a higher level?
B. The Labour Force
For the period from i860 to the end of the nineteenth century
we have at our disposal considerably more evidence on the
development of labour conditions than for the preceding de¬
cades. But at the same time, the methods of exploitation became
so much more complex that even a vastly superior collection of
facts does not mean that we can get much closer to an accurate
statistical description of what occurred than we were able to
do in dealing with earlier periods. Yet, though handicapped at
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 75
least as much as before, we shall be able to arrive at some reliable
conclusions as to the development of labour conditions also for
this period.
During the period from i860 to 1900 the industrial section of
the population grew so much more rapidly than the rest, that by
1870 it was already in excess of that employed in agriculture.
The greatest section of the industrial population was made up of
workers employed in manufacturing industries, the total number
of whom developed as follows (according to the census):
i860 1,300,000 1890 4,250,000
1870 2,050,000 1900 5,300,000
1880 2,750,000
Within forty years the number of workers employed in manu¬
facturing industries had increased four times—the same rate of
increase that we observe in the previous four decades from 1820
to i860.
The total number of industrial workers in 1900 was over
millions, about two-thirds of whom were employed in manu¬
facture, about 1 million in building and general construction
work, considerably more than 1 million in transportation, and
more than | million in mining.
Of the total number of more than 5 million workers em¬
ployed in manufacturing industries almost 1 • 7 million were
females of 10 years of age and over. After i860 the percentage
distribution of men', women and children in manufacturing
industries was as follows :
MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Men 16 years
Women 16 years
Children urn
Tear
and over
and over
16 years
Per cent
Per cent
Per cent
i860
79*3
20-7
*
1870
78-6
15*8
5*6
1880
73‘9
19*4
6-7
1890
78-3
18*9
2'8
1900
77’4
i 9‘4
3*2
The figures are not very conclusive. One gets the impression
that the only group which shows any real change is the children’s
group. But it is doubtful whether the relative decline in the
employment of children which the above figures show really
* Not reported separately.
76 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
took place; although there probably was a small relative
decline. The rapid fall in the percentage of children employed
can be explained by two facts: the rapidly growing number of
sweat shops absorbed an increasing number of children, very few
of whom were reported as working; and the phenomenal in¬
crease in industrial immigration tended to reduce the percentage
of children within the industrial population.
But to say that the figures are not very conclusive already
shows that some important change has taken place; for, during
the first period under review, at least, and during part of the
second period the figures—had there been any—would have
been very conclusive, showing a decisive increase in the employ¬
ment of women and children.
While the number of women workers in manufacturing indus¬
tries has changed little in relation to that of men, the percentage
of women employed in other industrial occupations has increased
rapidly. The number of women employed as clerks, saleswomen,
stenographers, typists, bookkeepers, cashiers and accountants
increased, between i860 and 1900, about a hundred times to
almost 400,000.
Although the percentage of women employed in manufac¬
turing industries was about the same in i860 as in 1900, the
distribution of women in the individual manufacturing indus¬
tries changed appreciably. *
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN EMPLOYED
Industry
i860
1900
Textile industries
53*4
40*6
Clothing industries
45 *o
55*9
Food and kindred products
4*0
20*8
Liquors and Beverages
Tobacco and Cigars
°*3
1 *7
13-9
37*5
Paper and Printing
Iron and Steel and their products
27-3
24-8
1 • 6
i *9
Lumber and its manufactures
2*5
2*5
Chemicals and allied products
4*7
14-1
Clay, Glass and Stone Products
Metals and metal products other than
i *7
3*8
iron and steel .. .. '
5*3
13-7
Vehicles for Land Transportation
o *4
o -7
Other manufacturing industries
5*2
5*2
* Cf. Senate Documents , 61st Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 94, Washington,
t9to.
THE ripe YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO I9OO 77
In almost all industrial groups the employment of women
increased relatively and absolutely—with two important excep¬
tions : textiles and paper and printing. But if we look the branches
of the -textile industry over we find that in most of them the per¬
centage of women did increase—with one important exception,
namely the cotton goods industry, where there was a relatively
very sharp drop in the percentage of women employed. If we
investigate the reasons for this we arrive at the following signi¬
ficant conclusions:
During the period under review, a considerable development
in cotton manufacture took place in the South. The South, until
then predominantly agricultural, offered the employers the
opportunity of getting workers even cheaper than in the North.
Wages, in fact, were so low that, in the beginning at least, it did
not make much difference whether one employed men or
women. We find, therefore, in the South a rapid increase in the
employment of men in cotton manufacture, thus (since the '
Southern industry grew rapidly) influencing the national aver¬
ages for men and women employed in this branch. In this way,
the decline in the percentage of women in the textile industries
does not really indicate a departure from the employers’ method
of increasing, as far as possible, the percentage of relatively low
paid workers (women and children), which we observed during
the preceding decades; but what happened was simply that the
employers found another category of cheap workers: Southern
men.
Thus, with the exception of the employment of children which
probably did not increase relatively but may possibly have even
declined, we find no real change as regards the employment
policy. For if Southern men now began to be recruited, partly
to replace women, this was because of the low pay they would
receive. The importance of the immigrant workers in this con¬
nection will be discussed in subsequent pages.
* C. Wages and Purchasing Power
Thanks to a number of outstanding investigations it is possible
to arrive at some really conclusive data concerning wages. The
United States Government has published two reports on wages
78 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
which have never been equalled*in any country: the famous
Aldrich Report, and the less famous but, in my opinion, even
more important collection of data relating to labour conditions,
assembled by J. D. Weeks and published in Vol. XX of the
ioth Census Report . Both of these reports have been worked
through by Professor Wesley C. Mitchell who, in his study on
Gold, Prices and Wages under the Greenback Standard computed
most useful wage indices from the material presented in the
two* “raw material” studies mentioned. In addition, we have
at our disposal the wage collection of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics which we have used for the * previous period under
review, and for the final years—that is for the nineties—we can
take advantage of the fine collection of wages data, full of inter¬
esting computations, which Professor Paul H. Douglas has
published under the title Real Wages in the United States , i8go-
1926. None of these studies gives a complete survey, and we have
usually to combine several already mixed series of wage data in
order to arrive at a final average—but this does not invalidate
the results of our investigation or even seriously affect the figures
which indeed are of such quality that they may be regarded as
probable also so far as the year-to-year fluctuations of wages
are concerned, with the possible exception of the figures for
mining.
At the same time, fortunately, we are able to work with an
index of genuine retail prices, using for the years i860 to 1880
the index constructed by Mitchell in his above-mentioned book,
for the years 1880 to 1890 that constructed by Carl Snyder and
published in his book on Business Cycles and Business Measurements ,
and for 1890 to 1897 we used the index computed by Paul
Douglas, to be found in his book already mentioned.
The index of wages for the most important industrial groups
runs as follows: *
* In computing the different wage series, I proceeded as follows:
Transportation: 1860-1890 wage data from the History of Wages in the United
States from Colonial Times to 1928. Wages of brakemen, railroad, Massachusetts;
wages of conductors, passengers, railroad, 1860-1870 Massachusetts, 1870-1890
Massachusetts and Illinois; wages of conductors, freight, railroad, Massa¬
chusetts; wages of engineers, locomotive, railroad, 1860-1870 Massachusetts,
1870-1890 Massachusetts and Pennsylvania; wages of firemen, locomotive,
1860-1870 Massachusetts, 1870-1885 Illinois and Pennsylvania, 1885-1890
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO I90O 79
INDEX OF MONEY WAGES FOR FULLY EMPLOYED WORKERS
PER DAY OR WEEK
{i860 — 100)
Transpor¬
Manufac¬
All
Year
tation
Mining
Building
Labourers
turing
Industry
i860
100
100
too
100
100
100
1861
103
86
101
9 i
100
9 ^
1862
103
100
103
9 i
100
99
1863
107
143
112
103
1 13
112
1864
107
222
131
U 5
125
127
1865
138
151
144
139
139
140
1866
136
172
159
M 3
150
150
1867
146
154
175
137
150
151
1868
145
216
179
i 39
150
155
1869
149
297
184
142
150
161
1870
147
223
183
Mi
155
159
1871
' H 7
202
182
M 5
152
157
1872
149
194
181
139
157
158
‘873
150
288
181
M 3
156
163
1874
140
H 7
166
i 37
150
M 9
1875
142
246
160
136
M 5
150
1876
138
209
151
130
140
M 3
1877
139
x 74
140
123
!33
l 35
1878
135
164
135
114
M 3
131
1879
134
161
137
113
130
130
1880
147
178
142
113
138
137
Pennsylvania. Unweighted average of states within each occupation; un¬
weighted average of occupations. 1890-1897 data from Douglas, p. 168.
Mining: 1860-1890 wage data from the History of Wages in the United States
from Colonial Times to 1928. Wages of coal miners in Pennsylvania. 1890-1897
data from Douglas, p. 143.
Building: 1860-1890 wage data from the History of * Wages. Wages of brick¬
layers in New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania; wages of carpenters
and joiners in the same states; wages of masons in Connecticut, Massachusetts
and New York; wages of painters in Maryland, Massachusetts and New York;
wages of hod carriers in Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania. Un¬
weighted average of states within each occupation; unweighted average of
occupations. 1890-1897 data from Douglas, p. 140.
Labourers: 1860-1890 data from the History of Wages. Unweighted average
of wage data for Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania. 1890-1897
data from Douglas, p. 182.
Manufacturing Industry: 1860-1880 data from Mitchell’s computation of
relative wages in all industries represented in Weeks’ Report, p. 177 of Mitchell’s
above quoted book, 1880-1890 average of data for the following industries:
woodworking, glass, printing and publishing, iron, steel and metals, and
textiles; weight for averaging: 1 to 1 to 2 to 7 to 7. Regarding the construction
of indices for these industries see below where I discuss the development of
wages in separate industries. 1890-1897 data from Douglas, p. 130.
All Industry: Average of Transport (weight 2), Mining (1), Building (3),
Labourers (4) and Manufacturing Industry (10).
80 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
INDEX OF MONEY WAGES FOR FULLY EMPLOYED WORKERS
PER DAY OR WEEK— continued
Tear
Transpor¬
tation
Mining
(i860 = 100)
Building
Labourers
Manufac¬
turing
All
Industry
1881
147
204
150
ii3
141
141
1882
143
168
162
124
146
x 45
1883
144
142
169
127
148
146
1884
136
122
166
145
149
148
1885
138
145
161
122
138
x 39
1886
147
128
167
122
*43
142
1887
140
155
151
123
x 54
146
1888
152
232
167
123
*54
153
1889
147
183
171
XI 9
149
1890
148
172
168
128
155
152
1891
H7
160
166
129
157
x 52
1892
148
172
168
129
158 .
x 54
1893
148
179
168
129
158
*54
1894
145
163
165
127
153
*49
1895
145
152
165
127
x 55
150
1896
145
142
165
127
158
150
1897
145
133
165
128
155
150
> Surveying the development of money wages during the period
under review we find at the beginning quite extraordinary
fluctuations caused by the Civil War and its consequences, ex¬
tending far into peace time. Between i860 and 1869 wages
increased by over 60 per cent; between 1869 and 1879 they
declined again by about 20 per cent; by 1888 they had again
increased by almost the same percentage.
In the individual branches of national industry, fluctuations
were even greater.-In building wages between i860 and 1869
were almost doubled and in mining they were not far from being
trebled.
These fluctuations indicate the serious problems the workers
had to tackle in maintaining or increasing their wage standard.
For, whatever the development of prices, money wage fluctua¬
tions always indicate either considerable political activity or else
the need for such activity on the part of the workers.
But even greater than the fluctuation in wages was that in the
cost of living. In the following table we give money wages, cost
of living and real wages for the period under review: *
* For the years from 1878 on, we are able to include agricultural wages.
I used the methods and data on which Paul H. Douglas, Real Wages in the
United States, 1890-1936 (p. 186), based his computations.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 81
MONEY WAGES, COST OF LIVING AND REAL WAGES, 1860-1897
(1900 = 100)
Money
Cost of
Real
Money
Cost of
Real
Tear
Wages
Living
Wages
Tear
Wages
Living
Wages
i860
63
76
83
1880
87
97
90
1861
62
79
78
1881
89
100
89
1862
63
89
7i
1882
92
102
90
1863
7i
106
67
1883
92
97
95
1864
80
129
62
1884
94
92
102
1865
89
136
65
1885
89
90
99
1866
95
134
7i
1886
9i
90
IOI
>867
96
128
75
1887
92
90
102
l868
98
127
77
1888
98
93
103
I869
102
122
84
1889
94
94
100
I87O
IOI
118
86
1890
98
98
'98
1871
99
113
88
1891
98
95
IOI
1872
100
112
90
1892
97
98
IOI
1873
103
110
94
1893
98
95
IOI
1874
94
108
87
1894
92
92
IOO
1875
95
104
9i
1895
94
92
102
I876
9i
102
89
1896
94
93
IOI
1877
85
100
85
1897
94
94
IOO
1878
83
97
86
1879
82
95
86
Between i860 and 1865 the cost of living increased by about
80 per cent, only to decline in the following years and to reach a
low level in 1879 about 30 per cent below that of 1865; from
1879 to 1897 the fluctuations were comparatively small.
A better survey of the development of real wages can be had
by giving averages by trade cycles :
AVERAGE REAL WAGE RATES FOR FULLY EMPLOYED WORKERS,
1791-1897
{1900 — 100)
Decades and
Decades and
Trade Cycles
Index
Trade Cycles
Index
1791-1800
54
1843-1848
83
1801-1810
61
1849-1858
79
1811-1820
61
1859-1867
72
1821-1826
89
1868-1878
87
1827-1834
72
1878-1885
92
1835-1842
72
1885-1897
IOI
During the period of more than one hundred years under
review, real wages fluctuated considerably. In the sixties real
wages moved on the level of the twenties and thirties; during the
VOL. II F
82
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
seventies they were barely higher than during the forties;
during the fifties and sixties real wages had a pronounced down¬
ward trend; and during the last third of the century real wages
increased steadily and not inconsiderably.
On the whole, real wages during the century under review
had a tendency to increase. Compressing the above averages into
new averages, each new average comprising three decades or
trade cycles, we arrive at the following figures for real wages:
1791-1820 59 1843-1867 78
1821-1842 71 1868-1897 93
But this increase does not mean that the conditions of the
workers improved continuously; for as we have emphasized
quite often: labour conditions are determined by quite a number
of other factors in addition to real wages.
We have seen above that the movement of money wages, and
therefore also of real wages was distributed unequally among the
different branches of industry. Let us study this development
more carefully by looking at the following table which gives
average real wages per day or per week in the form of trade cycle
averages for individual branches of industry:
REAL WAGES BY INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES, 1860-1897
(i860 — 100)
Tears
Transport
Mining
Building
Manufacturing
1859-1867
83
97
89
85
1868-1878
99
147
114
IOI
1878-1885
111
127
120
no
1885-1897
"9
133
134
124
We see that the development varied considerably in different
branches of industry. The largest increase of the real wage level
since i860 took place in the building industry, followed by
mining. Both industries were not only paying at the end of the
period relatively higher real wages than the other two branches,
but even during the sixties the workers in these two industries
were already receiving larger wage increases than those in
manufacturing and transport. Both industries are, of course, of
special importance in building up an industrial system, and it is
not astonishing that, during a period of rapid growth of industry
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 83
as a whole, these two industries should be the best organized in
trade unions and that increases in real wages should be relatively
higher.
If we divide the workers employed in industry in two sections,
of which the one, while considerable in extent, is much smaller
than the other: that is, into the aristocracy of skilled, relatively
better-paid workers, and the fnass of unskilled, semi-skilled,
worst-paid workers, we arrive, for the period since 1868, at the
following table: *
MONEY WAGES OF THE LABOUR ARISTOCRACY
AND THE MASS OF THE WORKERS
(igoo = 100)
Index for
Index for
Index for
Index for
Year
Aristocracy
Mass
Year
Aristocracy
Mass
1868
118
112
1883
97
93
1869
124
”5
1884
97
93
1870
120
113
1885
97
93
1871
1 17
1 15
1886
97
95
1872
118
116
1887
97
95
>873
118
112
1888
99
95
1874
115
107
1889
99
95
1875
108
100
1890
100
98
1876
103
95
1891
99
97
1877
93
88
1892
100
97
1878
90
88
1893
100
96
1879
92
85
1894
98
90
1880
92
86
1895
97
92
1881
95
9 °
1896
96
93
1882
97
93
1897
98
‘ 93
Combined into trade-cycle averages the figures look as follows:
MONEY WAGES OF THE LABOUR ARISTOCRACY
AND THE MASS OF THE WORKERS, TRADE-CYCLE AVERAGES
(igoo = 100)
Years
Aristocracy
Mass
1868-1878
ni
106
1878-1885
95
90
1885-1897
98
94
* These figures are not strictly comparable with those quoted above. They
include, for instance, estimates of wages of farm labour between 1868 to 1878,
and they are based on a smaller set of wage data. They are quoted from
Jurgen Kuczynski , Die Entwicklung der Lage der Arbeiterschaft in Europa und
Amerika, 1870-1033, where the methods of computation arc explained in detail.
84 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
These figures reveal a very important fact: comparing the
development of wages of the labour aristocracy and the great
mass of the workers, we find that money wages, and therefore
also real wages, changed by about the same percentage for both
categories from 1868-1878 to 1878-1885: and the same holds
true for the movement in the following cycle.
While in the early years of* American industrial capitalism
there was little distinction between unskilled and skilled labour—
or, rather almost all industrial work was skilled—and wage
differences between industries were small, in the course of the
nineteenth century definite wage differentiation between skilled
and unskilled workers, and between various industries, became
established. The textile industry became a low paying industry
and the iron and steel industry became a comparatively better
paying one. In the last third of the nineteenth century the differ¬
entiation did not become rigid, but as far as the division into the
mass of the workers and the aristocracy of labour was concerned,
the differences remained on the average unchanged.
In observing above the relative development of wages in
different branches of industry we have treated manufacturing as
one big industry. In the following table we investigate the
development of money wages in a number of branches of the
manufacturing industry. *
* In computing the above indices I used the following sources:
Textiles: 1860-1880 an unweighted combination of the indices for cotton
and woollen textiles constructed by Mitchell on the basis of the data collected
by Weeks (see p. 179 of Mitchell’s book). 1880-1890 based on data contained
in the above mentioned History of Wages; wages of doffers, cotton goods,
Massachusetts (males and females) and New York (females); wages of spinners,
cotton goods, Massachusetts (males and females) and New York (males and
females); wages of weavers, cotton goods, see spinners; wages of winders, silk
goods, Connecticut (females), Massachusetts (females); wages of dressers,
woollen and worsted goods, Massachusetts (males and females), Rhode Island
(males). Unweighted average of states and sexes within each occupation.
Unweighted average of occupations. 1890-1897 data taken from Douglas,
p. 126.
Iron and Steel and Metals: 1860-1880 data taken from Mitchell, p. 179.
1880-1890 based on data contained in the above mentioned History of
Wages; wages of puddlers, puddling mills, Ohio and Pennsylvania; wages
of furnace keepers, pig-iron blast furnaces, Pennsylvania; wages of fillers, pig-
iron blast furnaces, Pennsylvania and Ohio. Unweighted average of states
within each occupation; Unweighted average of occupations. Wages of black¬
smiths, Ohio and Pennsylvania; wages of machinists, Ohio and Pennsylvania;
wages of millwrights. New York and Pennsylvania; wages of moulders, iron,
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 85
INDICES OF DAILY OR WEEKLY FULL TIME WAGES IN SELECTED
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1860-1897
(i860 — 100)
Iron and Steel
Printing and
Wood¬
Tear
Textiles
and Metals
Publishing
working
Glass
i860
100
100
100
100
100
1861
100
100
92
100
100
1862
100
100
98
100
100
1863
105
IQO
98
111
100
1864
**7
138
106
1 17
123
1865
136
H 7
*13
1T 7
129
1866
149
150
118
120
146
1867
152
150
137
125
150
1868
150
150
151
125
143
1869
* 5 *
150
152
125
154
1870
154
157
152
125
154
1871
154
150
152
125
*54
1872
155
157
159
* 25
156
>873
155
157
145
125
*55
1874
* 5 *
143
150
120
* 5 *
1875
150
140
* 5 *
1 17
150
1876
H 5
129
148
1 17
150
1877
139
125
i 45
113
150
1878
135
125
138
**3
*39
>879
132
125
* 3 *
1 17
139
1880
139
133
136
120
150
1881
140
138
139
124
167
1882
H 7
142
138
128
161
1883
H 9
144
155
126
*43
1884
153
142
148
128
*55
1885
132
142
146
128
*47
1886
147
136
141
127
146
1887
150
H 5
146
127
*73
1888
156
148
148
133
176
1889
156
146
148
127
146
1890
165
150
145
126
141
1891
163
147
144
129
*35
1892
165
148
i 45
129
146
1893
171
150
144
12^
138
1894
155
138
141
123
138
1895
157
141
141
123
*35
1896
163
142
144
123
135
1897
160
140
144
123
*34
Illinois and Pennsylvania. Unweighted average of states within each occupa¬
tion. Unweighted average of occupations. Unweighted average of the above
index for iron and steel and the index for metal trades. 1890-1897 data fronp.
Douglas, p. 119 and p. 126 (unweighted average).
Printing and Publishing: 1860-1890 based on data contained in the above-
86
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
With the exception of woodworking we find that movements in
wages in the various manufacturing industries under review have
not varied very greatly. At the end of the sixties wages were
between 50 and 54 per cent higher than in i860; at the end of
the seventies they were between 25 and 39 per cent higher; at
the end of the eighties they were between 46 and 56 per cent
higher; and in 1897 they were between 34 and 60 per cent
higher. The larger spread at the end of the period was due to a
sudden spurt in textile wages, while the spread at the end of the
seventies was due to a temporary relative stability of the wages
of glass workers. On the whole, one can say that the relations
between the individual manufacturing industries as regards
wage differences changed but little.
One last survey of wages from yet another angle should be
made: how did comparative wages of men and women develop?
Did the men gain on the women, as they did during the earlier
period of American capitalism, or did they lose? Or did the
relation remain the same?
Mitchell gives a series of tables indicating the development
during the years i860 to 1880. There are two tables, both of
great interest. One indicates the relative development of the
wages of male and female workers in identical industries (see
p. 122), and the other the relative development of wages for
workers who received less than $1.00 in January i860 (p. 166);
the data are given for January and July of each year; we have
combined them in the following table into one figure. The
mentioned History of Wages ; wages of press feeders, book and job, New York
and Pennsylvania; wages of compositors, New York and Pennsylvania. Un¬
weighted average of states within each occupation; unweighted average of
occupations. 1890-1897 data from Douglas, p. 119.
Woodworking: 1860-1880 data taken from Mitchell, p. 179. 1880-1890
based on data contained in the above-mentioned History of Wages; wages of
cabinet-makers, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania; wages of woodworkers in
Massachusetts. Unweighted average of states within each occupation; un¬
weighted average of occupations. 1890-1897 data from the same source;
wages of cabinet-makers in Cincinnati, Philadelphia and San Francisco;
wages of woodworkers in Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia. Unweighted
average of cities within each occupation; unweighted average of occupations.
Glass: 1860-1880 data taken from Mitchell, p. 179. 1880-1890 based on
data contained in the above-mentioned History of Wages; wages of glass-
blowers, bottles, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Unweighted average. 1890-
1897, same source; wages of blowers (green glass) in the North Atlantic states.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 87
figures for 1880-1897 are not as comprehensive as those for the
preceding decades. *
The tables show quite clearly that during the period under
review the wages of women tended to fall less and to increase
more than the wages of men. The relative position of women in
industry improved in the period under review—and this was not
WAGES OF MALE AND FEMALE WORKERS, 1860-1880
( January , i860 — 100)
Wages in Industries Em - Wages of Male and Female
ploying Male and Female Workers receiving less than
Tear
Workers
%i.oo per Day
Males
Females
Males
Females
i860
100
IOI
100
IOI
1861
100
104
IOI
104
1862
IOI
106
103
106
1863
110
109
116
no
1864
125
116
129
116
1865
144
i 35
151
137
1866
i 59
160
165
163
1867
161
167
169
170
1868
161
165
169
169
1869
162
170
182
174
1870
162
169
183
174
1871
167
187
184
193
1872
171
192
185
200
1873
169
192
184
199
1874
162
i 79
173
185
1875
155
167
161
171
1876
i 49
163
153
166
1877
142
157
H 3
158
1878
142
163
143
163
1879
137
160
137
162
1880
138
165
139
166
* The following occupations and industries are covered by the data for
1880 to 1897—all data taken from the above-mentioned History of Wages:
doffers, cotton goods, 1880-1890, Massachusetts; wages of spinners, cotton
goods, 1880-1895, Massachusetts; wages of weavers, cotton goods, 1880-1895,
Massachusetts; weavers, cotton goods, 1890—1897, Massachusetts and Nmv
Hampshire; knitters, hosiery and underwear, 1890-1897, North Atlantic;
wages of weavers, silk, 1890-1897, United States; wages of dressers, woollen
and worsted goods, 1880-1887, Massachusetts; wages of spinners, mule,
woollen goods, 1880-1890, Connecticut and Massachusetts; 1890-1897, Maine
and Massachusetts.
I computed an unweighted average of states and regions within each
occupation, and an unweighted average of occupations.
88 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
WAGES OF MALE AND FEMALE WORKERS IN TEXTILE
INDUSTRIES
{i860 = 100)
Tear
Male Workers
Female Workers
1880
100
100
1881
100
97
1882
103
102
1883
108
112
1884
103
110
1885
109
107
1886
108
119
1887
105
121
1888
105
119
1889
“3
J 33
1890
115
i 33
1891
118
132
1892
115
135
1893
124
143
1894
116
H 7
1895
114
i 37
1896
115
i 43
1897
109
i 37
due solely to the fact that women entered into relatively higher
paid occupations. *
If we recall that as far as the division of wages into those of the
mass of workers and the labour aristocracy was concerned no
relative improvement of the wages of the latter could be ob¬
served, we are justified in drawing the conclusion that the
peculiar position which the “privileged” workers had gained
during the first seventy years of industrial capitalism was not
further accentuated during the last forty years of the nineteenth
century; on the contrary, while from 1790 to 1860 the wages of
skilled workers in relation to unskilled workers, and of male
workers in relation to female workers, improved, during the last
forty years this process not only ceased but a narrowing of the
gap probably took place between these groups of workers.
D. Hours of Work and Unemployment
Our information about the development of the hours worked
per day or per week by fully employed workers is deplorably bad.
Some interesting data (based on a very small sample) are in-
* Unfortunately no data on sweat shops can be included in our computa¬
tions and conclusions; otherwise the relative gain of women’s wages upon
those of men would probably be considerably smaller.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO I9OO 89
eluded in the above quoted report by Weeks on labour condi-
tions :
Establish¬
Working 8 hours and
Working 11 hours
Working 13 hours
ments
less than 11
and less than 13
and less than 14
Tears
Reporting
Number
Per cent
Number
Per cent
Number Per cent
i860
350
235
67-1
107
30-6
8 2*3
1865
496
344
69-4
141
28-6
II 2*0
1870
744
542
72-9
185
24*9
17 2*2
1875
930
687
73‘9
224
24*1
19 2-0
1880
L °39
763
73‘5
252
24*2
24 2*3
As compared with the period from 1840 to i860 progress in
the shortening of the working week has quickened, though the
percentage of establishments working 13 hours and longer was,
in fact, the same in 1880 as in i860. While it would be wrong to
base our conclusions exclusively on this table, all the other
scattered evidence available supports the data given in it. The
above-mentioned Aldrich report, for example, computes the
decline in the number of hours worked between 1845-1849 and
1 855- 1 859 as 3*2 per cent; during the following decade the
decline is computed to be 2*9 per cent, and from 1865-1869 to
1875- 1 879 3*7 per cent.
From the tables in the often cited History of Wages we gather
that at least in the following trades the normal number of hours
per week was 72 or more in the beginning of the eighties:
TRADES IN WHICH 72 OR MORE HOURS WERE WORKED PER
NORMAL WORKING WEEK IN THE BEGINNING
OF THE EIGHTIES
Trades and Occupations States Hours
Bakers New York 112
Illinois 87
Connecticut 84
New Jersey 80
Ohio 72
Carpenters and Joiners New Hampshire, S. Carolina 72
Engineers, stationary Georgia, North Carolina, Rhode
Island 72
Firemen, stationary New Jersey, North Carolina,
Rhode Island 72
Plasterers North Carolina 72
Dressmakers New Jersey 93
Sewing-machine operators North Carolina 72
Catchers, bar mills New Jersey 72
Rollers, bar mills New Jersey 72
Roughers, bar mills New Jersey 72
Puddlers, puddling mills Tennessee 75
go A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
TRADES IN WHICH 72 OR MORE HOURS WERE WORKED PER
NORMAL WORKING WEEK IN THE BEGINNING
OF THE EIGHTIES —continued
Trades and Occupations
States Hours
Puddlers, puddling mills
New Jersey
72
Furnace Keepers, pig-iron blast fur¬
Maryland, New York, Pennsyl¬
naces
vania, Tennessee, Virginia
84
New Jersey
80
Ohio
78
Moulders, Iron
Compositors
New Hampshire
72
Michigan
72
Doffers, cotton goods
South Carolina
76
Georgia
72
Drawers-in, cotton goods
Georgia, North Carolina, South
Carolina
72
Dyers, cotton goods
Rhode Island
72
Loom fixers, cotton goods
Georgia
72
Speeder tenders, cotton goods
Georgia, South Carolina
72
Spinners, cotton goods
North Carolina, S. Carolina
72
Weavers, cotton goods
Georgia, North Carolina, South
Carolina
72
Dressers, woollen and worsted
Rhode Island
72
Spinners, woollen and worsted
Rhode Island
72
Weavers, woollen and worsted
Connecticut, Rhode Island
72
Brakemen, railroad
New Jersey
81
Ohio
75
Kansas
74
Michigan, New York, Tennessee
72
Fillers, pig-iron blast furnaces
Maryland, New Jersey, Penn¬
sylvania, Virginia
84
Ohio
81
Shoemakers
Missouri
78
Pennsylvania, Illinois
72
Conductors, street railway
Kansas
102
Pennsylvania
96
Missouri
93
Illinois
88
New Jersey
84
Ohio
81
California
78
Iowa
74
Conductors, railroad
New Jersey, California
84
Engineers, locomotive
New Jersey
81
Pennsylvania
79
New Jersey
77
Kansas
76
Firemen, locomotive
Kansas
75
Teamsters
California, Louisiana, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island,
South Carolina
72
Coopers
New York
72
Sawyers, lumber
Pennsylvania
72
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO I90O 91
From the above, very incomplete, table it is obvious that there
were many industries and occupations in which the twelve-hour
day was still quite usual, and even a normal fourteen hour day
week can be found not infrequently.
Ten years later the situation seemed to be somewhat improved.
It is true Missouri still had an 84-hour week for bakers, and in
all the South Central States the average working week for them
was 74*3 hours; in Maine there was still a 72-hour week for
electricians; for stationary firemen, Wisconsin still had the 14-
hour day; dressmakers still worked 70 hours in Illinois; sewing-
machine operators 84 hours in Missouri; catchers in the bar
mills still worked a 72-hour week in the whole North Central
region, and so did bar mill rollers and roughers; for keepers in
blast furnaces, the 84-hour week was customary in the whole of
the United States, and the same is true of top fillers and bottom
fillers in the blast furnaces; iron moulders worked 84 hours in
Alabama; and coal miners 72 in Virginia; pressmen worked 84
hours in North Carolina; speeder tenders in cotton goods worked
72 hours in North Carolina; railroad brakemen worked 79 hours
in Indiana; freight conductors, 84 hours in Maryland; loco¬
motive engineers, 81 hours in Michigan; locomotive firemen, 75
hours in Indiana and Colorado; teamsters, 72 hours in Cali¬
fornia and Louisiana; and coopers 72 hours in New York.*
And yet—Douglas is probably right in estimating the average
normal working week for 1890 at about 60 hours, for in a con¬
siderable number of industries the working day was less than 1 o
hours, and in a number of trades many workers had already
successfully fought, by 1890, for the 8-hour day.
After 1890, according to the estimates of Douglas, the normal
average working week developed as follows (p. 208):
STANDARD
HOURS PER WEEK
IN ALL
INDUSTRY
1890
58*4
1894
57*8
1891
58-2
1895
58-1
1892
58-2
1896
57*9
1893
58*2
*897
57*7
During the eight years reviewed in this table the normal
working week has been shortened by about J of an hour to
* The Aldrich report computes a decline of the average working week of
2-7 per cent between 1880 and 1890.
92 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
57*7 hours which about corresponds to a io-hour day with a
short Saturday afternoon.
For the chief industries Douglas gives the following hours per
week:
AVERAGE NORMAL WORKING WEEK FOR CHIEF
INDUSTRIAL GROUPS
Tear
Manufacturing
Industries
Building*
Coal Mining
Standard Hours
Unskilled
Labour
1890
600
51*3
60 -o
59*7
1891
59*7
51-0
60-o
59*7
1892
59-8
50*6
60-o
59*7
1893
59*7
50*4
60 -o
59*7
1894
59 * 1
50-5
60 -o
59*6
1895
59*5
50-3
60 *o
59*7
1896
59*2
50* 1
60 -o
59*8
1897
59 *i
49*8
6o*o
59*3
Organized workers.
The differences—with the exception of the organized building
workers—are not very great; and one is justified in making the
generalization that at the end of the last century the great mass
of the workers had gained the io-hour day—which does not
exclude the fact that hundreds of thousands still worked twelve
hours per day, and quite a number only eight hours.
An interesting table, comparing wages in unionized and non-
unionized manufacturing industries has been computed by Millis
and Montgomery:*
STANDARD HOURS OF WORK PER WEEK IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES
Tear
Unionized
Non-Unionized
1890
54*4
62-2
•895
53*5
62-3
1900
53 *o
62-1
It is obvious how much shorter the working day was in indus¬
tries with a high degree of trade-union organization than in those
where trade unionism was weak.
* * *
The data concerning the number of hours worked refer only
to the so-called normal or standard working week. THfey exclude
overtime and they do not include short-time, which at that period
♦ Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, Labor's Progress and Some
Basic Labor Problems , The Economics of Labor , vol. i, p. 470.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 93
was much less widespread than since the last war. Furthermore,
they give no indication of the regularity of employment.
Though not at all comprehensive, the oft-quoted study by
Weeks also includes some data on the security of employment.
The Himrod Furnace Company, Youngstown, Ohio (Bitu¬
minous), for instance, worked as follows:
AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS COMPANY WORKED
DURING
YEAR
Year
Months
Year
Months
Year
Months
Year
Months
i860
. 9
1866
9
1871
7
1876
10 ‘
1861
8
1867
9
1872
7
1877
7
1862
12
1868
8
1873
6
1878
12
1863
8
1869
9
1874
12
1879
8
1864
1865
10
6
1870
10
1875
8
1880
10
In 21 years the works were open throughout the whole year
only three times; twice they worked only half a year, and the
average working time per year was about 9 months—which
usually meant 25 per cent unemployment per year.
Such an average is by no means low. For instance, Gridley and
Son, Amenia, New York, charcoal iron blast furnace, report the
following average periods in operation per year :
1857-1860 two months 20 days 1861-1865 three months 20 days
1866-1870 six months 1871-1875 nine months 10 days
1876-1879 three and a half months 1880 seven months 4 days
Considerably better employment is reported from the T. K.
Earle Manufacturing Company, Worcester, Massachusetts, pro¬
ducing machinery (average periods per year):
1861-1865 11 months 18 days 1866-1870 12 months
1871-1875 10 months 24 days 1876-1880 9 months
The Albany and Rensselaer Iron and Steel Company, Troy,
New York, on the other hand, reports on the average little more
than 9 months’ employment during each year for the period
from i860 to 1880.
An establishment producing woollen goods gives the follow¬
ing percentage of full-time employment for its weavers, 1874,
81 per cent; 1875, 88 per cent; 1876, 89 per cent; 1877,
74 per cent; 1878, 65 per cent; 1879, 87 per cent; and 1880,
97 per cent. Another textile establishment, producing cotton
94 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
goods in Connecticut, reports the number of days worked each
year as follows:
Year
Days
Year
Days
Year
Days
Year
Days
i860
292
1866
290
1871
303
1876
209
1861
165
1867
263
1872
307
1877
205
1862
195
1868
310
1873
261
1878
302
1863
76
1869
3°4
1874
265
1879
3 QI
1864
62
1870
298
1875
302
1880
304
1865 180
These few examples are sufficient to indicate that unemploy¬
ment was occasionally very high during the years i860 to 1880,
and that during some years, on the other hand, there may even
have been a labour shortage. And though there probably have
been quite a number of cases of very irregular employment,
there have been also many cases in which factories worked full
time almost without any abnormal stoppage for several years.
For the period between 1880 and 1889 our information on the
security of employment is even more meagre than for the pre¬
vious two decades, but subsequently a considerable number of
estimates and even actual census data on unemployment are
available. For the years 1889 to 1897 Douglas has made use of
all these data and constructed what to date are the best figures
of employment and unemployment for that time.
His final estimate of unemployment and employment and
labour supply in manufacturing industries and transport for the
years 1889 to 1897 is:
LABOUR SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT,
1889-1897
(In Thousands)
Year Labour Supply Employment Unemployment
Manu - Railroadsy Steam
Total
facturing
and Electric
Total
Total
Percentagi
1889
4,645
3,624
765
4,388
257
5*6
1890
4,797
3,748
805
4,553
244
5 * 1
1891
4,956
3,836
842
4,679
278
5*6
1892
5 , 1 *7
4,036
892
4,927
190
3*7
1893
5,267
3,887
876
4>763
505
9.6
1894
5,405
3,668
833
4,502
904
16*7
1895
5 , 54 *
4,022
863
4,885
657
u -9
1896
5,685
3,928
889
4,817
868
i 5‘3
1897
5 , 8 i 9
4,057
916
4,973
846
14*5
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 95
The highest number of unemployed in the industries mentioned
above is almost one million—and if we take into account the
industries not covered by this survey, we shall not be wrong in
assuming that the total number of unemployed workers in 1894
was not far from 1 £ millions. On the other hand, for 1892 Douglas
counts 190,000 unemployed, and including the industries ex¬
cluded from his survey the total would be about 250,000. Within
two years the total number of unemployed had increased six
times. But the number of * ‘really unemployed persons”—that is,
of workers not able to find a job—probably increased ten to
twenty times, for among the 250,000 unemployed in 1892 only a
few could really not find any work at all, the vast majority
having been unemployed only for a few days or a couple of
weeks, having left their former jobs to find better ones. In 1894,
however, most of the unemployed were trying desperately hard
to find work and not succeeding.
While therefore in some years the problem of unemployment
was of small importance, in others it loomed largely, and in¬
security of employment was great.
E. Productivity and Intensity of Work
During the first period reviewed, from 1791 to 1840, the
amount of work was increased chiefly by the primitive method
of prolonging the working day. During the second period, from
1840 to i860, this method was being gradually abandoned in
favour of increasing the intensity of work, of getting the worker
to produce more and more per hour. This latter method was
continued during (the third period, from i860 to 1900.
In Weeks’ report on labour conditions in manufacturing
industries, we find a pertinent remark by a machine-shop and
foundry-hand (p. 187) on the development of hours of labour,
wages and production:
“The hours of labor were 12 previously to 1845, when they
were reduced to i o without any reduction of wages, but with a
decrease in cost of production and an improvement in quality of
goods.”
Though it was by no means a general occurrence that the
96 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
hours per week were cut without any cut in wages, it was typical
of what happened that at the same time the production costs
declined and the quality of the goods was improved. For the
workers driven harder produced more per minute, so much so
indeed that the labour costs per piece declined rapidly; * and the
higher quality of the goods is probably due either to improved
machinery or to better organization of the production process,
or to more stringent measures being taken against the workers
for faults in production.
The more usual experience of the workers—an increase in the
intensity of work combined with a cut in wages—is described
“By a Lady Familiar with the Subject” in a study called Remarks
on Working Women , Their Condition , Wages , etc. etc. :f “Factory life
now is much harder on woman than it was twenty-five years ago;
instead of tending two looms as then, she is required to attend
six, while her wages are now so proportionally lowered, that a
week’s work now will not procure as much comfort as when she
only tended one loom.”
A more than usually accurate picture of the development of
productivity is presented by Weeks (p. 115) for an iron blast
furnace establishment in New York. See opposite page.
This table—which really ought to be famous in the study of
labour and industrial conditions but which is practically un¬
known, in spite of the great dearth of material on the subject of
productivity for so early a period—deserves the most careful
study. It is unfortunate that no data on hours of labour in this
establishment are known. But we can be safe in assuming that it
is extremely improbable that the number of hours was lengthened
in the course of time. We are, therefore, also safe in assuming
that, if the development of productivity is mispresented in this
table, it can only have increased more than the table indicates;
under no circumstances could it be less.
The table can be scrutinized from many angles. It may be
said, for instance, that during the period covered, productivity
was doubled. For in 1865 2 *4 men-days were necessary in order
* Technical progress also, of course, contributed materially to a decline in
labour costs. In fact, it was largely due to technical progress that the intensity
of work could be increased.
t Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor , Massachusetts, Boston, 1870,
p. 36a-
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 97
to produce one ton of pig iron, and only i -2 in 1878. It can also
be said that productivity has remained practically unchanged
sinc£ in 1861 i*6 days were necessary in order to produce one
ton of pig iron, and, in 1879, 1*5 days. Is the table, therefore,
inconclusive? Is it, therefore, justifiable to say that productivity
PRODUCTIVITY IN IRON BLAST FURNACES, 1860-1879
Number of Men-Days
Tons Pig Iron
Men-Days
Tear
Worked per Tear
Produced
per Ton
i860
22,399
11,989
1 '9
1861
18,554
11,403
1 -6
1862
19,986
10,730
i *9
1863
20,127
10,998
i-8
1864
25,469
13,839
i*8
1865
18,106
7,598
2*4
1866
23*205
11,123
2* I
1867
25,794
13,174
2*0
1868
25,353
13,281
1*9
1869
24,643
13,882
i-8
1870
*9,358
11,074
i *7
1871
17,984
10,724
i *7
1872
24,163
17,852
1 ’4
1873
24,537
15, 05 *
1 -6
1874
• 24,766
18,624
i *3
•875
24,936
18,827
i *3
1876
25,128
18,886
i *3
1877
23,893
18,640
i *3
1878
23,644
19,478
I *2
1879
16,311
10,715
i *5
on the whole did not change very much but fluctuated con¬
siderably?
There is no justification in drawing this conclusion because
then productivity would have to be regarded as an isolated
economic factor, and one would not take into account several
other elements strongly influencing the development of produc¬
tivity.
If we compare the column indicating the tons of pig iron
produced with the one indicating the men-days necessary to
produce one ton of pig iron we notice that, generally, whenever
production falls, productivity also declines. From i860 to 1869
there is one year when productivity declines rapidly and reaches
a record depth: 1865; and in the same year production also
vol. n. G
98 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
declines to a record depth. There is one year when productivity
reaches a record height: 1878; and in the same year production
also reaches a record height. From this we can draw the not
unfamiliar (though, of course, not always valid) conclusion that
—other conditions remaining unchanged—productivity in¬
creases with an increase in production and declines with a
decline in production. In spite of the disturbance of the develop¬
ment by variations in trade activity, it is still quite possible to
discern the trend of the whole development: productivity in the
period under review has increased considerably. The intensity of
work, of course, has not increased to the same extent. Although,
unfortunately, neither for this nor for any other period or coun¬
try, do there exist sufficient accurate data of a more general
character to show the exact increase in the intensity of work, one
is quite safe in assuming that, as usual, the increase in produc¬
tivity of work also brought an increase in the intensity of
work.
It is a matter for regret that I have been able to find for the
early part of the period under review only this one table giving
reliable productivity data for a series of years. Other examples of
the development must be taken from computations for two years
with a large gap in between them. They are quoted from a most
interesting study on Hand and Machine Labor published as the
13th Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor . In the following
table I give a number of identical commodities with the time of
production by hand and by machine. Hand production refers to
the earlier, and machine production to the more recent year.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that all these products
were hand produced formerly and that all were machine /pro¬
duced at the end of the century. It only indicates the rapid
progress which machine production has brought about. A
detailed description of each commodity is given in Vol. I, p. 24 f,
of the Report. In order to facilitate the identification of
each commodity I give in brackets its file number in the
Report.
The table shows clearly the rapid progress which the machine
has brought about. It shows how production has been accelerated
—sometimes twentyfold, while in other cases the machine has
only about doubled production.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO I9OO 99
TIME WORKED BY HAND AND BY MACHINE ON CERTAIN GOODS
Time Worked by Hand Time Worked by Machine
Commodity
Tear
Minutes
1,000
Tear
Minutes
1,000
Boots, 100 pairs (69)
Shoes, Women’s, 100 pairs (74)..
>859
86-2
1895
9*2
1858
61 -5
>895
4*8
Collars, 100 dozen (302)..
•855
81 *0
1895
”*5
Shirts, 12 dozen (312) ..
1853
86-3
1895
11 *3
Corn, 100 dozen cans (289)
Tobacco, chewing, 1,000 pounds
1865
6*5
1894
2*7
(610).
1855
18 • 3
1895
8*5
Soap, 25,000 pounds (588)
*839
25‘9
1897
1 *.3
Desks, 12 (330) ..
i860
73*4
1895
17*2
Tables, 12 (349).
i860
33-8
1894
5 *o
Doors, 50 (499).
>857
83-1
1895
30-6
Bolts, 500 (381).
1865
2-9
1895
0-7
Screws, 100 (577).
1862
o *5
1896
o-1
Posters, 1,000 (544)
Envelopes, 100,000 (275)
Loading timber, 5,000 feet (688)
1845
1-2
1897
O* I
1855
26- I
1896
1*9
i860
o -5
1896
o* 1
Unloading coal, 100 tons (670)..
>859
7.2
1896
o-6
For the manufacturing and mining industries as a whole we
are able again to compute trade-cycle averages. The quality of
the general productivity statistics is, for the period under review,
somewhat better than for the previous one; this is mainly due to
the better quality of jthe production index. *
PRODUCTIVITY IN MINING AND MANUFACTURING, 1827 to 1897
Trade Cycle
(1900 =
Index
100)
Trade Cycle
Index
1827-1834
15
1859-1867
4 i
1835-1842
22
1868-1878
58
1843-1848
34
1878-1885
72
1849-1858
37
1885-1897
86
The early period of industrial capitalism, comprising the years
up to the middle of the century, ends in stagnation, due mainly
to a decline of productivity in all those factories which have not
yet changed over to the new system of intensive exploitation. The
increase of productivity between 1849-58 and 1859-67 was
probably somewhat larger than appears from the above figures
* From 1859 to 1863 we used the sources mentioned in connection with
the index of productivity for the years 1827 to 1858; for the years 1859 to
1897 the McLpod, etc., production index, also mentioned in connection with
the productivity data for the previous period, was used; employment and
hours of work were based on the sources mentioned in connection with the
construction of the index for the years 1827 to 1858.
IOO
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
as I did not take into account the diminution of the labour force
through military events. Very probably the new increase of pro¬
ductivity which we observe for the rest of the century really
began already from the fifties to the sixties.
For the last few years of the century we are able to give de¬
tailed annual figures of the development of productivity as we
can take into account the development of unemployment. *
PRODUCTIVITY PER
WORKER IN
(1890 = IOO)
SELECTED
INDUSTRIES
Year
Manufacturing
Coal Mining
Railroads
Street Railways
1889
97
90
98
—
1890
100
IOO
IOO
IOO
1891
107
IOI
103
IOI
1892
102
106
104
IOO
1893
93
107
104
97
1894
98
109
104
98
1895
109
III
106
IOO
1896
102
112
108
102
1897
112
120
113
I06
The years for which these figures are available are very un¬
fortunately chosen since they give the impression that produc¬
tivity increased considerably less than it really did. Why? For
the simple reason that the increase of productivity which we
usually observe after a crisis and depression have passed, occurred
in the first few years after 1885. When in 1893 the crisis broke out,
productivity, as usual during the nineteenth century, began to
decline or remain stable and only at the end of the period, that
is, during the last stages of the depression, did it begin to in¬
crease again. But even so, the figures indicate clearly a rapid
increase in the productivity per worker. And if we realize that,
during the period under review, the number of hours worked
showed a tendency to decline, it will be all the more obvious that
productivity per worker and per hour worked really increased
very much.
In conclusion we can say that during the period under review
productivity showed a very considerable rise, especially produc¬
tivity per hour, and that part of this increase undoubtedly was
due to an increase in the intensity of work.
♦ The figures are based for manufacturing on the production index of
McLeod, etc., and the employment data computed by Douglas; for trans¬
portation on the data furnished by Douglas, and for coal mining on the
information contained in Bulletin 115 of the Bureau of Mines.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 101
F. “Colonial Labour” and Immigration—Child Labour.
Colonial labour is generally used to produce goods consider¬
ably more cheaply than they can be produced elsewhere. For
over half a century the United States has been using a great deal
of this “colonial labour,” though it rules over but few territories
outside the U.S.A. American capitalism came, in the course of
time, to exploit the backward population of many Central and
South-American countries, and the peoples of Cuba, Haiti,
Liberia and the Philippines. It shares to a certain extent in the
exploitation of other colonial empires, and chiefly, and finally,
some of the home population of the United States is employed
under colonial labour conditions, especially the negro population.
CAPITAL INVESTED, VALUE OF OUTPUT AND NUMBER OF
WAGE EARNERS BY GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS, 1850-1900
Item
Year
New
England
Middle
States
Southern
States
Central
States
Western
States
Pacific
States
Capital
1850
166
236
67
63
0
2
(million)
i860
257
435
116
173
4
25
dollars)
1870
490
906
139
5 i 7
21
46
1880
624
1,176
i ,*75
193
700
28
71
1890
2,554
5 ”
L 940
130
213
1900
L 594
3,952
954
2,750
290
291
Output
1850
283
473
101
146
1
15
(million
i860
4^9
802
193
342
7
73
dollars)
1870
1,109
1,769
278
1,055
45
76
1880
1,106
2,219
389
L 503
73
130
1890
L 499
3,647
707
2,945
278
297
1900
1,876
4,958
1,184
4,001
555
436
Wage
1850
313
421
110
hi
0
4
Earners
i860
392
546
132
187
4
5 i
(1,000)
1870
527
806
186
488
17
29
1880
647
i,i 39
223
646
28
48
1890
821
I , 6 35
1,980
412
1,198
78
108
1900
948
65 6
L 472
117
142
All those who have visited a typical Southern factory village
can vouch for this. Here, wages are lower and hours longer than
in any other part of the country. Here, the whole family of the
worker is dependent upon the employer; sometimes they are
not even allowed to move away from the village; if they do they
will be blacklisted and therefore can obtain work nowhere else.
They are obliged to send their children to the factory otherwise
102
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
they will be condemned to economic death through unemploy¬
ment. If they are allowed to vote at all, they have to vote as the
employers want them to. Every effort is made to keep them as
uneducated as possible. Until a short time ago, they were effec-'
tively prevented from forming or joining labour unions.
During the second half of the period under review in this
chapter the industrialization of the South—that is, the exploita¬
tion of “colonial labour” within the United States in industrial
establishments—began on a substantial scale.
The table on p. 101 give the chief census data concerning the
distribution of manufacturing industries in the various geo¬
graphical divisions.
If we arrange the different geographical regions according to
the percentage of increase in capital, value of output and number
of wage earners, during the period under review, we get the
following table:
GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS ARRANGED ACCORDING TO RATE
OF GROWTH OF MANUFACTURES
Tears States
1850 to i860: Western, Pacific, Central, Southern, Middle, New England.
i860 to 1870: Western, Central, Middle, New England, Southern Pacific.
1870 to 1880: Pacific, Western, Central, Middle, Southern, New England*
1880 to 1890: Western, Pacific, Central, Southern, Middle, New England.
1890 to 1900: Western, Southern, Pacific, Middle, Central, New England.
A final table, before we summarize:
PERCENTAGE OF EACH GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES,
New Middle
1850, 1880, 1900
Southern Central
Western
Pacific
Item
Tear
England
States
States
States
States
States
Capital
1850
3 i * 1
44-2
12*6
11 -8
o» 4 *
0S
1880
22*4
42-1
6*9
25*1
I *0
2*5
1900
16-2
40* 1
9*7
27*9
2-9
3.0
Output
1850
27-8
46-4
9-9
i 4*3
o* 1
i *5
1880
20-6
4 i -3
6-3
28-0
i *4
2*4
1900
14-4
38-0
9 *i
30-7
4*3
3*3
Wage
1850
32-7
43*9
"•5
”*5
03*
04
Earners
1880
23*7
41*7
8*2
236
1*0
i*8
♦ i860.
1900
17*8
37*2
123
27*7
2*2
2-7.
Two regions have lost in importance as manufacturing areas:
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO IO3
the New England States and the Middle States; both of them
belonged in 1850 as well as in 1880 and 1900 to the chief manu¬
facturing centres. Two regions gained considerably without be-
• coming of great importance: the Western and the Pacific States.
One region gained high rank in the course of time: the Central
States. And one region, after having lost in importance because
of the Civil War and its consequences, rapidly strode ahead
during the years from 1880 to 1900: the Southern States.
If we now look at the following table,[indicating average annual
earnings by regions, it will become obvious why we must focus
our attention on these Southern States:
AVERAGE YEARLY EARNINGS OF EMPLOYED WORKERS IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES BY GEOGRAPHIC
DIVISIONS, 1880
Divisions
United States
New England
Middle States
Southern States
Central States
Western States
Pacific States
Wages ( Dollars)
347
330
356
238
353
382
482
Three divisions paid wages differing considerably from the
average for the United States as a whole: the Southern States,
the Western States, and the Pacific States. The latter two em¬
ployed in 1880 about 2 - 8 per cent of all wage-earners and, there¬
fore, are of no great importance. The Southern States, on the
other hand, employed 8-2 per cent of all wage-earners, a per¬
centage which, by 1900, had increased to about one-eighth of all
wage-earners while, in the other two regions by 1900, a fraction
amounting to not even one-twentieth of all wage-earners was
reached.
Wages in the Southern States were about 30 per cent below
the average for the United States as a whole, and about one-
third below the average for all other than the Southern
States.
It now becomes obvious why we called the Southern States an
industrial home colony of the United States. But, it may be
argued, perhaps those industries prevail in the South which
104 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
generally do pay low wages, and therefore the poor Southern
wages are not an indication of virtual colonial conditions but
indicate only the peculiar composition of Southern industries.
But this argument is not valid. Take for instance wages in the#
cotton goods industry which pays wages far below the United
States average. In 1880 average wages in the cotton industry for
the United States as a whole amounted to 244 dollars per year
per employed worker; in New England, the chief centre of the
industry, to 256 dollars; but in the Southern States to only 169
dollars, or about 30 per cent less than in the United States
average and over one-third less than in New England.
Thirty per cent less than in the United States as a whole is
exactly the percentage by which wages in all Southern manu¬
facturing industries were lower than the average for the United
States as a whole. Therefore, one cannot say that wages in the
South were lower because the distribution of industries was such
that just in the South the generally lower paying industries were
in a preponderance.
By 1900, conditions had not changed at all. Average annual
earnings in the Southern States were still about 30 per cent
lower than in the United States as a whole. But something had
changed: the percentage of total U.S.A. output produced in the
South had increased from 6*3 to 9*1; that is, an increasing
percentage of the nation’s manufactured goods were produced
under colonial labour conditions. The employers were creating
a rapidly expanding “colonial empire” within the territory of
the United States. In a large area of the United States, a con¬
siderable number of workers were obliged to produce manu¬
factured products under colonial labour conditions. Truly, a
most ingenious venture by the employers, netting them much
extra profit. *
But the exploitation of “colonial labour” was not restricted to
the South. There was one kind of “colonial labour” which could
be found in ever-increasing numbers all over the United States:
the Negro worker. Wages of Negro workers were lower every¬
where than those of white workers. Negro workers everywhere
were exploited even more cruelly than white workers.
* It is interesting to note that a considerable percentage of the capital
invested in the South came from the old industrial North.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO IO5
It is true that the liberation of the Negro worker from slavery
meant some progress for him; he was now free to sell his labour
and he was now able to enter trades which before were almost
completely closed to him.
But if we compare the material conditions of the Negro worker
at the end of the nineteenth century with those existing just
before the Civil War, the change was very small indeed. Every¬
thing from which the mass of the white workers suffered: insuffi¬
cient wages, poor housing conditions, low standards of health,
and so on, afflicted the Negro worker to a far more intense
degree.
Everything was worse for the Negro workers than for the
white, and their standard of living was a disgrace to the people
of the United States—their absolute standard, that is their
abject poverty and misery, as well as their relative standard,
relative not only as compared with that of the rich but also as
compared with that of the white workers.
During the first two decades in the period under review, from
i860 to 1870 and from 1870 to 1880, immigration remained at
the same level as from 1850 to i860. About 2£ million people in
each decade came to settle in the States. Between 1880 and 1890
immigration almost doubled, but declined again between 1890
and 1900:
IMMIGRATION, 1851-1900
Years
1851-1860
1861-1870
1871-1880
1881-1890
1891-1900
Number of Immigrants
2,600,000
2,300,000
2,800,000
5,200,000
3,800,000
After 1880 an increasing number of the immigrants came from
other countries than Great Britain, Ireland and Germany,
countries such as Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy. The ten¬
dency which could be already observed during the previous
period under review, to settle in the Eastern cities, was even
more pronounced between i860 and 1900. By the end of the
century more than four-fifths of the immigrants were living in
106 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
the North Atlantic and Central States. In 1900 only about two-
thirds of the population were native born and had native-born
parents; and almost one-fifth of these were Negroes.
The immigrants were all accustomed to a lower standard of
living than ttiat prevailing in the United States. They were,
therefore, the ideal labour force for the American employers who
used them partly as fruitful objects of exploitation and at the
same time as a means of exerting pressure upon the standard of
living of the native workers.
A number of companies sprang up whose sole business was to
organize the immigration of labour into the United States. One
such immigration agent advertises as follows in the Missouri
Democrat , May 15, 1865:
“. . . I am about to enter upon the great enterprise of inducing
labor and capital to Missouri. I have been honoured with an
appointment from Governor Fletcher, as a Commissioner on the
Board of Immigration. Already my duties have led to an exten¬
sive correspondence with leading parties in England and Scot¬
land, and consequently upon this appointment, the American
Emigrant Company of New York have designated me their
agent for Missouri. This company has been formed under the
auspices of leading members of our government, of the Immigra¬
tion Bureau at Washington, and of leading merchants, bankers,
senators and representatives, chiefly in the Eastern States. It
has been ‘chartered for the purpose of procuring and assisting
emigrants from foreign countries to settle in the United States.’
The Company has a paid up capital of $540,000. The direct
advantages are these:
“ 1st. It secures a supply of diversified labor necessary to
develop the varied resources of the country, and to prosecute
every branch of industry.
“2nd. It offers facilities for large corporations or special
industrial interests to import in sufficient quantity the special
kind of labor which they require.
“3rd. It gives each individual employer the opportunity of
supplying himself with the exact number and description of
operatives he needs,
“4th. It will tend to equalize the value of labor in Europe
and America, and thus by raising the rate of wages in the Old
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM i860 TO 19OO IO7
World, undermine and finally destroy its manufacturing supre¬
macy.”*
It is quite interesting to see how such companies worked. They
employed as their agent a Government official who, of course,
had more means of guaranteeing the necessary demand and
supply of immigrants. They declared themselves ready to supply
every kind of labour required so that there need be no shortage,
and so that workers should be as little able as possible to put
pressure upon the employers if they want an improvement of
labour conditions. Finally, they explain that this also helps to
equalize wage conditions in Europe and the United States; a,s
they express it, it will lead to higher wages in Europe and thus
hamper the competitive activities of Europe. But what they and
the employers really expect from immigration is an ‘‘equaliza¬
tion” which will lower wages in the States.
It is of interest to look at some of the names of the patrons of
the above-mentioned company :f
“The company is enabled, by special permission, to refer to
the following gentlemen :
“Hon. S. P. Chase, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C.
Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.
Governor Buckingham, Connecticut.
Chief Justice Hinman, Connecticut.
Henry A. Perkins, president, Hartford Bank.
Thomas Belknap, president, State Bank, Hartford.
Theodore Tilton, editor, Independent , New York.
Samuel Bolles, editor, Springfield Republican , Springfield, Mass.
Professor Caswell, Providence, R.I.
Russel and Erwin Manufacturing Co., New York.
Hon. R. A. Chapman, judge, Supreme Court, Mass.
Rev. H. W. Beecher, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Hon. James Dixon, U.S. senator, Conn.
Hon. Charles Sumner, U.S. senator, Mass.
Hon. Henry Wilson, U.S. senator, Mass.
Ex-Governor Sprague, U.S. senator, Rhode Island.
Hon. L. S. Foster, U.S. senator, Conn.
Governor Stone, Iowa.
Hon. Jas. Harlan, U.S. senator, Iowa.”
All the ruling classes are represented as patrons of such immi¬
gration agencies: secretaries of State, governors, senators,
preachers, bank presidents, manufacturing employers, etc.
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. ix, p. 78.
t Ibid., p. 75.
108 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
♦ * *
The exploitation of child labour continued all through the
period under review. While conditions towards the end of the
nineteenth century were better in many respects than during the
first half, it would be easy to exaggerate these improvements.
There is no doubt that school attendance of children and juveniles
improved. There is no doubt that the working day for children
was shortened with the general shortening of the working day.
But it is doubtful whether the extent of child labour was much
diminished. At the same time children suffered also from the
increase of the intensity of work. The development of new
sweated industries contributed much to the extension of child
labour in some branches of national economy. How unfortunately
true, for instance, were the words of a witness before the Senate
Committee on the Relations between Labor and Capital:* “A
tailor is nothing without a wife and very often a child.’’
The degree of exhaustion of many children in the factories
comes out clearly in the testimony of an overlooker in a cotton
mill, which we find in the often quoted i8jo Report of the Massa¬
chusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor (pp. 126-27): “The child¬
ren were drowsy and sleepy; have known them to fall asleep
standing up at their work. Some of these children are now work¬
ing in the mill, and appear to be under fifteen years of age. I
have had to sprinkle water in their face to arouse them, after
having spoken to them till hoarse; this was done gently, without
any intention of hurting them.”
G. Health and Accidents
Health reports available for the period under review are on the
whole not very different from those for the previous period, as far
as a general estimate of health conditions is concerned. On the
other hand, while in the thirties and forties the length of the
working day and working conditions within the factory were the
chief grounds of complaint, during the fifties a third factor had
already appeared: the pernicious housing conditions in the
cities. Since no improvement took place in housing conditions
during the second half of the century, since, on the contrary,
* Report , 1885, vol. i, p. 414.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO log
conditions grew worse—partly because housing conditions
deteriorated and partly because more and more people* came to
live in the congested cities—poor housing must be regarded as
one of the chief factors contributing to a deterioration of living
conditions. While in 1850 only about 12*5 per cent of the total
population lived in cities of over 8,000 inhabitants, by 1870 the
percentage had already risen to 21 per cent and by 1900 it had
reached one-third.
A comparison of housing conditions in England and in Massa¬
chusetts draws the following picture:* “Here, as well as there,
will be found, in the labyrinthal slums of cities, in narrow courts,
dark lanes, and nasty alleys, wretched tenements, with small
rooms, dismal, dark, unventilated, into which the sun, God’s
free gift, never sends a shimmering ray; packed full of men,
women and children, as thick as smoked herrings in a grocer’s
box. Here they breed, here they live (!), and here they die, with
their half-starved, ill-clad, children—death’s daily dish, with
typhus, and scarlet fever, and cholera for his butchers;—and these
festering sties, owned by gentlemen of fortune, £ who live at home
at ease,’ and whose gold is of the sweat of their tenant’s brow, in
a rental of 15 to 20 per cent, paid in advance! In such dens, if a
horse were kept, the society for the suppression of cruelty to
animals, should look after his owner.” Such is the official lan¬
guage of a State paper, describing housing conditions in the
United States! After a detailed survey of a number of houses in
Boston, the same report concludes: “In fact, so far as we have
been able to ascertain, there are no places within the settled
portions of the city of Boston, where the low-paid toiler can find
a home of decency and comfort. ”f That is, as far as the low-paid
workers are concerned, the whole city is one single slum!
In many of these “homes” the workers spent not only the
night, but they were, at the same time, their working place.
Home work occupied many a family, and in some industries,
particularly clothing and cigarmaking, a very considerable part
of the work was done at home in the slums of the cities. It is not
to be wondered at, then, that, for instance, the annual report of
the cigarmakers’union in 1901 indicates a tuberculosis mortality
* Report of Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, Boston, 1870, p. 88
t Ibid. , p. 182.
IIO A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
rate of terrifying proportions. According to this report about half
of all deceased members of the union in 1890 died of tuberculosis,
a rate which had declined, by 1900, to about one-third. *
As to the course of development of accidents, unfortunately no
general and accurate data are available. However, from what
we do know, and it is very little, we get the impression that the
accident rate in industry increased considerably during the
period under review. Only for one industry are consecutive and
comparable data available, and even there the material is not
ideal. The U.S. Bureau of Mines has published a history of
Coal Mine Fatalities in the United States, 1870-1914.! which
gives some information about accidents resulting in death.
According to these statistics fatal accidents developed as follows :
FATAL ACCIDENTS IN COAL MINES PER 1,000 EMPLOYED
Year
Accidents
Year
Accidents
1878
2-6
1888
2*6
•879
3*3
1889
• 2*4
1880
2*2
1890
2-5
1881
2-9
1891
3 * 1
1882
2*8
1892
3 *i
1883
3-3
1893
2*7
1884
2*8
1894
2*7
1885
2*6
1895
30
1886
2-3
1896
2*9
1887
2*2
1897
2*6
From this table one gets the impression that accidents re¬
mained about the same during these twenty years. If we compute
business-cycle averages they are as follows:
1878-1885 2*8
1885-1897 2*7
Fatal accidents seem to have slightly declined. But this im¬
pression, which seems to contradict what we have said above, is
wrong. Not that the figures are wrong, though they are not all-
embracing and probably not all fatal accidents were reported.
The important thing is that during the period under review the
average number of hours worked per day declined. If one could
compute a fatal accident rate per hour worked then one would
find that the fatal accident rate instead of having slightly declined
from one trade cycle to another, has increased.
♦ Cigar maker s' Official Journal, September, 1901.
t Bulletin, 115.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO III
It is of interest to follow the trend of the mining legislation
enacted in order to decrease accidents during the period under
review. This legislation was limited for this period to provision
for inspection of mines by State officials. During the years 1878
to 1897 about every seventh miner was likely to be killed through
an accident in the course of his working life. One would perhaps
imagine that there had been steady pressure to improve condi¬
tions and introduce the inspection of mines. But if we look at the
dates upon which inspection systems were introduced in the
different States, we realize that the decisive factor for the intro¬
duction of such legislation was not the existence of a steady and
high fatal accident rate. The decisive factor is the occurrence of
great mining disasters which because of the high “normal 55 daily
fatal accident rate do not influence materially the general fatal
accident rate, but which impress public opinion very consider¬
ably. We can say that legislation for the protection of the miners
spreads with each disaster. Catastrophes, sometimes killing more
than 100 miners, apparently must first occur as a spur to pro¬
gress. A terrible accident in 1869 in Pennsylvania in which 179
miners lost their lives, brought about the introduction of the first
law providing for systematic mine inspection in the United
States (in the anthracite mines in Pennsylvania). An accident
costing the lives of 69 miners led to a more efficient re-organiza¬
tion of the inspection service of Illinois in 1883. Fifty-nine deaths
from one accident effected the same step in Colorado in 1884.
The death of 109 miners in a mining accident in Pennsylvania
led to Federal legislation for the U.S. Territories in 1891. And
so on.
Otherwise, most of the factors contributing to a deterioration
of health conditions or to keeping them at a low level, which we
have observed during former periods, remained in force; fore¬
most among them was, as has been already mentioned, the
increasing intensity of work.
H. Summary of Labour Conditions
It is not as easy to arrive at a conclusion as to the development
of labour conditions between i860 and 1900 as it, was for the
foregoing periods.
112 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
Real wages increased after the Civil War and the first post¬
war years, as was to be expected and as usually is the case after
the ravages which wars cause in the living standard of the
workers. During the seventies real wages were about on the
same level as during the forties, and about io per cent higher
than during the fifties. During the next trade cycle real wages
increased again, this time by 6 per cent; and during the follow¬
ing trade cycle they increased by about io per cent. There is no
doubt that the purchasing power of the industrial workers did
increase materially after the war, and, at the end of the period
under review, was about 20 per cent higher than during the
peak years of the preceding period.
In addition to the increase in real wages we find that the hours
worked per week declined.
What factors have we observed to offset, or at least partially
to counter, this undoubted improvement in labour conditions?
First, there was the increase in the intensity of work. Large-scale
introduction of power, the better organization of the production
process, and the spread in the application of more effective
machinery, facilitated an increase in the intensity of work. This
increase in the intensity of work necessitated more and/or better
food for the restoration of the working power of the workers.
Therefore, part of the increase in purchasing power, which we
have observed, cannot be regarded as a real increase because it
was at once cancelled out through the intensified exertions of the
workers. Another factor contributing to the deterioration in
working and living conditions was the increased frequency of
accidents. The deterioration in housing conditions was a further
important factor. Not accounted for in the <cost of living index
are the following items which increased in importance during
the period under review: cost of transport to and from the
factory, an item multiplying with the growth of cities; trade
union dues or dues to other labour organizations, an item of
necessity since it represents the bill the worker had to pay for
many a wage increase reflected in the increase in purchasing
power; similarly there was the growing expenditure on strikes
which, again, were necessary in order to raise the level of pur¬
chasing power. The sum of these items cancels most of the advan-
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, l86<$ TO I9OO 113
tages the industrial worker gained through increased purchasing
power.
During the first half of the period under review, conditions
were, it seems, worse than ever before. The misery and degrada¬
tion in which the workers lived were more widespread and acute
than ever before. It is instructive to quote here a member of the
Massachusetts Senate on the ignorance of the legislature as far as
labour conditions are concerned, and on the shock they received
when a group of honest and decent members investigated condi¬
tions among the workers: “But there is another view of the
subject, which is even more important to us as a people, than the
mere increase of wealth, or the perfection of the mechanic arts—
the protection, preservation and advancement of man. In this
view, we feel that there is a solemn duty and responsibility resting
upon us, and that we are called upon to atone for our apathy of
the past by early and earnest action in the future. We have been
surprised at the developments which the investigation has pro¬
duced. No subject which has been before a committee of this
legislature has elicited more important facts, or awakened a more
lively or general interest—an interest of the most numerous class
in the community, and one which has but too seldom, in our
opinion, engaged the attention of our legislation—the condition
of our producing classes. In common with the great majority of
the community, we have approached this subject with an entire
ignorance of it; and in the belief that there was, nor could be,
any need of investigation, much less of improvement or meliora¬
tion in the conditions of those whose labors have enriched us, and
whose skill and genius in the arts have placed us in the vanguard
of the nation. Investigation has dispelled this ignorance; and your
Committee must bear testimony to the urgent necessity of action
and reform in the matter. The evidence presented almost chal¬
lenged belief. Certainly the Committee were astonished that, in
the midst of progress and prosperity unparalleled; advancement
in the arts and sciences; development in machinery for the
saving of labor; progress in invention, and in the increase of
wealth and material prosperity; yet Man, the producer of all
these—‘the first great cause of all,’ was the least of all, and least
understood. The result of this prosperity of which we boast—and
which should be a blessing to us—has a tendency to make the
VOL. H H
114 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
conditions of the workingman little else than a machine, with no
thought of aspiration higher, in the language of one of the wit¬
nesses, ‘than a slave; for, 5 he added, ‘we are slaves; overworked,
worn out and enfeebled by toil; with no time left us for improve¬
ment of mind or soul. Is it surprising that we are degraded and
ignorant? 5 55 * This, one of the most worthy documents ever
emanating from a legislative committee in any parliament under
capitalism, gives a true picture of the reaction of ignorant but
decent men upon the state of labour during the first half of the
period under review.
It is, however, not improbable that in the second half of the
period under review (1880-1900) conditions among industrial
workers improved slightly. Does this statement not contradict
the theory that labour conditions have the tendency to de¬
teriorate from trade cycle to trade cycle, and that this tendency
is really effective and is not counter-balanced by other tendencies?
It does not, for here we deal for a large part of the period
under review only with industrial labour in the United States
and there is no theory—or, at least, there should be no
theory—that the labour conditions of each class of workers
continuously get worse. If we had included the development of
labour conditions among agricultural workers for the Whole
period under review, and if we had also included living con¬
ditions among the still comparatively small number of workers
exploited by American capitalists in other American countries
and had given due weight to Negro and sweat-shop wages—
then we would have found that the labour conditions of all
workers combined did actually deteriorate in the period under
review. It remained true for the period as a whole what the two
chiefs of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, Henry
K. Oliver and George E. McNeill, remarked in 1870:
“Like Tantalus perishing of thirst in the midst of deep waters , they live
in the midst of blessings that can never bless them. 55
* Report by Senator Martin Griffin of Boston for the Judiciary Committee
asked to consider the expediency of regulating and limiting the number of
hours constituting a day’s labor. April 29, 1865.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO I90O II5
I. Labour’s Fight for Better Working Conditions
John B. Andrews writes in vol. ii of Commons’ History of
Labor in the United States , (p. 43):
“In the field of trade unionism the nationalization of the
market gave birth to the national trade union. To be sure, there
had been some attempt at ‘national’ trade unions during the
thirties, such as the national conventions of the printers and
cordwainers. It is nevertheless true that it was only during the
sixties that labour organizations began to think and act on a
lasting national basis. Moreover, the ‘nation’ over which the
unions of the thirties had spread their activities was, properly
speaking, nothing more than a region of neighbouring towns
such as the ‘greater industrial New York’ of to-day.”
Now national unions sprang up almost every year during the
sixties:
1861 one 1866 none
1862 none 1867 one
1863 two 1868 two
1864 four 1869 three
1865 six 1870 two
Many of them soon went out of existence, but only soon to be
replaced by others. Nation-wide trade unionism had come into
its own just as national industry had done. *
At the same time national labour organizations trying to
co-ordinate the individual national union movements were
formed. The first was the National Labor Union, the successor in
the sixties of the National Trades’ Union of the thirties, and the
predecessor of the Knights of Labor and the American Federa¬
tion of Labor which, by 1890, had beaten the Knights and
which up to 1936 was the undisputed representative of organized
labour (excluding the railway workers, organized in the Rail¬
road Brotherhoods).
The chief ends for which labour fought during the forty years
under review were: higher wages, the shorter work day, and the
restriction of immigration.
The fight for higher wages was based upon the customary and
* Some of these unions were called “international,” embracing also
organized workers in Canada.
Il6 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
most potent argument: wages were too low for the workers to
live a decent life. And, indeed, in spite of the increase in average
purchasing power, the standard of livipg was still so low that
this more than sufficed to rally the workers behind a fight for
higher wages, and to gain the widespread support of progressive
public opinion.
While with regard to wages, labour quite rightly used the
same argument as during the preceding hundred years, the
argument for a shorter working day was an elaboration on that
sometimes used in the fifties. We remember from earlier chapters
that originally the argument for a reduction in working hours
was simply the inordinate length of the working day and the
effect which a working day of 14 and 16 hours must have upon
the worker, his health, capacity for education, and so on. During
the period from 1840 to i860, a new argument for fewer hours
was developed, a combined hour-wage argument, which ran as
follows: less hours worked per day means a lower labour supply;
a lower labour supply while the demand remains stable or even
increases, means that a higher price will be paid for labour, in
other words higher wages. Therefore, fewer hours are not only
advantageous in themselves but also mean higher wages, more
purchasing power.
During the sixties and seventies. this argument for a shorter
working day was further developed, chiefly under the influence
of Ira Steward of the Machinists’ and Blacksmiths’ Union. Under
his guidance the annual session of that Union, at its meeting in
Boston, 1863, accepted the following resolutions:*
“Resolved, that from east to west, from north to south, the
most important change to us as working men, to which all else is
subordinate, is a permanent reduction to eight of the hours
exacted for each day’s work.
“Resolved, that a reduction of Hours is an Increase of
Wages.
“Resolved, that a reduction of the number of hours for a day’s
work, be the cardinal point to which our movement ought to be
directed; that we make this point with the understanding that it
is not antagonistic with capital, while at the same time it invests
our cause with the dignity and power of great moral and social
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. ix, p. 279*
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 117
reform, and that it is every way worthy of the sympathy and
co-operation of the most progressive and liberal thinkers of the
age, and that the time has fully arrived in which to commence a
thorough and systematic agitation of this, the leading point in the
great problem of labor reform.’ 5
The question of working hours was now claimed to be that
upon which labour should concentrate all its fighting power;
through a shortening of the working day the trade unions be¬
lieved they could eliminate all the evils from which the workers
suffered. They believed in a general raising of the standard of
living of labour through a shortening of the working day to
eight hours, and moreover, they thought this not to be against
the interests of the employers.
What was the line of thought behind this argument? In his
pamphlet A Reduction of Hours an Increase of Wages Ira Steward
argued as follows:*
Those who work hardest and longest are paid least while
those whose employ is agreeable usually receive more, and
many who do nothing receive more than either.
From this it can be concluded that those who work hardest
and longest receive so little pay just because they work so hard
and long.
Those men who work excessively are so worn out and ex¬
hausted that they want nothing but to satisfy their bodily neces¬
sities. Those, however, who work less have time to cultivate
tastes and create wants in addition to mere material comforts.
Those who work so hard and so long cannot be stimulated to
demand higher wages for they have no strength left, no time and
no wants.
Take a man who works fourteen hours per day; he has no
time to read newspapers or books; he has no time to take a bath,
to write letters, to cultivate flowers, to receive visitors, or to look
at works of art. His home means to him food and bed.
But take a man who works only eight hours a day and has,
therefore, considerably more leisure at his disposal:
“My theory is,
“1st. That more leisure will create motives and temptations for
the common people to ask for more wages.
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. ix, p. 284.
Il8 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
“2nd. That where all ask for more wages, there will be no
motive for refusing, since employers will all fare alike.
“3rd. That where all demand more wages, the demand cannot
be resisted.
“4th. That resistance would amount to the folly of a ‘strike’ by
employers themselves, against the strongest power in the world,
viz. the habits, customs, and opinions of the masses.
“5th. That the change in the habits and opinions of the people
through more leisure will be too gradual to disturb or jar the
commerce and enterprise of capital.
“6th. That the increase in wages will fall upon the wastes of
society, in its crimes, idleness, fashions, and monopolies, as well
as the more legitimate and honorable profits of capital, in the
production and distribution of wealth, and
“7th. In the mechanical fact that the cost of making an article
depends almost entirely upon the number manufacured is a
practical increase of wages, by tempting the workers through
their new leisure to unite in buying luxuries now confined to the
wealthy, and, which are costly because bought only by the
wealthy.”*
What do we think of this theory on the basis of our experience?
Many of us to-day work eight hours, our wages are higher to-day
than seventy years ago, our needs are more varied than those of
the workers of seventy years ago; but are our conditions better?
Are the employers willing to concede higher wages because they
cannot resist the workers? Have our living conditions genuinely
improved? Later chapters will supply the answer to these ques¬
tions. But some points can be stated here.
It is true that more leisure creates more varied demands—but
more demands can also be an indication of greater needs. And
if, as was the case during the last seventy years, the intensity of
work has increased rapidly, then these additional wants do not
necessarily mean that the standard of living has improved, but
they have been created by the greater exhaustion of body and
mind, solely for the purpose of keeping the standard of living at
the same level. Furthermore, shorter hours of work do not
necessarily mean more leisure; for an automobile worker after a
day’s work at the Ford plant, for instance, is so exhausted that
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. ix, pp. 289-296.
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO igOO 119
many need at least an hour to regain the same degree of physical
and mental energy possessed by another worker who has worked
an hour longer on a less intensive job.
Furthermore, the intensity or variety of the desire for more
things has never yet led directly to more pay, in order that these
wants may be satisfied. Otherwise, the life of the workers to-day
would be very different.
But there is an element of truth in this conception. For, with
increasing leisure the workers have more time in which to devote
themselves to improving their conditions. Imagine a worker
to-day attending a trade union meeting, a meeting of a political
party, or other progressive organization, and engaging in some
kind of spare time activity in connection with these organizations,
and also putting in twelve or even fourteen hours per day at his
work! Few could stand this for a long time. Now, such activity
on the part of the workers contributes to a temporary improve¬
ment in their conditions, or at least it often checks deterioration.
Therefore, the shorter working day means not only more leisure
for the workers but also facilitates considerably the securing of
other improvements, relative or absolute, in their conditions.
The shorter working day, therefore, while it is not the central
objective of labour, is an important means of improving labour
conditions.
The eight-hour movement quickly spread during the sixties
over most of the United States, and it was so successful that a
considerable number of laws providing for the eight-hour day
were passed. In 1867 alone, Illinois, Missouri, New York and
Wisconsin passed more or less comprehensive eight-hour laws—
but they remained on paper as they were not enforced.
Soon afterwards the movement died out, to be revived in the
second half of the eighties. On May 1, 1886, a general strike for
the eight-hour day was declared by most of the national trade
unions, with only half-hearted support from the leaders of the
Knights of Labor.* Of the 200,000 striking workers about 40,000
succeeded in obtaining a shortening of the working day while
about 150,000 others, who took no part in the strike, also secured
a reduction in hours. In the course of the next few years, when
* Out of the eight-hour struggle which culminated in this general strike
came international May Day.
120
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
the American Federation of Labor took over the leadership of
the fight for the eight-hour day, the tactics were changed. It was
decided to fight union by union and that all other unions should
give support to the one union which was out on strike.
By the end of the century a number of organized trades had
gained the eight-hour day, especially among the building trade
workers; but the majority of the organized workers were still
employed for nine hours per day or more.
Besides wages and hours of work, there was a third important
objective in the labour movement’s fight for better working con¬
ditions. It was concerned with immigration. The New York
Congress of the National Labor Union in 1868 stated the issue
clearly :*
“Resolved that the chartering of immigrant companies is a
direct attempt to control the price of home labor, and is hereby
reprobated and denounced.”
The most conspicuous activity of the labour movement in this
campaign against immigration as a means of depressing the
“price of labor” was directed against Chinese immigration. The
living standard in China was incredibly low, and even if the
Chinese immigrants lived better in the States, their standard of
living still constituted a serious menace to that of the American
workers—unless the latter did succeed in bringing them into the
American labour movement. This, of course, was extremely
difficult with workers who spoke a different language, and lived
in accordance with their own customs in separate districts, and
so on. And if the influx of foreign labour is a rapid one, it is all
the more difficult to assimilate the immigrants. While, therefore,
it would have been wrong to take the attitude that under no
circumstances should immigration be allowed, the organized
workers of the United States were at that time justified in oppos¬
ing the mass immigration of Chinese workers ,* though the result
of this campaign—the complete cessation of all immigration
from China was not the correct solution.
When Chinese coolies from California appeared as strike¬
breakers in Massachusetts, the 1870 Convention of the National
Labor Union took up the problem of Chinese immigration as a
national issue. Supported by the labour movement, as well as by
* A Documentary History of American Industrial Society , vol. ix, p. 221.
THE RIPE YEARS OP AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO I9OO 121
a large section of the public in the Pacific and Western States,
the labour movement ten years later succeeded in having passed
an Act of Congress suspending immigration from China.
The chief weapon of the workers, during the period under
review, was the strike. Never before had the United States
experienced strikes of such an extent and intensity as those
during the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Strike
waves occurred embracing several hundreds of thousands of
workers.
STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS, 1881-1897
Wage Per cent of Employees
Strikes Establish - Losses involved in Strikes which
and
ments
Million
Partially
Tear
Lock-outs
Involved
Employees
Dollars Succeeded Succeeded Failed
1881
477
2,937
130,176
3’4
43
14
44
1882
476
2,147
158,802
10-3
30
5
66
1883
506
2,876
170,275
7*3
37
11
52
1884
485
2,721
165,175
9 ’ 1
38
3
61
1885
695
2,467
258,129
ii*6
48
10
43
1886
1.572
11,562
610,024
i 9'3
39
15
47
1887
1,503
7,870
439,300
20*8
34
7
59
1888
946
3,686
162,880
7*5
28
8
65
1889
i,ui
3,918
260,290
11 -8
29
25
46
1890
1,897
9,748
373,499
14*8
45
14
4 1
1891
1,786
8,662
329,953
15-7
27
8
85
1892
1,359
6,256
238,685
13-6
30
8
83
1893
1,375
4,860
287,756
16-6
2 3
16
61
1894
1,404
9,071
690,044
39*2
18
21
61
1895
U 255
7,343
407,188
13-8
40
11
49
1896
1,066
5 , 5 i 3
248,838
11 -8
4 i
H
44
1897
I,IIO
8,663
416,154
i8-1
39
37
24
Unfortunately, no reliable strike statistics are available for the
period before 1880. Only two States published strike statistics
relating to those years; Massachusetts covering the period from
1825, Pennsylvania that from 1835. Of the 159 strikes reported
in Massachusetts for the period from 1825 to 1880, 18 had been
successful, 16 compromised, 6 partly successful, 9 unknown and
1 pending, while over two-thirds or 109 were unsuccessful; in
Pennsylvania 45 strikes were successful, 13 compromised, n
partly successful, 17 unknown, and 66 unsuccessful. The number
of strikes reported is, however, so small that one cannot draw any
conclusion as to the general success of strikes or their failure. *
* This holds true also of the few data for the United States as a whole,
collected in the 3rd Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor .
122
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
Since 1881, however, more complete strike figures for the
United States as a whole are available, especially for the latter
years under review; they are published in the 16th Annual Report
of the Commissioner of Labor.
While the figures for the first years omit quite a number of
strikes, from th£ middle of the eighties on, the figures are com¬
parable and reflect strike activity pretty accurately. A first high
peak, probably a historic record, was reached in 1886 when the
great eight-hour strike movement took place. Eight years later,
in 1894, a second strike wave reached new heights. Among the
1894 strikes which were chiefly defensive in character, being
against further deterioration in working and living conditions,
the miners’ strike and the Pullman strike are outstanding. Both
strikes were lost, but they marked a new advance in strike
strategy, and were therefore of great importance.
If we look at the different columns we are struck by the dis¬
similarity in their movement. It is, for instance, astonishing that
there is little relation between the number of strikes and lock-outs
and the number of establishments involved in the strikes. Let us
take four years to illustrate this :
Year
Number of Strikes
and Lock-outs
Number of Eitab-
lishments involved
1886
1 >572
11,562
1887
1,503
1.897
7,870
1890
9.748
1894
1,404
9 , 07 «
The highest number of strikes, in 1890, involved by no means
the highest number of establishments; in 1894 7 per cent fewer
strikes involved 15 per cent more establishments than in 1887;
and while the number of strikes declined from 1886 to 1887 by
only about 5 per cent, the number of establishments involved
declined by about 30 per cent. About as irregular are the rela¬
tions between these two items and the number of workmen
involved. The greatest number of strikers is reported for 1894,
which ranks fifth as to the number of strikes and third as to the
number of establishments involved. The wage losses were higher,
in 1887 than in 1886 although the number of strikers involved
declined by about 30 per cent. It is necessary, therefore, always
to study a number of factors in order to be able to judge the
THE RIPE YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, i860 TO I9OO 123
importance and intensity of any strike movement. We can sum
up by saying that, firstly, there were two chief strike years, 1886
and 1894—the former at the beginning of a phase of increasing
trade activity, the latter in the midst of a crisis. Taking the period
under review there is no reason to conclude that strikes occur
mainly during a period of business improvement and that,
during periods of crisis and depression, the workers meekly
accept everything the employers seek to impose upon them. On
the contrary, strike history from 1880 to 1897 shows us that
American workingmen fought whether a crisis existed or not.
As to the results, we find, equally during the crisis and depres¬
sion as during years of considerable trade activity, comparatively
great successes and great failures. The highest percentage of
failures occurs in 1888 and 1891, both years of considerable
trade activity, and the highest percentage of complete successes
occurs in 1885, 1890 and 1896, of which only 1890 is a year of
increasing trade activity. There are, therefore, no hard and fast
rules as to when to strike, whether during a depression or during
the up-swing. There are other factors which are more important
than general trade conditions.
* Finally, we must briefly mention a second weapon which
labour developed in the period under review. It is the boycott, a
weapon little used by the labour movement of other countries.
In 1885 alone, 237 boycott movements were under way. Forty-
five were directed against newspapers; 41 were anti-Chinese
boycotts on the Pacific Coast; 26 were directed against cigar
manufacturers and dealers; 22 against hat manufacturers and
dealers; 14 against clothing dealers, and so on. Of these 237
boycotts, 99 were won, 24 were lost and 114 were still proceeding
at the end of the year.
In the course of time the importance of this weapon waned,
but it was never given up completely, and always played a greater
role in the American labour movement than in any other.
CHAPTER IV
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1900 to 1941
A. Monopoly-capitalist Background
In order to understand the development of American industry
during the last forty years or so, it is necessary first to point out
the great change which has taken place in the structure of
industry—a change which is not visible if we consider only the
figures indicating the growth of industrial production, the
development of railroad mileage, or the output of the mining
industry.
The last forty odd years of capitalism in all advanced indus¬
trial countries (Great Britain, Germany, the United States,
France) have developed a special form of capitalism: finance
capitalism, monopolism. This new stage of capitalism is charac¬
terized by Lenin* as follows:
(1) The concentration of production and capital developed to
such a stage that it creates monopolies which play a decisive role
in economic life.
(2) The merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and
the creation, on the basis of “finance capital,” of a financial
oligarchy.
(3) The export of capital, which has become extremely im¬
portant, as distinguished from the export of commodities.
(4) The formation of international capitalist monopolies
which share the world among themselves.
(5) The territorial division of the whole world among the
greatest capitalist powers is completed.
This development was uneven in different countries and did
not take place always within a few years. The United States
began the large-scale export of capital only during and after the
world war; in Great Britain the monopolization of the iron and
steel industry occurred only at the end of the 1920s. But.the
* Lenin: Imperialism , the Highest Stage of Capitalism . Selected Works, vol. v,
p. 81.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1900 TO I94I 125
beginning of rapid monopolization occurred pretty evenly in
most large capitalist countries around 1900.
The history of monopoly capitalism is outlined by Lenin* as
follows:
“Thus, the principal stages in the history of monopolies are
the following: (1) 1860-1870, the highest stage, the apex of
development of free competition; monopoly is in the barely
discernible, embryonic stage. (2) After the crisis of 1873, a wide
zone^of development of cartels; but they are still the exception.
They are not yet durable. They are still a transitory phenomenon.
(3) The boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis
of 1900-1903.! Cartels become one of the foundations of the
whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into
imperialism.”
Professor Myron W. Watkins, in his study, Industrial Combina¬
tions and Public Policy gives the following interesting table con¬
cerning “industrial consolidations” for the first period of mono¬
polization in the United States:
INDUSTRIAL MERGERS, 1890-1904
Number of
Capitalization
Date
Consolidations
Dollars
1890
11
i 37 > 6lI > 5 °°
1891
13
133 » 597 ,i 67
1892
12
170,017,000
1893
5
I 56,500,000
1894
—
—
1895
3
26,500,000
1896
14,500,000
1897
6
75,000,000
1898
18
475 , 250,000
1899
78
I ,886,050,000
1900
23
294 > 5 00 >° 00
I 9 GI
23
1,632,310,000
1902
26
588,850,000
i 9°3
8
137,000,000
1904
8
236,194,000
Total
237
5,963,879,667
♦ Op. cit., p. 19. , ... , . ,
f Though American trade cycles at that time do not coincide exactly with
the European, the foundation years of monopoly capitalism, of imperialism,
are about the same in Europe and the United States.
j cf. pp. 317-324-
126
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
During the five years 1898 to 1902 more than 80 per cent of
the total capitalization, mentioned in the above table, took
place; this really did mark the birth of American finance capital.
During the following years only a small number of consolida¬
tions occurred, while some large-scale concerns came into being
not so much through mergers as by their own rapid growth,
especially in the aluminium, automobile and motion-picture
industries.
It was only after the war of 1917-1918 that a new wide develop¬
ment of trusts, cartels and monopolies can be observed. During
the twenties over 4,000 manufacturing and mining concerns
merged and over 3,000 concerns were taken over by others.
Even among the largest, this process continued, and of the 200
largest corporations about one quarter disappeared during the
twenties through a merger with, or acquisition by, another big
company. *
A. A. Berle and G. C. Means (The Modern Corporation and Private
Property , p. 31) estimate that at the beginning of 1930 the 200
largest “non-banking corporations” f had “nearly half of all
non-banking corporations’ wealth,” that they controlled about
two-fifths of all business wealth and more than one-fifth of the
total wealth of the country. Two hundred corporations own more
than one-fifth of the total wealth of the nation: this is the mean¬
ing of finance capitalism, of monopolism. And among these 200
are invariably the chief backers of any fascist movement or
imperialist war.
While wealth became concentrated more ancf more into the
hands of a few families and corporations, while a few corporations
acquired control over an ever increasing part of the nation’s
production, while they manipulated prices, expropriated an
increasing number of smaller employers, and cashed in on super¬
profits, the curve of progress seemed to indicate no change.
Production in manufacturing industries increased rapidly;
mining output rose; the transportation system was being speedily
developed; public utility enterprises were expanding throughout
the country.
* A magnificent case study of the development of finance capital in the
United States is Anna Rochester’s Rulers of America .
t “Non-banking” does not exclude their very close relation with big banks
and financial institutions.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 190O TO 1941 127
We can give in the following pages only a very compressed
survey of what happened, since our examination of the economic
development of the country is only to serve as background to the
study of the development of labour conditions.
According to the Census of Manufactures , the number of estab¬
lishments, horse power used, the value of production and the
value added by manufacture, increased as follows:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1899-1939
Year
Number of
Establishments
Horse-power §
Value of Product
Value added k
Manufacture
1899
1,000
205
10,098*
1,000,000 dollars
11,104 4,662
1904
214
13,488
14.34 6
6,039
1909
266
18,675
20,068
8,192
1914
269
22,421
23,444
9,423
! 9 * 4 t
174
22,264!
23,066
9,241
1919
210
29,298!
60,054
23,770
1921
192
—
4 L 749
17,303
1923
192
33,057
58,288
24,630
1925
184
35,773
60,926
25,732
1927
188
38,769
60,472
26,426
1929
207
42,869
68,178
30,737
1931
171
—
39,830
18,601
14,008
1933
139
—
30,557
1935
168
—
44,994
> 8,553
1937
167
—
60,713
25.174
1939
184
50,452
56,843
24,683
Most striking has been the decline in the number of establish¬
ments and the increase in the use of horse-power, an indication
of the rapid process of concentration, on the one hand, and of
the swift technical reconstruction and progress of manufacturing
industry, on the other. The total value of the product manu¬
factured has increased more than five times between the close of
the century and the end of the twenties; since then, in the
course of the crisis, the value has been halved; but it has in¬
creased again in the course of the recovery, reaching the 1929
peak figures in 1940. Very similar was the development of the
* Land and neighbourhood industries and factories with products valued
at less than $500 included.
t First figure for 1914 and preceding figures excluding establishments with
products valued at less than $500; second figure for 1914 and the following
figures excluding establishments with products valued at less than $5,000.
t Includes data for all establishments reporting products valued at $500
or more.
§ Data on horse-power refer to a not identical, but only very slightly
different, number of establishments than the other figures.
128 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
value added by manufactures, that is, the value of products less
the cost of raw material, fuel and purchased energy necessary for
their production.
The increase in manufacturing production was great, but not
greater than in former times. The following table surveys the
development of production in manufacturing industries since
1868, that is beginning with the first trade cycle for which we
have a separate production index* (for the preceding years we
have not sufficient data to compute more than a combined index
of production in manufacturing and mining):
PHYSICAL VOLUME IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Trade Cycle
(1900 = 100)
Index of
Production
Rate of Growth
in Per Cent
1868-1878
27
—
1878-1885
45
66
1885-1897
70
58
1897-1908
1 19
70
1908-1914
>59
34
1915-1921
211
33
1922-1933
259
23
> 933-1941
3 >i
20
The figures show that the rate of growth of manufacturing pro¬
duction has declined not inconsiderably during the period of
imperialism and monopolism. The change in the rate of growth
during the twentieth century has been very marked indeed.
The following table showing the development of the combined
manufacturing and mining production over a period of more
than a century makes this even clearer: *f
PRODUCTION IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING, 1827 to 1941
(1900 = wo)
Trade Cycle
Index
Trade Cycle
Index
1827-1834
1
1885-1897
69
1835-1842
2
1897-1908
120
1843-1848
5
1908-1914
165
1849-1858
8
1915-1921
212
1859-1867
>3
1922-1933
256
1868-1878
25
> 933-1941
307
1878-1885
43
* For the years 1868 to 1921 I used the sources mentioned above in con¬
nection with the studies of productivity; from 1922 on I used the index of the
Federal Reserve Board which is only a continuation of the McLeod index of
manufacturing production.
f Sources same as for the above index of manufacturing production.
THE DECAY OP AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I90O TO 1941 129
The rise in production continued through the whole period
from one trade cycle to another. But the rate of growth which was
roughly maintained during the nineteenth century, fell rapidly
during the twentieth century.
Similar was the development of foreign trade. In the following
table * we give the physical volume of foreign trade by trade
cycles :
. PHYSICAL VOLUME OF FOREIGN TRADE, 1821-1941
(1 goo =* 100)
Trade Cycle
Index of Trade
Rate of Growth
in Per cent
1821-1826
4
—
1827-1834
7
67
1835-1842
8
20
1843-1848
11
33
1849-1858
*7
63
1859-1867
20
15
1868-1878
32
60
1878-1885
50
58
1885-1897
74
47
1897-1908
106
43
1908-1914
132
25
1915-1921
i 99
5 i
1922-1933
201
J
I 933 “ I 94 I
201
0
If we exclude the war years 1914-1918 when the United States
did a roaring trade in armaments, the rate of growth of foreign
trade has declined continuously for over half a century
and, during the last cycle, has become zero.
The chief events from the economic point of view, during the
period under review, were the world war and the world crisis.
The world war meant such destruction and deformation for
most countries engaged in it that even with a decreasing rate of
progress, the United States, which was barely affected by its
destructive consequences, easily became the foremost industrial
power in the world—to be rivalled in many respects only lately
by the growing industrial power of the first socialist country, the
Soviet Union. While, therefore, as a consequence of the world
* Cf. Jurgen Kuczynski, Weltproduktion und Welthandel in den letzten 100
Jahren for the years 1821 to 1929 and Statistical Abstract of the United States
for the years 1930 to 1941.
VOL. H I
130 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
war, the United States became the foremost industrial power—
it was not chiefly because of progress in the United States itself
but because of what was almost retrogression in the European
countries. The war transformed the States from a debtor into a
creditor nation. Before the war, the United States owed consider¬
ably more than it was owed, and a not inconsiderable amount of
the profits extracted from the work of the toiling masses left the
States to flow into the pockets of foreign (chiefly British) capi¬
talists. During the war, the United States lent huge sums to the
Allied Powers, and after the war they again invested heavily, this
time chiefly in the reconstruction of Central Europe. During this
period they made large profits, partly from war loans and busi¬
ness, and later from the labour of the undernourished workers of
Central Europe.
FOREIGN CAPITAL ISSUES (GOVERNMENTAL AND CORPORATE)
PUBLICLY OFFERED IN THE UNITED STATES, 1914-1941
Billion dollars
1914
o-o
1921
o*7
1928
i*5
1935
o-1
1915
o-8
1922
o-9
1929
0-7
1938
O' I
1916
1*2
1923
o-5
x 93°
1 ■ 1
1937
O' 2
1917
o-7
1924
I *2
i93i
o-3
j 938
O' I
1918
o-o
1925
1 *3
1932
o-1
1939
O' I
1919
o-8
1926
i*3
1933
O' I
1940
0*0
1920
0*6
1927
i-6
1934
0-0
i94i
O'O
The sums invested were enormous; so great, that instead of
being a debtor nation the United States became a rival to Great
Britain as a creditor nation.
The second great economic event during the period under
review was the last crisis, from the effects of which the people of
the United States suffered severely, even long after the lowest
point of the crisis had been passed.
The effects of the crisis upon American industry were devas¬
tating. During the three years, 1930, 1931 and 1932, 85,000
commercial failures took place, total liabilities amounting to
considerably over 2,000,000,000 dollars.
Production during the crisis was more than halved in manufac¬
turing industries, and mineral production declined almost as
much. Enormous sums were lost, the worst sufferers being the
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1900 TO 1941 131
small savers who, through bank failure, often lost in a single day
the savings of years.
Almost all railroad lines became virtually bankrupt, and
several actually, Even in 1940 the railroad situation was not
much better than it was during the crisis.
The spell of “prosperity” was broken, The psychological
effects of the crisis were as marked as the economic. The blind
trust of thousands of minor capitalists and millions of small folk
in. the prevailing system, in the certainty of progress under
capitalism, was broken. Millions of workers, salaried employees,
petty bourgeois’, hundreds of thousands of intellectuals, liberals
and progressives felt that there should be a profound change in
the system of society. This rising tide of progressivism has often
found expression in the policy of the Roosevelt administration
which, influenced by mass pressure and support, has made a
definite impression upon the economic life of the United States,
and particularly upon the working and living conditions of large
numbers of working people.
Labour conditions in the period under review have been
determined by a number of very varied factors. The general
decaying tendency of American capitalism affected labour con¬
ditions adversely ,* they tended to deteriorate because of this even
more than during the periods of American capitalism’s increasing
strength. The world crisis, of course, had a similar effect on
labour conditions. On the other hand, the marked rise of Ameri¬
can capitalism as the creditor of many capitalists in other coun¬
tries tended to ameliorate to a certain degree the position of some
elements of the American working class. Engels and Lenin have
shown the significance of colonial exploitation in regard to the
working class of the “mother-country”; how, for certain purposes
and under certain circumstances, part of the working class can
also profit—though only to a small extent and for a limited time
—from the exploitation of the people in the colonies. Now, the
United States acquired no colonies during the war; nor can one
simply compare the period of decay during the war and the
nineteen-twenties with , for instance, the period of industrial
progress in Britain during the second part of the nineteenth
132 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
century. Yet, there is a certain similarity between the exploita¬
tion of European and Central and South-American workers
through American capital during the war and the twenties, and
the colonial exploitation practised by later nineteenth-century
Britain. Likewise, there is a similarity between the development
of labour conditions in Britain at that time and certain tendencies
of labour conditions in the United States during the war and the
twenties.*
B. The Labour Force
In the period under review, manufacturing industry forged
ahead of all other branches of national economy in the total
number of people gainfully occupied, not so much through
relative progress but because of the regress of agriculture.
Transport was more rapid in progress than manufacturing,
while mining lagged much behind, and clerical services on the
other hand beat all records in development:
GAINFULLY OCCUPIED PERSONS, 16 YEARS AND OVER, IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1 9 3of
In per cent of total
Occupation Group
Agriculture
Mining .. .. ..
Manufacturing and Mechanical In
Trade and Transportation
Clerical Service ..
Domestic and Personal Service ..
ProfessiQnal Services
Total
1900
1910
1920
1930
•• 35-9
3°'3
25-8
21*3
2' I
2*6
2*7
2*0
ries 27-5
28-6
3°*5
28*6
.. 16*3
17-4
i8*o
20*7
.. 2*8
4*6
7-2
8*2
.. 10*0
io*6
8-8
u *3
1.. 1*0
1 • 1
i-6
1 *4
.. 4*4
CO
5-4
6*5
.. 100*0
100*0
100*0
100*0
The largest group of these gainfully occupied people are wage-
earners while another large group are the salaried employees.
In manufacturing industries the number of employed wage-
earners and salaried employees developed as follows:
♦ See also p. 101 of this book.
f Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Occupational Trends in
the United States: 1870 to 1930. June 7, 1937, p. 1. The figures for 1940 are,
unfortunately, not comparable with those for die preceding years.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igoO TO I94I 133
WAGE EARNERS AND SALARIED EMPLOYEES IN MANUFAC¬
TURING INDUSTRIES, 1899-1939
In thousands
Number of Wage - Number of Salaried
Tear earners Employees
i8 99 4 > 7 i 3 3*>4
1 9°4 5 >4 88 520
1909 6,615 79°
1914 7,024 963
1914* 6,888 9561
1919 8,990 1,429!
1921 6,938 1,141
1923 8,768 1,350
1925 8,384 1,256
1927 8,334 1,296
1929 8,822 1,354
1929* 8,381 1,304
1931 6,163 —
1933 5*788 770+
*935 7*204 1,059
1937 8,569 1,217
1939 7*887 1,049
The table shows that the development up to 1919 was about
the same as in former periods, as far as the rate of growth of wage-
earners is concerned; during the second half of the nineteenth
century we had observed that the number of wage-earners just
about doubled in twenty years. Since 1919, however, the number
of workers has remained stable.
Up to 1919, the number of salaried employees grew at a more
rapid rate than that of the workers. While in 1899 about 7 per
cent of all employees were salaried workers, in 1919 the per¬
centage had grown to about 14. Since then there has been no
further increase.
This development can be observed not only within manufac¬
turing industries, but in the national economy as a whole. A
computation by Alba M. Edwards in the Monthly Labor Review ,
March, 1934, shows the substantial increase in the number and
proportion of salaried employees, or “white-collar” workers:
* Not strictly comparable with preceding series of figures,
t Includes data for establishments reporting products valued at $500 or
more.
t Excluding data for salaried officers of corporations.
134 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS,
1870-1940
Tear
Total Gainfully
Employed
White Collar Workers
Number Per cent of Total
1870
12,505,923
366,752
2*9
1880
i 7 > 392,099
656,303
3*8
1890
23,318,183
1,388,713
2,169,057
6 -o
1900
29 ,o 73>233
7*5
1910
38,167,336
3,835,813
10*0
1920
41,614,248
5,718,352
13*7
1930
48,829,920
7 - 949,455
16*3
1940
52,020,023*
8 , 923,939
17-2
The rise of the salaried worker was particularly great in trade,
banking, the government services, etc. These branches of national
economy are not primarily concerned with the process of pro¬
duction, but are chiefly occupied either with distribution or
with branches of national economy whose growth is a sure sign
of the transformation of capitalism into finance capitalism.
Professor Rautenstrauch*]* gives a table which indicates the
rapid growth of those branches of national economy which
chiefly employ salaried workers, and which at the same time are
not primarily engaged in productive work. Professor Rauten¬
strauch calls them the overhead branches of national economy
(banking, mercantile, government and other services) in contrast
to the productive branches.
“PRODUCERS AND OVERHEAD”
Producers in per cent
Tear
Producers%
Overhead
of Overh
1909
21,347
12,908
165
1912
22,500
13,734
164
1915
23,079
14,877
155
i 9 J 8
25,023
15,360
163
1921
25,227
'5,592
162
1924
25,144
17,979
140
1927
25,181
20,192
125
1930
22,685
>9,195
118
1932
18,164
16,822
108
1935
20,224
1 7 , 9 H
113
♦ Excluding new workers; the total labour force including new workers
is 52,789,499.
t Cf. Who Gets the Money?, first and second editions, and The Economics of
Business Enterprise .
J Includes workers (wage and salaried) in agriculture, mining, manufac¬
turing, construction, power, transportation and communicaton, as well as
farm owners.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1 94J 135
The number of people engaged in “overhead” work has
increased so much in comparison with those in “productive”
industries that while the latter employed in 1909 about two-
thirds more than the former, to-day they employ almost an
equal number.
This table is not only an indication of the rising importance of
the salaried worker and all that this means from the sociological
and political point of view; it also indicates in a most impressive
way what Lenin means by the development of parasitical
industries.
Another aspect of the same question—the relative decline of
the productive forces within the national labour force—is pre¬
sented in the following table* which divides the total number of
gainfully employed (by percentages) into those engaged in pro¬
duction, in marketing (that is trade and tranportation; i.e.
distribution), and those doing professional, clerical and domestic
work:
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF GAINFULLY ENGAGED
THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGE IS EMPLOYED IN
Tear
Production
Marketing
Professional,
etc., Work
1870
69-0
9‘9
21 • 1
1880
66* 1
io-8
23*1
1890
62-'7
14*6
22*7
1900
60 • 1
16-4
23*5
1910
63*5
16-4
20- I
1920
59’7
17-6
22*7
193 °
52-8
20-4
26*8
The table shows clearly the growing importance of distribution
(marketing), and professional and similar work, in the national
economy, and the corresponding decline of the productive force
from more than two-thirds to about one-half of the total number
of the gainfully engaged.
Before we leave the subject of the composition of the labour
force, it is necessary to deal with one more aspect. How did the
employment of women and children develop? We recall the fact
that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the employment
* The table is quoted from P. D. Converse, “Employment, Wages and
Labor Relations in Marketing.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science , May, 1940, p. 149.
I 36 * A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
of women and children rose rapidly, absolutely as well as rela¬
tively, but that, during the last decades of that century, the
percentage of women employed ceased to rise, while that of
children probably declined.
In manufacturing industries the percentage of men, women
and children employed since the turn of the century was the
following:
MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES, 189^-1939
Men 16 years
Women 16
Children under
Tear
and over
years and over
16 years
Per cent
Per cent
Per cent
1899
77 *i
I 9‘5
3*4
1909
78-1
i 9‘5
2*4
MEN AND
WOMEN (INCLUDING CHILDREN)
Men\
Women\
Children*
1909
79*4
20-6
2*5
1919
79-9
20* I
i ‘5
1929
77*9
22-1
o*8
1939
74*2
25*8
—
Thus, the percentage of women employed has increased only
recently. The percentage of children employed has diminished.
However, general employment of women has increased more
than the above figures indicate. More and more women found
employment in clerical positions; a male secretary is almost as
rare to-day as a female miner. The distribution between the sexes
of the total number of gainfully occupied persons of 10 years of
age and over developed as follows:
GAINFULLY OCCUPIED PERSONS, 1900-1940
Total
Percentage
Percentage
Tear
Number
Men
Women
1900
29 ,' 073>233
82
18
1910
38,167,336
79
21
1920
41,614,248
79
21
1930
48,829,920
78
22
* 94 °t
52,789,499
76
24
* Population Census occupational figures for children aged 10-15 in
manufacturing and mechanical industries related to Manufacturing Census
figures of total employment.
+ Including children.
t Not strictly comparable with preceding figures.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igOO TO 1 941 137
From 1900 to 1910 the employment of women increased
absolutely as well as relatively; since 1910, however, the per-
centage of women gainfully employed has changed compara¬
tively little. This might be surprising at first sight, but is easily
explained by the fact that an important change has taken place
in the type of occupation for women. Women have shifted more
rapidly than men from agricultural to industrial occupations,
and while therefore the percentage of women engaged in agri¬
cultural pursuits has declined rapidly, that of women in indus¬
trial (non-manufacturing) occupations has increased much more
rapidly than the above figures indicate.
C. Unemployment and Short-time
For the development of unemployment we have at our dis¬
posal the estimates made by Paul Douglas, the best available for
the period up to 1927, and for the following years we have the
data collected by the American Federation of Labor.
Paul Douglas estimates the development of unemployment as
follows: *
PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES,
1897-1927
Tear
Manufacturing and Building
Transportation Trades f
Coal-Mining
Total
1897
H *5
3 i -9
41-7
18*0
1898
13*9
28*2
39*8
16*9
1899
7-7
20*8
30*4
io*5
1900
6-3
26*9
3 1 *°
10*0
1901
4*5
17*9
28-9
7*5
1902
3*5
15-8
35 ’ 7
6*8
1903
3*5
21 • 1
27*9
7 -o
1904
7 *i
17-6
34*3
I0‘ 1
1905
4 -o
12*0
30-8
6-7
1906
3*5
8-6
3 1 ‘4
5*9
1907
3*5
21 • 1
25*0
6*9
1908
12*0
35*8
36-5
16*4
1909
5*1
22 * 5
32 ’ 2
8-9
* Paul H. Douglas: Real Wages in the United States, i8go~igs6, pp. 445, 455,
,7 and 460.
f Computed from absolute figures given by Douglas on p. 455 of his book.
138 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES
1897-1927 —continued
Tear
Manufacturing and
Transportation
Building
Trades*
Coal-Mining
Total
1910
3‘7
20*2
28*0
7-2
1911
5*6
25*7
28-5
9*4
1912
4-0
18* 1
26-6
1°
1913
5*4
21 -6
22*1
82
1914
12-9
34-6
32*2
16*4
1915
I2‘4
3 i -5
3 1 * 7
15*5
1916
3*5
20*7
23*2
6-3
I 9 U
3*5
21 *6
18-2
6*o
1918
3*5
17-7
i6* 1
5*5
1919
4*0
17*5
3 i *4
6*9
1920
4*3
23*8
24-8
7-2
1921
21*2
26-6
43*3
23 * 1
1922
i 5'4
19-2
53*5
18*3
1923
4*4
17*2
36-5
7*9
1924
83
25*9
37 *i
12*0
1925
5 *i
21-4 .
37*2
8*9
1926
4*5
17-6
27*8
7*5
1927
5*6
—
—
9 *°t
This table is extraordinarily revealing. Unemployment during
the whole period under review was high, and the lowest points
reached, during the pre-war and war period, were not touched
again during the post-war period. Unemployment, therefore,
was not only high but had a tendency to increase. The lowest
levels of unemployment reached in the period under review were
5’9 per cent in 1906 and 5-5 per cent in 1918—while in Euro¬
pean countries such as Great Britain and Germany, the lowest
percentage reached was about half as high.J
Unemployment was usually lowest in the manufacturing in¬
dustry, and here also the highest percentage was considerably
below the peaks reached in other branches. In the building
trades, only once, in 1906, was unemployment lower than 10 per
cent, and nine times it was above 25 per cent; that is, almost
every third year rather more than a quarter of all building trades
workers were unemployed. Even higher was the percentage
among the miners. The lowest percentage of unemployment
* Computed from absolute figures given by Douglas on p. 455 of his book,
t P. H. Douglas and F. T. Jennison, The Movement of Money and Real Earnings
in the United States , 1926-1928 , p. 48.
J For Great Britain see vol. i, p. 111.
THE DECAY AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1 94 1 1 39
among the miners was 16 • i in 1918; this means that in the best
year of employment almost every sixth miner was unemployed.
Oijly in five out of 30 years was unemployment among miners
less than 25 per cent, and in 10 years—or in every third year—at
least one-third of the miners were unemployed.
Mr. Douglas has also computed figures of the absolute number
of unemployed in these four branches of industry. We must
realize that these figures do not comprise all industrial workers
and that the total number of unemployed, therefore, was actually
higher than that given in the following table:
TOTAL LABOUR SUPPLY AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN MANUFAC¬
TURING, TRANSPORTATION, BUILDING TRADES AND MINING,
1897-1926
In millions of workers
Labour
Unem¬
Labour
Unem¬
Labour
Unem¬
Year
Supply
ployment
Year
Supply
ployment
Year
Supply
ployment
1897
7-0
1 '3
1907
10' 1
°* 7
1917
12*8
o*8
1898
7*2
1-2
1908
10- 1
1-7
1918
I 3 * 1
o -7
1899
7*3
o-8
1909
10-4
0-9
1919
12*8
09
1900
7’5
o-8
1910
10-7
o-8
1920
130
o *9
1901
7*8
o*6
1911
10-9
I ‘O
1921
12*6
2*9
1902
8-3
o*6
1912
11 • 1
o-8
1922
12*8
23
1903
8-7
o*6
1913
1 1 '4
°*9
1923
12*8
1 *o
1904
8-7
o -9
I 9 H
11 -6
1 *9
1924
12*6
1 '5
1905
9*3
o-6
1915
ii *7
i-8
*925
12*6
1 • 1
1906
9*8
o-6
1916
12*2
o-8
1926
12-8
1 -o
In the industries under review there were never less than half
a million workers unemployed. In more than a third of the years
over one million workers were unemployed, and in 1921 almost
three millions. If we add to these three millions the unemployed
of those branches of industry, not represented in the above table,
we find that in 1921 there were not many short of 5,000,000
workers unemployed.
And yet, gigantic as these figures must appear, they are
comparatively small as compared with those of the last fourteen
years. The following figures k based on statistics computed by the
American Federation of Labor are probably not quite so accurate
as those of Douglas, but they are better in so far as they (partly,
at least) refer to all workers. *
* The figures are taken from the American Federationist.
140 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE A.F. OF L. TRADE UNIONS,
1928 TO I93O
{Per Cent)
Tear
Total
Trades
Building
Metal
Printing
All Other
Trades
1928
13
27
11
5
9
1929
12
25
7
4
8
1930
21
40
20
7
14
GAINFULLY OCCUPIED, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT,
1929 TO I94I
{In Thousands)
Tear
Gainfully
Occupied*
Employed
Unemployed
Trade Union
Unemployment
1929
48,056
4 6 > i 92
1,864
Per cent
1930
48,752
43,982
4,770
I 4‘5
1931
49,417
40,679
8,738
19-1
1932
50,060
36,878
13> l8 2
238
1933
50,682
36,959
13,723
24*3
1934
5 i , 2 88
51,884
39,193
12,095
20*9
1935
40,539
IL 345
18*5
1936
52,477
42,364
10,112
13*3
* 935 +
5 Li 9 i
40,539
10,652
18-5
5 *>759
42,364
9,395
133
• 937 +
52,307
44,025
8,282
io*5
•938
52,879
41,947
1 o ,933
i 5’3
•939
53,455
43,235
10,220
9,388
10-7
• 94 °
54,027
44,639
10*0
• 94 ‘§
54 , 101
49,088
5 ,oi 3
—
The amount of unemployment reached enormous heights
during the crisis; and was quite unprecedented during the up¬
swing. Almost 14 millions unemployed in 1933 is a gigantic
figure, but data available for former crises in the United States
and in Great Britain indicate that an equally high percentage of
unemployment may have been reached before. But what never
had happened before was the existence of over 8 million workers,
or a corresponding percentage, unemployed after more than four
years of increasing business activity. The unique and most
appalling fact is not the high percentage of unemployment
* Wrongly called “Gainful Workers” by the A.F. of L.; it includes em¬
ployers as well.
t Weighted average; 1940 my estimate, no A.F. of L. estimate available.
t Revised figures; no explanation is given why and how the figures were
revised.
§ Bureau of the Census estimate of Civilian labour force.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igOO TO 194 1 141
during the crisis—though this is terrible enough—but the
enormous amount of unemployment during the period of in¬
creasing business activity.
The question arises, why has unemployment increased so much
during recent years and why was it comparatively higher during
post-war years, especially after the 1933 crisis, than during
pre-war years?
Many explanations have been given. Some say that produc¬
tivity increased too quickly; others that hours of work have not
been reduced quickly enough; again, others say that unemploy¬
ment must always be high in the period of imperialism and
decaying capitalism.
Has productivity increased more rapidly during recent de¬
cades than in former periods? Though not enough statistics are
available to construct an index of productivity in the nineteenth
century, we know enough about productivity to say definitely
that in the twentieth century productivity has not increased
more than formerly, perhaps even less. We know, on the other
hand, that the enormous increase in productivity witnessed
during the first half of the nineteenth century in the textile
industries, and during the second half in the iron and steel
industry, did not cause unemployment, but resulted rather in a
rapid increase of employment in these industries.
At least as inadequate is the argument concerning the shorten¬
ing of the working day. There is no doubt that hours of work
should be deduced, and there can be no doubt that this would
contribute to a relative or absolute decline of unemployment—
for a short period. But it is not good diagnostics to confuse the
contrary of a temporary expedient with the cause of unemploy¬
ment. There have often been periods in the history of labour
conditions, not only in the United States but also in other
countries, when the hours of work were not shortened but
lengthened and yet employment rose.
The assertion that the increase in unemployment is due to the
decay of capitalism, is correct. Yet, it would seem that it is not
wholly sufficient, for we need only to point to Germany where
capitalism is undoubtedly decaying—more so, surely, than in
any other capitalist country—and yet from 1935 on there was a
labour shortage. Germany also provides a second example: in
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
142
1923, when inflation was at its height, no country had so few
unemployed as Germany.
If we bear in mind the table showing the development of
production we know that the rate of growth of production
declined during the twentieth century. A very similar develop¬
ment can be observed in Great Britain* and elsewhere. Now, if
the increase in production slows down, fewer and fewer addi¬
tional workers are needed. If, at the same time, productivity
increases it may be that the increasing production can be main¬
tained by a stable or even a declining number of workers. This
tendency may be counteracted to a certain extent, by a rapid
decline in the number of hours normally worked. We thus come
to the following conclusion:
The number of employed workers is dependent upon the size
of production, the productivity per worker, and the number of
hours worked per worker. In a period in which production tends
to grow less and in which productivity does not tend to increase
in a correspondingly smaller degree, or in which the number of
hours worked per worker is not shortened correspondingly,
unemployment must tend to increase—provided that the adult
population increases, or does not decline correspondingly.
The question is: can one call the period of imperialism, of
monopolism, or, in other words, the period of decaying capital¬
ism, a period during which production tends to grow less and
less? If we look at the few figures available for world production,
we find that world production as a whole has developed very
rapidly during recent decades and perhaps there has been no
lessening in the rate of increase. If, however, we look at the
increase in production of individual countries, we find in many a
decided slackening in the rate of increase. In many of the old
industrial countries the progress of production is slowing down,
while other countries, the industrialization of which is only of
recent date, have made up for this slackening.
Thus, we may say that there is a tendency in many of the
older and most important capitalist countries towards a slacken¬
ing in the rate of progress of production. Since, in addition,
productivity continues to grow at a rapid pace while hours of
work do not decline correspondingly, and the adult population
* See vol. i, p. 81.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igoo TO 1041 143
still'grows in size, there is a tendency in these countries for
unemployment to be higher than formerly.
But decay and imperialism and monopolism do not necessarily
always mean a slackening of the rate of increase of production,
as the example of fascist Germany shows. It is possible through
enormous State orders (for military purposes) to accelerate the
rate of growth of industrial production to such a degree that
unemployment disappears. However, this drive for increased
(war) production cannot last long, and, after some time, must
result either in a war or an overproduction crisis, more severe
than any which we have had so far. It is also possible, during an
inflation period, when real wages decline to unbelievably low
levels and production not only does not increase but falls off
considerably, that unemployment may disappear, even without
an appreciable shortening of the hours of work. This was the
case in Germany during 1923. The explanation of this curious
development was a steep decline in productivity. This did not
necessarily mean that the workers had to work less intensively.
It is true that the objective intensity of work was lower since the
physical working powers of the workers were reduced rapidly
because of their extremely poor diet—the consequence of a rapid
fall in real wages. But they had to work at least as hard, to
exhaust themselves at least as much as before. To some
extent also, this decline of productivity was due to the fact
that an increasing proportion of production was done by hand
instead of by machine, because real wages had declined so
much that hand power had become cheaper than machine
power.
We must, therefore, admit that the relatively high percentage
of unemployment which can be observed in the United States
during post-war years is due to the economy of the United
States being in process of decay, a natural consequence of its
imperialistic-monopolistic structure. This does not mean, how¬
ever, that American capitalism cannot for some time avoid
severe unemployment, just as did German capitalism in 1923
and in recent years. But such periods of low unemployment can
only be shortlived and imply other heavier burdens for the mass
of the population. The final abolition of unemployment can be
accomplished only in a socialist society.
144 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
Apart from unemployment, short-time took away a consider¬
able part of the worker’s earnings. Fortunately, it is possible to
give some data on the extent of short-time for some of the years
under review. The American Federationist , the official journal of
the A.F. of L. has for some years been publishing data on short-
time:
PART-TIME WORK AMONG TRADE UNIONISTS
Tear
Percentage
Tear
Percentage
1931
19
1936
21
1932
21
1937
20
1933
21
1938
20
1934
23
1939
18
1935
22
The percentage of short-time workers has remained fairly
stable in recent years: about one-fifth of all trade unionists
worked short-time.
The amount of time lost from the normal working week
through short-time work can be computed from the statistics of
the National Industrial Conference Board which give data on
the nominal and actual working week, * and from data published
by the Bureau.of Labor Statistics.! Unfortunately, no figures arc
available for the period from 1934 to 1940.
PERCENTAGE OF FULL WORKING TIME LOST THROUGH
SHORT-TIME WORK, 1914 to 1933
Tear
Percentage
Tear
Percentage
1914
6
1927
4
1920
3 t
1928
3
1921
8
1929
2
1922
2§
1930
7
1923
2
1931
11
1924
6
1932
15
1925
3
1933
11
1926
3
Wage losses through short-time have been extraordinarily
high. During the crisis they almost rivalled the losses through
* Used for the years 1914 and 1922 to 1928.
t Used for the years 1929 to 1933.
} June to December only.
§ July to December only.
THE DECAY OP AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1941 145
unemployment. Thus, short-time has in fact become a problem
equal in importance to that of unemployment. It is necessary for
the labour movement to realize this; for up to now very little
notice has been taken of this. On the contrary, short-time has
often been regarded as something “not so bad,” indicating “a
desire on the part of the employers to contribute to the solution
of the problem of unemployment by spreading out the available
work.”
D. Wages, Hours op Work, and Purchasing Power
Wage statistics for the period under review are more numerous
and of better quality than for any of the preceding periods. We
have sufficient data to compute wages per worker including
losses through unemployment and short-time; we can compute
wages per employed worker; wages for the large mass of the
workers and the so-called aristocracy of labour; wages for male
and female workers; yearly and weekly and hourly wages;
money and real and relative (or social) wages; we can compute
wages for industry as a whole, for numerous chief branches of
the national economy, and for a very great number of individual
industries.
In no other country is there such a wealth of wage statistics,
nor such a large number of government and private agencies
collecting statistics of wages. The number of studies published on
wages is great. Though most of the data pertain to the post-war
period, sufficient wage material is also available for the first
years of the century.
In the following pages we give only so much material on the
development of wages as is necessary in order to follow up the
general trend for various groups and under various conditions.
We shall begin with a study of wages of the fully employed
worker. The Bureau of Labor Statistics gives the following
information on hourly wage rates.*
* From History of Wages in the United States from Colonial Times to 1928,
Monthly Labor Review, August, 1935, and Statistical Abstract, 1936. Figures
for 1936 to 1940 hourly earnings based on Monthly Labor Review, September,
1940, and Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1941 ed., vol. ii.
VOL. n. K
I46 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
WAGE RATES PER HOUR FOR INDUSTRIAL WORKERS,
1897 TO I94O
(1913 = IOO)
Year
Index
Year
Index
Year
Index
Year
Index
1897
89
1908
89
1919
184
1930
229
1898
• 69
1909
90
1920
234
i 93 i
217
1899
70
1910
93
1921
218
1932
186
1900
73
1911
95
1922
208
1933
178
1901
74
1912
97
1923
217
1934
200
1902
77
1913
IOO
1924
223
1935
204
1903
80
I 9 H
102
1925
226
1938
206
1904
80
1915
103
1926
229
1937
227
1905
82
1916
hi
1927
231
1938
231
1906
85
1917
128
1928
232
1939
232
i 9 t >7
89
1918
162
1929
233
1940
239
These figures (which we used also for former times) have
during recent decades acquired certain disadvantages which
make them, in a sense, less representative than they are for
former periods. While trade union rates played a relatively
unimportant role in nineteenth century wage statistics they have
acquired such an importance in this index during the twentieth
century that there is a danger of serious misrepresentation of the
development of wages. This danger arises from the fact that
organized workers have succeeded in raising their wages con¬
siderably more, or have been much more successful in resisting
wage cuts than the mass of the unorganized workers. Therefore,
our first objection to this index is that it has an upward bias;
that is, it tends to show wages in a better light than circum¬
stances warrant. *
The second objection does not pertain to the index itself but
to possible misuses to which it may be subjected. For most of the
period, the index shows the development of hourly wage rates,
and, indeed, it is a great satisfaction to be able to study the
development of houfly rates. But, firstly, hourly wage rates are
not hourly earnings; and, secondly, hourly earnings are not
weekly earnings. Or, to express it differently, hourly wage rates
do not indicate correctly the movement of the amount of money
the wage earner gets per hour. Wage rates have a tendency to
rigidity while actual hourly earnings are flexible. During the
* This criticism does not pertain to recent figures, indicating the develop¬
ment of earnings.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1941 147
crisis and depression, actual hourly earnings fall below the rates
while during the boom they often exceed the rates. Furthermore,
they do not indicate changes in the amount the workers actually
find in their pay envelopes since they do not take into account
changes in the number of full time hours worked per week.
Therefore, they are not an adequate indication even of changes
in the fully employed worker’s income.
How important have been the changes in the number of hours
worked per full-time week, becomes obvious from the following
estimates and computations: *
STANDARD HOURS PER WEEK IN ALL INDUSTRY, 1897 to 1932
Year
Hours
Year
Hours
Year
Hours
Year
Hours
1897
57'7
1906
55*3
1915
53*5
1924
50-0
1898
57*8
* 9°7
55‘3
1916
53*3
1925
49*9
1899
57*5
1908
54'9
1917
53*0
1926
49*7
1900
57*3
1909
54‘9
1918
52*2
1927
49-6
1901
56-8
1910
54-6
1919
5 1 ’3
1928
49-6
1902
58-3
1911
54’4
1920
50*4
1929
49-6
1903
55*9
1912
54-2
1921
5°*3
* 93 °
48-6
1904
55*7
1913
53-8
1922
50*5
I 93 i
48'0
1905
55‘7
1914
53'5
1923
50-4
*932
47 "8t
During the thirty-six years under review the number of hours
worked per full time week has declined by almost 20 per cent.
The rate of decline was about double that of the preceding
periods of similar length. The fact that, on the one hand, the
intensification of the working process increased rapidly during
this period and that, at the same time, labour was better organ¬
ized and devoted much of its efforts to shortening the working
day, goes far to explain the quickening decline of the number of
hours worked per full-time week.
In the following table we find an index of full-time weekly
wages, computed on the basis of the above statistics of hourly
wages and standard hours of work.
* Paul Douglas, l.c. pp. 208, 547, and the monthly statistics of the National
Industrial Conference Board.
t First four months only; statistics unfortunately discontinued.
148 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
FULL-TIME WEEKLY WAGE RATES IN INDUSTRY, 1897 to 1933
(1900 = 100)
Year
Index
Year
Index
1897
96
1907
118
1898
96
1908
118
1899
96
1909
119
1900
100
1910
122
1901
IOI
1911
125
1902
104
1912
126
1903
106
1913
130
1904
106
1914
131
1905
112
1915
132
906
”3
Year
Index
Year
Index
1916
143
1925
273
1917
164
1926
274
1918
204
1927
277
1919
227
1928
277
1920
286
1929
278
1921
264
1930
268
1922
255
i93i
251
1923
265
1932
216*
1924
269
1933
204t
The increase is still too high, since trade union wage rates
have too great a share in the wage index, and trade union rates
have a tendency to increase more than average wages; further¬
more, for reasons mentioned above and connected with the
overweighting of trade union rates, this index is not too reliable
as far as year-to-year changes are concerned.
But whatever the deficiencies of the index of hourly wages,
and of that of weekly wage rates—both show a considerable
increase between 1897 and 1916; both show a very rapid in¬
crease between 1916 and 1920; both show relatively stable con¬
ditions between 1920 and 1930; and both show a rapid decline
during the crisis from 1930 to 1933.
Fortunately, our study of wage conditions need not be con¬
fined to full-time weekly wages. We have at our disposal suffi¬
cient material for a study of actual earnings, that is, wage data
which take into account short-time and over-time, which take
into account also that pressure during a crisis which drives actual
hourly earnings below the level of the hourly wage rates, as also
the tendency of actual hourly earnings, in a period of increasing
production, to rise above the level of hourly wage rates.
The following table gives data on actual yearly earnings for
the chief non-agricultural industries:
* Assuming hours during first four months to be indicative of the whole
year.
t Assuming a decline in the number of hours between 1932 and 1933 of
1 per cent.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igOO TO 1941 149
INDEX OF MONEY WAGES OF FULLY AND PART-TIME EMPLOYED
WORKERS PER YEAR, 1897 to 1941.*
(1914 = 100)
Tear
Manufacturing
Industries
Transport
Transport and
Public Utilities]
Coal%
1897
70
69
72
50
1898
7 i
89
72
58
i 899
73
70
72
70
1900
75
70
73
81
19 01
79
7 i
73
86
1902
82
72
73
90
1903
84
75
77
96
1904
82
76
78
87
1905
85
76
77
92
1906 '
87
78
79
99
1907
90
84
85
107
1908
82
85
85
90
1909
89
82
84
97
1910
96
86
87
103
19 11
93
89
90
102
1912
95
9 i
92
1 13
1913
100
96
96
116
1914
100
100
100
100
1915
98
102
103
108
1916
112
109
109
132
1917
i 33
124
123
176
1918
169
175
171
224
1919
200
190
187
210
1920
234
227
220
261
1921
203
205
202
207
1922
198
199
197
176
1923
216
200
198
244
228
1924
214
199
199
1925
221
202
201
214
1926
223
204
203
244
1927
224
206
205
218
1928
226
208
207
226
1929
227
214
212
221
193 °
211
210
21 I
199
i 93 i
189
205
2£>8
164
1932
154
183
189
133
1933
149
177
182
135
1934
163
185
190
160
1935
179
201
204
168
1936
194
210
211
188
1937
214
216
219
200
1938
194
225
226
176
>939
215
229
230
198
1940
227
233
234
246
204
> 94 "
267
247
245
For footnotes see p, 150 .
150 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
INDEX
OF
AVERAGE
MONEY
WAGES
OF FULLY AND
PART-
TIME EMPLOYED*
WORKERS PER
{1900 = 100)
YEAR,
1897 TO I94I
Year
Index
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
'»97
9 i
• 1908
112
1919
264
193 °
280
1898
93
1909
1 19
1920
312
1 93 I
253
«899
96
1910
127
1921
271
1932
212
1900
100
1911
124
1922
260
1933
207
1901
104
1912
128
1923
287
1934
225
1902
108
1913
135
1924
283
1935
244
1903
112
I 9 H
133
1925
288
1936
263
1904
109
1915
133
1926
295
1937
285
1905
112
1916
152
1927
292
1938
265
1906
116
1917
181
1928
296
1939
288
1907
121
1918
235
1929
297
1940
1 94 1
301
346
We note that during the pre-war period wages have increased
most in the coal industry while transport and manufacturing
lagged behind about equally. From 1914 to 1920 wages again
rose most in the coal industry, and wages in the two other chief
branches again lagged behind in about the same degree. During
the first quarter of a century under review we find, therefore, a
relative rise in the position of the miners while the relative
position of workers in manufacturing and transport remained
stable. During the crisis of 1921 miners’ wages dropped so much
that all the relative advantages the miners had gained since 1914
were lost. Since then the relative position of these industries has
* A combination of the indices for Manufacturing, Transport and Public
Utilities, and Coal, weighted according to the number of employed.
* For the years 1897 to 1928 I used the figures given by Paul Douglas
in his book on Real Wages (pp. 246, 325, 336, 350) and in his study with
Florence Tye Jennison, The Movement of Money and Real Earnings in the United
States , 1926-1928. For the years from 1928 to 2941 I used the following
sources:
Manufacturing: Census figures and Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(computed from payroll and employment data).
Transport: Computations of “average compensation per employee per year”
by the interstate Commerce Commission. Census data and payroll and
employment data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics for electric railways.
Public Utilities: 1928 to 1929: Computed on the basis of data published by
the National Industrial Conference Board. 1929 to 1941 Census data and
index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (computed from payroll and employ¬
ment data) for telephone, telegraph, gas and electricity.
t Public Utilities include Telephone, Telegraph, Gas and Electricity.
$ Up to 1914 bituminous coal only; since 1929 including metalliferrous
mining.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1941 I5I
not changed very much and has been similar to that before the
outbreak of the first world war, though transport was always in
a slightly favoured, and coal in a slightly inferior, position.
The workers during the period under review, however,
suffered very severely from unemployment. In order to measure
what the workers receive annually in money one must, there¬
fore, also take into account wage losses through unemployment.
In the following table we give an index of average yearly wages,
including wage losses from short-time and unemployment.
The index is computed by applying the unemployment data
given above to the index of money wages of fully and part-time
employed workers. *
INDEX OF MONEY WAGES OF EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED
WORKERS, 1897 to 1941 (1900 ~ 100)
Year
Index
Year
Index
Year
Index
Year
Index
1897
83
1908
104
1919
273
1930
266
1898
86
1909
120
1920
322
I 93 i
228
1899
96
1910
131
1921
231
1932
180
1900
100
1911
124
1922
236
1933
174
1901
107
1912
132
1923
293
1934
198
1902
112
1913
138
1924
277
1933
221
! 9°3
116
I 9 H
123
1925
291
1938
253
1904
109
1915
124
1926
300
1937
283
1905
116
1916
158
1927
296
*938
249
1906
121
1917
189
1928
299
1939
285
1907
126
1918
247
1929
303
1940
1941
301
349
If we look at the figures for individual years we find a con¬
siderable difference between those in the above and those in the
preceding table. If one includes the effects of unemployment, the
wage index for 1921, for instance, stands at 231 instead of 271
for employed workers only, and in 1933 it stands at 174 instead
of 207; on the other hand in 1929 it stands at 303 instead of 297,
for in years of comparatively low unemployment the difference
is comparatively small.
The best comparison of the effect of fluctuations in unemploy¬
ment upon wages can be made by comparing the wages of all
* For the years 1897 to 1927 ,1 used the data given on pp. 137 f. of this book,
for 1928 I estimated unemployment at 9 per cent, for 1929 at 8 per cent,
and for the years 1930 to 1940 I used the Trade Union percentages given
on p. 140. For 1941 I estimated unemployment at 9 per cent.
152 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
employed, and of all workers including the unemployed, by
cycles:
WAGES OF EMPLOYED WORKERS AND OF ALL WORKERS,
INCLUDING THE UNEMPLOYED, 1897 to 1941
(igoo = 100)
Years Employed Workers All Workers
1897-1908 106 106
1908-1914 125 125
I 9 I 5 _I 9 21 221 221
1922-1933 271 262
I 933 -I 94 L * 26 9 2 57
The above figures show that the effect of high unemployment
was noticeable only in the last two trade cycles, those following
the world war. For, during the preceding cycles, unemployment
though high did not vary much from cycle to cycle. In post-war
years, however, unemployment depressed average wages by 4 per
cent and more as compared with wages of the employed workers
only.
While these figures show the development of money wages and
the influence of short-time and unemployment upon the income
of the worker, they do not, of course, indicate the development
of his purchasing power. In order to study purchasing power we
must first look at the following table, giving the index of the
cost of living,f and then at the next table, which gives the index
of real wages for all workers, employed and unemployed.
THE
COST OF
LIVING,
1897 TO
1941 (/9O0
— 100)
Year
Index
Year
Index
Year
Index
Year
Index
,1897
94
1908
"4
1919
227
1930
218
1898
94
1909
114
1920
261
1931
199
1899
96
1910
121
1921
233
1932
180
1900
100
1911
125
1922
219
J 933
171
1901
102
1912
125
1923
223
1934
177
1902
105
1913
129
*924
223
1935
182
1903
109
t 9 H
131
1925
229
1938
184
1904
108
1915
132
1926
231
1937
190
I9<>5
108
1916
142
1927
226
1938
186
1906
112
1917
167
1928
224
1939
184
1907
"9
1918
196
1929
224
1940
185
j
%
I94i
194
* Incomplete cycle.
t For the years 1897 to 1913 cf. the above-mentioned book by Douglas;
for the years 1913 to 1937 cf. Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power
(Public Resolution No. 113, Seventy-Fifth Congress), Part 1, p. 61, and for
the more recent years see Monthly Labor Review.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1941 153
During the pre-war period, 1897 to l 9 l 4 retail prices had a
tendency to rise considerably. In 1914, they were more than a
third higher than at the end of the nineteenth century. During
the world war and early post-war years prices doubled. After a
decline from 1920 to 1921 they remained fairly stable during the
twenties, declined again during the world crisis of 1929 to 1933.
and showed, in recent years, a tendency to increase again.
REAL WAGES OF EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED WORKERS,
1897 T0 I 94 I ( J 9°° — roo)
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
1897
88
1908
9 i
1919
120
1930
122
1898
9i
1909
105
1920
123
1931
”5
1899
100
1910
108
1921
99
1932
100
1900
100
1911
99
1922
108
1933
102
1901
105
1912
106
1923
131
1934
112
1902
107
1913
107
1924
124
1935
121
1903
106
1914
94
1925
127
1936
137
1904
IOI
1915
94
1926
130
1937
149
1905
107
1916
111
1927
131
1938
134
1906
108
1917
113
1928
133
1939
J 55
1907
106
1918
126
1929
135
194 °
1941
162
180
Looking over the entire period, we find that wages on the
average fluctuated considerably before the world war, but did
not increase on the whole. During the world war, wages rose,
the purchasing power of the workers increased; they shared to a
small extent in the gigantic war profits of American capitalism.
Then followed the crisis, and in 1921 the purchasing power of all
industrial workers was about the same as in the beginning of the
century. During the twenties real wages increased again but only
a little above the level reached in 1918. During the crisis, from
1929 to 1933, real wages fell again to the 1921 crisis level. In the
following years the purchasing power rose again, this time not
immaterially above the peak year of the previous trade cycle.
The above figures, however, refer only to wages of industrial
workers. The picture of wage conditions looks somewhat different
if we include the wages of agricultural workers.* The wages of
* The index of wages of agricultural workers is an index of wage rates
based on the data given in the Statistical Abstract for the United States. For
necessary interpolations the methods of Douglas, referred to above (see p. 186
of his book), were applied. I assumed that unemployment among agricultural
workers corresponded to the national average.
154
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
agricultural workers have moved considerably less favourably
during the twentieth century than those of industrial workers.
The following table gives the wages of all wage earners:
REAL WAGES OF EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED WORKERS
(INCLUDING AGRICULTURAL WORKERS), 1897 to 1941
(1900 = 100)
Year
Index
Year
Index
Year
Index
Year
Index
1897
88
1908
94
1919
122
1930
118
1898
9i
1909
108
1920
125
1931
109
i 899
100
1910
110
1921
96
1932
93
1900
100
1911
IOI
1922
104
! 933
94
1901
105
1912
108
1923
127
*934
104
1902
107
1913
109
*924
121
1935
112
1903
106
i9H
95
1925
123
1936
127
1904
102
1915
96
1926
126
1937
139
1905
109
1916
112
1927
127
1938
126
1906
IIO
1917
115
1928
129
1939
144
I9<>7
107
1918
127
1929
131
1940
J 94i
149
167
Up to the end of the first world war and during the first post¬
war years, there is relatively little difference between this and the
preceding table. But in the following years, during the second
half of the twenties, the crisis of 1929-1933 and during the
thirties a considerable difference is developing, owing' to the
specially poor wage conditions among the agricultural workers.
In the following table we survey the development of real wages
during the last 150 years by trade cycles:
REAL WAGES, 1791 to 1941*
(1900 — 100)
Decades and Trade Cycles
Index
1791-1800
54
1801-1810
61
1811-1820
61
1821-1826
89
1827-1834
72
1835-1842
72
1843-1848
83
1849-1858
79
1859-1867
72
Decades and Trade Cycles Index
1868-1878 87
1878-1885 92
1885-1897 101
1897-1908 102
1908-1914 104
1915-1921 113
1922-1933 117
I 933~ I 94 I t *25
* 1791-1897 real wages of fully employed workers; 1897-1940 real wages
of all workers, including the unemployed,
t Incomplete trade cycle.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igOO TO 1941 155
The movement of real wages during the last half century is
most interesting. During the first half of the period real wages
remained fairly stable, being about the same in all three trade
cycles. During the second half of the period they first increased
not inconsiderably; during the twenties and thirties, however,
the increase was smaller.
Compressing the above averages into new averages, each new
average comprising three decades or trade cycles, and com¬
pressing the trade cycles of the twentieth century into one single
average, we arrive at the following figures:
1791-1820
59
1821-1842
1843-1867
78
1868-1897
93
1897-1941
112
From this table emerges the astonishing fact that, during the
whole of the twentieth century, real wages did not increase more
than during the considerably shorter three-cycle period which
preceded it. This fact must be kept in mind later on when we
study such factors as the increased intensity of work, which make
for a lowering of the workers’ standard of living.
But it is not sufficient to consider only the wages of all fully
employed workers, or of all employed workers or even of all
/workers, including the unemployed. In order to understand the
development of wages it is important that we also consider the
development of the wages of the mass of the workers in relation
to those of the labour aristocracy. While the two terms are
applied rather roughly, the indices give an approximate indica¬
tion of the relative development of the wages of these two cate¬
gories of workers. *
* The mass of the workers comprises the following industries and occupa¬
tions: wages of unskilled workers, textile and clothing workers, agricultural
workers, woodworkers, tobacco and beverage industries’ workers, confectionery
workers. The labour aristocracy comprises the following industries and
occupations: wages of building and metal workers, wages of printers, stone,
building material and glass workers. For particulars see Jiirgen Kuczynski,
Die Entwicklung der Lage der Arbeiterschaft in Europa und Amerika, 1870-1933. For
1934 to 1940 wages computed in the same way except that wages in the food
industries replaced those for beverage and confectionery industrial workers,
and that instead of the Federal Reserve Board Bureau of Labor Statistics
data were used. For a more detailed characterization of the labour aristocracy
see also vol. i of this history of labour conditions, p. 87 f.
I56 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
WAGES OF EMPLOYED WORKERS OF THE LABOUR ARIS¬
TOCRACY AND THE MASS OF THE WORKERS, 1897 to 1939
{1900 = 100)
Years
Aristocracy
Mass
1
T
o>
00
108
108
1908-1914
130
129
1915-1921
209
219
1922-1933
290
235
1933-1939
305
190
This table—which includes agricultural workers and which,
among the industrial workers does not cover groups identical
with those covered by the former indices—throws such a strong
light on the development as a whole that it is worthy of more
detailed discussion.
The mass of the workers improved their position in relation to
that of the labour aristocracy during the war cycle. During the
first post-war cycle, ho\yever, the position of these workers
definitely deteriorated in relation to that of the labour aristo¬
cracy. In fact, the twenties and thirties are the two decades in
the twentieth century during which the relative position of the
labour aristocracy improved. The improvement was very rapid
in the twenties; and this improvement contributed to or may
even have caused the “high wages myth” which the crisis of
1929-1933 so effectively destroyed.
How was it that the relative position of the mass of the workers
improved during the war? There was a labour shortage during
the war and before demobilization was completed. Because of
this the rise in wages was highest with the mass of the workers;
while' a certain process of dilution of labour, of dividing a job
previously done by skilled labour into several unskilled jobs,
adversely affected the “privileged position” of the skilled workers.
If we analyse the development of real wages during the war
cycle we find that during the first two years of the world war
they were comparatively low and did not increase before the
United States had taken over enormous war contracts and then,
somewhat later, entered the war:
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I90O TO 1941 I57
REAL WAGES* OF THE ARISTOCRACY AND THE MASS OF THE
WORKERS DURING THE WAR CYCLE
(1900 =3 100)
Tears
Aristocracy
Mass
97
93
1915
102
96
1916
110
hi
1917
102
hi
1918
106
U 4
1919
104
116
1920
108
"7
1921
100
85
Not until 1916 did the wages of the mass of the workers rise
steeply, and, while the rapid rise from 1915 to 1916 was followed
by a period of relative stability with a pronounced upward
trend until 1920, the purchasing power of the labour aristocracy
fluctuated from year to year, rising and then declining.
During the crisis the purchasing power of the mass of the
workers declined. If we compare the purchasing power of these
groups with that of all workers, we find that: the index of the
purchasing power of all workers increased from the war cycle to
the first post-war cycle by about 4 per cent; the index of the
purchasing power of the labour aristocracy increased by about
23 per cent, while that of the mass of the workers declined by
about 3 per cent.
Concluding our examination of the relative development of
the wages of the mass of the workers and of the so-called labour
aristocracy, we find that, during the first phase under review,
comprising the two pre-war cycles, the relative position of the
labour aristocracy and the mass of the workers underwent no
great changes; during the war cycle the mass of the workers
forged ahead relatively, for reasons explained above; during the
two post-war cycles, however, the mass of the workers lost their
relative advantages and the relative position of the labour
aristocracy again improved.
In this connection two questions arise: the first with regard to
the relative position of women; and tfye second to the relative
position of the Southern workers whose position we have described
in some detail in the previous chapter, f Did the relative position
* Wage losses through unemployment taken into account,
t See pp. 101 ff. of this book.
158 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
of women’s wages in industry change in about the same direction
as that of the mass of the workers? And what was the relative
position of the lowest paid regional group in the United States,
the Southern Workers?
According to the Census of Manufactures, average annual
wages of employed workers developed in the whole United
States and in the Southern States as follows:
AVERAGE WAGES OF EMPLOYED WORKERS IN MANUFAC¬
TURING INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE
SOUTHERN STATES, 1899 to 1939
(Dollars)
Year United States East South Ctti*ral South Atlantic
1899
426
1904
477
1909
518
1914
580
1919
U158
1923
! > 2 54
1927
1 >299
1931
1,102
1935
1,023
1939
Li 53
3 l6
286
379
336
390
368
446
428
901
952
894
877
921
904
797
794
735
746
813
838
From 1899 to 1914, wages in the whole of the United States
increased by 36 per cent and in the South by 41 (East South
Central) and 49 (South Atlantic) per cent. The position of the
Southern worker, therefore, had relatively improved, This im¬
provement continued during the war, and in 1919 wages for the
whole of the United States had doubled, as compared with 1914,
while those in the East South Central States had increased by
104 and those in the South Atlantic States by 122 per cent.
During the post-war period, however, the relative position of the
Southern worker deteriorated; and in 1939, while wages for the
United States as a whole were about the same as in 1919,
wages in the South Atlantic States had fallen by 12 per cent and
in the East South Central States by 10 per cent.
On the whole, the development of the Southern workers’
relative position and that of the mass of the workers, as compared
with that of the labour aristocracy, was not very dissimilar.
Both improved their relative position during the war and both
experienced a relative deterioration in the post-war period.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 19OO TO 1941 159
As to the relative development of wages of male and female
workers, no very reliable statistics are available for the pre-war
period.
Paul Brissenden* estimates the earnings of men and women in
manufacturing industries as follows :
FULL-TIME MONEY EARNINGS OF MEN AND WOMEN IN ALL
MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES,
(Dollars)
1899 TO
Tear
Men
Women
1899
587
314
1904
659
353
1909
729
39 i
1914
804
430
According to Brissenden’s estimate, women’s wages were about
54 per cent of the men’s throughout the whole period.
For the period since 1914, we have at our disposal a number
of data collected by the National Industrial Conference Board.
The National Industrial Conference Board is an employers’ re¬
search association, and would obviously be biassed against
labour. I have had occasion several times to use in this study the
material published by this organization, and 1 do so because
even these statistics reveal how labour’s position has deteriorated.
HOURLY WAGES OF MEN AND WOMEN IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES, 1914 to 1941
(1923 = 100)
Tear
Men\
Women
Tear
Men
Women
1914 July
47
40
1930
107
103
ig2o{
111
108
i 93 i
102
97
1921
97
95
1932
90
85
I922§
9 i
92
1933
89
89
1923
100
100
1934
104
111
1924
104
103
1935
107
113
1925
104
102
1938
in
113
1926
105
104
1937
126
124
1927
106
104
1938
130
126
1928
107
103
1939
131
124
1929
108
104
1940
134
128
‘
1941
148
139
* Earnings of Factory Workers , 1899 to 1927 . Census Monographs X, p. 85.
f Skilled and semi-skilled men. J June to December. § July to December.
160 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
Between 1914 and 1920 the position of women improved.
While, according to the statistics of the National Industrial
Conference Board, women’s wages were only 53 per cent of
those of skilled and semi-skilled men in 1914, they were about
60 per cent in 1920; at the same time, the wages of unskilled
men, in relation to those of skilled and semi-skilled, increased
from 70 to 77 per cent.* They thus increased a little less than
those of women, so that it can be said that the position of women
improved relatively to that of all men, though much less to that
of unskilled men. The fact is that, during the war and the first
post-war years, the relative position of all lower paid workers
improved whether of unskilled men or Southern workers, or
women, or of the mass of the workers as contrasted to the labour
aristocracy.
From 1920 to 1923 the position of women relatively to that of
men continued to improve slightly, reaching a percentage of 62;
while that of unskilled workers deteriorated (as did that of the
mass of the workers and of Southern workers) from 77 to 72 per
cent of those of the skilled and semi-skilled workers. During the
following years, however, the relative position of women also
began to deteriorate and reached a low level in 1932. After this,
women’s relative position improved again, in 1935, in conse¬
quence of the progressive policy during the second Roosevelt
administration, becoming even higher than in 1923; that of the
unskilled men also almost regained the 1919 level. In recent
years, a deterioration has taken place for women while for
unskilled workers the improvement continued.
We have gone into more detail in this connection and have
always compared the relative development of several groups in
the same period in order to show that there is no absolute con¬
formity in the development of wages of all groups, that there is
not even conformity in the development of wages of the most
depressed groups; but, though there is no conformity, the
development of the relative position of the most depressed groups
of workers—such as women, unskilled workers, Southern workers,
Negroes, or the mass of the workers as contrasted with the labour
aristocracy—is, on the whole, not very dissimilar and the trend
over a longer period is often the same.
* Based on statistics of the National Industrial Conference Board.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 19OO TO 1 94 1 l6l
Unfortunately, one interesting comparison cannot be made:
that between wages of organized and unorganized workers. No
adequate data are available for such a comparison, and it is
really high time that the Bureau of Labor Statistics or the A.F.
of L. or C.I.O. undertook such a task. No study has been made
of the pioneer efforts of organized workers: not only in raising
their own wages or resisting a decline, but also in affecting by
these actions the wages of unorganized workers to their advan¬
tage. No study has been made to present the considerable
benefit derived by unorganized workers from the struggles and
victories of organized labour. How could one better convince
unorganized workers of the benefits of trade unionism than by
pointing out the advantages gained for them by organized
labour, and showing them that, though they do not benefit to
the full extent, they do benefit partly from these struggles and
victories; that it is hardly to their credit to refuse to join in the
fight by joining a trade union while they are ready to reap the
benefit of the unions’ fight. One could also show them how many
a fight of organized labour has weakened or lost because of
insufficient numbers being organized, and how labour would
gain by better organization.
E. Productivity and Intensity of Work
While real wages increased during the period under review,
the intensity of work and productivity per worker increased too,
the latter, at least, rising considerably more than real wages.
Looking through the literature published during the last
fifteen years, one gets the impression that the increase in produc¬
tivity during the twenties and thirties was unprecedented. And
because this appeared to be so, many of the social evils of present
times have been attributed to it.
Let us now study the development over the whole period under
review. The following table gives an index of productivity in the
combined manufacturing and mining industries. The figures for
the twentieth century are very much better than those for the
nineteenth century, but a rough comparison of the development
is possible even if the figures are not of equal quality.
VOL. II. L
162 A shoAt history of labour conditions
When we compare the rates of growth of productivity over the
whole period, we find considerable fluctuations. We also find
that the rate of growth during the twentieth century is by no
means unique.
PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING, 1827 to 1941*
(igoo — 100)
Trade Cycle
Index
Trade Cycle
Index
1827-1834
15
1885-1897
86
1835-1842
22
1 897-1908
104
1843-1848
► 34
1908-1914
116
1849-1858
37
1915-1921
127
1859-1867
4 1
1922-1933
187
1868-1878
58
1933 - 194 1
237
1878-1885
72
♦ For productivity data up to 1897 see the previous chapters. For the years
since 1897 productivity was computed as follows. I first constructed an index
of productivity in manufacturing industries (which is given in detail on the
next page) in the following way: First an index of man-hours worked was
constructed by making use for the years 1899 to 1919 of the data on labour
supply in manufacturing (and transport) as given by Douglas on p. 116 of his
book before mentioned, and of Brissenden’s estimate of unemployment and
short-time, also quoted by Douglas, and of Douglas' estimate of changes in
standard hours of work; for the years 1919 to 1923 I used the data on employ¬
ment given by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and of actual hours worked given
by the National Industrial Conference Board; for the years 1923 to 1939 I
used the data on man-hours given by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the
Monthly Labor Review , September, 1940; the data for the years prior to 1923 were
adjusted to the man-hour data computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
for the years 1909, 1914 and 1923; for 1940 and 1941 I used the Bureau of
Labor Statistics data on employment and average weekly hours of work. The
index of production is composed of the index constructed by Warren M.
Persons and Le Baron R. Foster (“A New Index of Industrial Production
and Trade,” The Review of Economic Statistics , August 15, 1933) for the years
1899 to 1919—and of the index computed by the Federal Reserve Board for
the years 1919 to 1941. For the years 1897 to 1899 the figures for man-hours
and production were estimated on the basis of the scanty and scattered material
available. By dividing the index of man-hours into the index of production I
arrived at our index of productivity in manufacturing industries. The index
of productivity in mining is based on that computed for tota mining, excluding
oil and gas wells, by H. Barger and S. H. Schurr, The Mining Industries , i8gg-
1939 » A Stuffy of Output , Employment and Productivity , New York, 1944. Years,
for which Barger and Schurr do not supply combined data, have been inter¬
polated with the help of data for coal and metals, as far as available (coal
data are available for all years); for the years 1940 and 1941 I used the data
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics .-Both indices of productivity were
then combined, weights corresponding to employment figures.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1941 163
Yet, while not unique, it is of special interest. We remember
that towards the end of the first period of exploitation and
during the period of transition productivity increased very little
while production continued to rise rapidly. A similar slowing
down, though not quite so pronounced, in the rate of increase of
productivity can be observed towards the end of the second
period of exploitation, including the transition period lasting
until about 1921. But while during the previous transition period
production continued to increase rapidly, its rate of growth fell
rapidly in the second period of transition, covering the years
from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the first
world war. After American capitalism had fully entered the third
period of its development, productivity began to rise again
rapidly, while production continued to rise only slowly. In this
respect the development in the United States is not fundamen¬
tally different from that in Great Britain.
For the manufacturing industries we can give reliable annual
data since 1897. Productivity developed as follows:
PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1899 to 1941*
(1 goo = 100)
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
Tear
Index
1897
89
1908
108
1919
129
193 °
268
1898
93
1909
”5
1920
I 3 i
1931
206
1899
100
1910
ii 5
1921
142
1932
204
1900
100
1911
115
1922
159
1933
221
1901
105
1912
120
1923
160
1934
227
IQ02
104
1913
125
1924
169
1935
240
1903
106 *
I 9 H
121
1925
177
1938
244
1904
109
1915
128
1926
183
1937
245
1905
111
1916
121
1927
189
1938
251
1906
110
i 9 U
118
1928
199
1939
270
1907
109
1918
1 19
1929
207
1940
288
I 94 1
292
The development of productivity was upward; it did not
increase steadily from year to year, for there were years when
productivity remained stable or even had a slight downward
trend. If we look at trade cycle averages of the development of
productivity, we get the following picture. (See table onp, 164.)
From 1897-1908 to 1908-1914, productivity increased by 13
per cent. During the following trade cycle it rose by about 8 per
* For methods of computation see preceding footnote.
164 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
cent, and in the last full trade cycle under review productivity
increased by about 50 per cent.
PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(1900 = 100)
1897-1908
104
I90&-I9I4
117
1915-1921
127
1922-1933
190
1933-1941
253
During the years 1916 to 1918 productivity was below the
1915 level. The causes for this are obvious. During the war years,
when work in many industries was switched over to war pro¬
duction, many people worked at processes to which they were
not accustomed—partly because of the altered nature of the
work, and partly because of the change in the composition of the
industrial working-class. Many industrial workers were mobilized
and many agricultural workers or other workers who had never
done any factory work came into industry. At that time profits
were rising rapidly; and it is easily understandable that, on the
one hand, productivity per worker could not rise as quickly as
before, and might at times even have a downward trend, while,
on the other hand, the employers—who obtained whatever
prices they demanded—were not as concerned as previously
with a steady increase of productivity and intensity of work.
Somewhat similar computations, though partly based on other
material for the manufacturing industries, have been made by
David Weintraub and Harold L. Posner, for some of the chief
branches of national economy for the years 1920 to 1934. Instead
of computing an index of productivity they computed the inverse
ratio of such an index, an index of labour requirement per
production unit.*
Quite obviously, productivity increased most in manufacturing
industries. On steam railroads and in telephone communica¬
tions its increase was about level, but less than in the manu¬
facturing industries. In mining the rate of increase of productivity
up to 1932 was greater than in the two last-mentioned branches
of industry; after that it began to decrease—probably because
* Unemployment and Increasing Productivity , National Research Project, March
1937 . P- 36 .
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO I94I 165
increased production meant the use of less rich and less easily
workable seams—but from 1935 on it increased again. In mining,
therefore, we encounter the same phenomenon after the crisis as in
manufacturing industries, though more sharply expressed': increas¬
ing production following a crisis leads first to decreasing, or less
quickly increasing, productivity because of the use of less modern
machinery or the working of poorer mines—a consequence of the
development during the crisis, which leads to production being
restricted to the most modern machinery or the best seams only.
MAN-HOURS NECESSARY PER UNIT OF OUTPUT, 1920 to 1941
V
(1920 *= IOO)
Telephone
Tear
Manufacturing
Mining
Steam Railroad
Communication
1920
IOO
IOO
IOO
IOO
1921
91 -6
96-2
100*3
96-4
1922
86*7
920
97*7
89-3
1923
88-2
89-2
94*2
91-2
1924
82* 1
9 1 *°
91*8
926
1925
78-6
88-6
87*3
90-5
1926
76-4
87-5
85*1
87-8
1927
74 -°
85-0
85*6
85-7
1928
69-0
81-3
81 *9
85-1
1929
69*8
78-5
80 *4
85-6
1930
65*0
76-8
81 *2
85-8
i 93 i
59 *o
74‘3
81 *2
80*4
1932
54*9
74-8
83*9
81 *4
1933
55 *o
77-9
75 *o
80*3
1934
55*6
80 *7
74*3
75*2
1 935 41
52*6
78-3
71*1
69- 9 t
1936
5 i *7
74*3
663
67 -6t
1937
5 i *5
72-6
65*1
68- 4 t
1938
50*2
67-9
65-8
® 5 '°t
1939
46-7
63-0
62*4
62- 4 t
1940
44 *o
62*7
60 *9
—
i 94 i
43*4
60-9
60 *0
—
From the scanty material available we find that during
former crises, especially in the nineteenth century, productivity
used to decline. The reason is probably that, firstly, in former
times the skill of the individual worker played a greater role
* Computations based on data I gave in the preceding tables, and given
in Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1941 ed., vol. ii, p. 13, and on Bureau of
Labor Statistics releases LS 45—3231 and LS 45—3461; figures for mining,
1935-1941, refer to bituminous coal only,
f Computations based on figures given in Labor Fact Book , vol. v, p. 78.
166 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
than it does to-day. It was in a firm’s interests to keep as large a
skilled labour force as possible in its employ, even if business was
defining; therefore, the number of employed skilled workers
tended to decrease less rapidly in relation to the decline in
production than it does to-day. This finds expression in a smaller
increase or a larger decrease of productivity per worker. Secondly,
it is probable that the decline of the competitive and the growth
of the monopolistic system have led to a much more varied
technical equipment of establishments. While formerly a com¬
pany using both old-fashioned and modern blast furnaces would
have been driven out of business after a while, the present mono¬
polistic structure of many industries allows many companies to
employ side by side both semi-obsolete and very modern equip¬
ment. This is because the monopolistic price is fixed so as to
allow a profit for the least well equipped department or company
within the monopoly ring. While formerly, therefore, a decline of
production during the crisis usually meant simply a decline in
the productive capacity used, to-day it means in addition the
restriction of productive capacity to the most modern and best
equipped means of production.
In this connection it is of interest to note that in the 1920’s
among the factories belonging to the New England textile manu¬
facturers’ ring, there were one or two factories whose equipment
dated from just after the Civil War, and it was these factories
which determined the cost accounting for the ring as a whole. It
is impossible to imagine any company in the nineties of the last
century, using equipment dating from the thirties. Whatever
may be the rate of technical progress to-day as compared with
fifty years ago, one thing is sure: technical progress fifty years
ago was more evenly spread and the existence of factories with
such widely varying equipment—including the latest and the
most antiquated machinery such as we find to-day under the
shelter of monopolism—was impossible.
An increase in productivity usually means an increase also in
the intensity of work. It is impossible, however, to measure this
increase in the intensity of work, and to ascertain the increase in
working energy expended by the worker per hour and per day
from a table showing the increase in the productivity of work.
Unfortunately, no dafii of a comprehensive character are avail-
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO I94I 167
able for measuring the increase in the intensity of work which
took place in the period under review. On the other hand, there
is no doubt that it did increase rapidly. The cyclostyled and,
unfortunately, already forgotten Preliminary Report on the Study
of Regularization of Employment and Improvement of Labor Conditions
in the Automobile Industry * gives numerous examples of the
rapid increase in the intensity of work and its effects upon the
workers.
If we study the intensity of work and the productivity per
worker over the last hundred and fifty years, we find that there
have been periods in which various means of increasing produc¬
tivity and intensity of work have been used.
In Chapter I we observed that, in the earliest period of Ameri¬
can capitalism, productivity of work was increased chiefly
through extending the working day and the introduction of
improved machinery. During the second period, from the forties
to the Civil War, the hours of work were seldom extended; on
the contrary, we found on the whole a diminution in the number
of hours worked per week. The intensity of work was increased
per hour (and thus per day, too) and new machinery was intro¬
duced to accelerate production. During the third period under
review, ending in the nineties, the development was not very
different from that which took place during the preceding period.
In other words, after the changes in the late thirties and the
early forties of the nineteenth century, methods of increasing
productivity and the intensity of work altered little—until the
twentieth century.
The twentieth century introduced a new factor in the tech¬
nique of extracting more from labour. Productivity per hour can
be increased in three ways:
1. Through the introduction of new machinery;
2. Through better organization of the production process;
3. Through speeding up the work the worker has to perform.
The first method means an increase in the productivity per
worker without necessarily increasing the intensity of work. The
* Prepared and published by the National Recovery Administration
Research and Planning Division.
168
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
same holds true of method 2. Method 3, of course, means that the
worker has to expend more energy per hour.
The first was the method used chiefly during the period from
the forties to the nineties in the nineteenth century—though it
was always combined with method 3.
The second method began to be used on a large scale with the
introduction of the Taylor system, and spread more and more
rapidly in recent years. To-day it is known under the high-
sounding name of scientific management. Method 2, if not
coupled with method 3, means great organizational progress.
Naturally, no socialist state would ignore the use of method 2,
nor would it dispense with method 1. But in the United States,
as in other capitalist countries, method 2 is used to-day chiefly in
order to increase the intensity of work. This has become a pro¬
fession and thousands of men are learning to-day how to speed-up
workers and how to intensify the working process.
What is expected from these men is explained clearly in the
following letter: *
“Dear Mr. Johnson,
“I have been keeping close tabs on your payroll and pro¬
duction at Loray Division and I am glad to say it is very grati¬
fying to see your payroll come down and your production go up.
I am frank to say I was sceptical about your being able to cut
$500,000 a year on the Loray payroll and keep your production
up. I want to apologize for this scepticism. Now I think you can
cut out $1,000,000 a year and still keep your production up.
{Signed) “F. L. Jenckes.”
The following editorial from the American Wool and Cotton
Reporter , February 24, 1927, is equally significant:
“If there is any manufacturer who doesn’t know how to
successfully and efficiently stretch out his machinery, to work
out plans and methods for increasing the production per opera¬
tive, we will be glad to name service organizations who have had
a very wide and wholly successful experience in this work. . . .
* Quoted from Labor and Textiles , a study of cotton and wool manufacturing,
by Robert W. Dunn and Jack Hardy, p. 131. This excellent book contains
numerous other examples of the speeding-up process in the textile industry.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO I941 169
If you have not already doubled up your processes per operative
these men can show you how to do it.”
In the course of time, however, these men who have studied
and learned how to intensify work, how to speed up the workers,
havf themselves been put under a speed-up system. If they do
not speed up the workers enough, they are fired. The speeders
are sped. An interesting sidelight on this development is to be
found in the above-mentioned report on the automobile indus¬
try :*
“The (automobile) industry led the country in effective time-
study of its operations and the time-study men gradually brought
its operations to this efficient peak. The competitive conditions of
the past few years have reached down to these time-study men.
They have been forced to show how to make inequitable reduc¬
tions in working time to hold their own jobs and from setting
jobs on an efficient basis, they have come to set them on a
speed-up basis that puts production demands beyond human
capability to produce day after day.”
Here we have an official statement on two facts: first, that the
time-study men have been put themselves under “time-study
conditions” in order to intensify their activity of intensifying the
work of the workers; second, that they have succeeded so well
that the workers can keep the pace only for a limited time and a
longer period of work at such a tempo must lead to a breakdown.
A worker who has worked continuously for several years in a
modern automobile factory very often needs either to rest for a
long spell in a sanatorium (but none can do that!) or he is
partly incapacitated for the rest of his life.
Now let us assume that such a worker has received during the
last forty years a real wage increase of 40 per cent, double the
average of all workers. What has he gained? First, he needs
more and better food when working owing to rapid exhaustion
of energy. In addition, he incurs permanent injury to his health
and thus his earning power is reduced. What, then, does a real
wage increase of 40 per cent over forty years mean under such
conditions? Nothing! The loss which the worker suffers is
greater, and to conclude from the wage increase that his working
and living conditions have improved is altogether erroneous.
* P. 46.
170 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
For, if more of his working power is taken from him, he needs
more to feed and rest his body and nerves.
But how is it possible that the worker’s energy has been used
so much more in recent times than before? How is it to be ex¬
plained that the employers of former times did not exploit this
energy to such a degree that no further increase was possible?
Is it possible for the employers to tap ever fresh reserves of work¬
ing power in the workers?
The history of the increasing use made of the working power
of the individual worker is somewhat complicated. Originally, the
employers utilized the workers’ strength as much as possible by
making them work as early in life as possible (child labour) and
by working them as long per day as possible. The result was that,
after half a century of more and more widespread application of
this method, the health of the children was so impaired that
their potential future working power was seriously impaired.
They grew up to become very unsatisfactory workers—if they
grew up. At the same time, the adult workers were so exhausted
by their long \yorking day that any extension of this method
became impossible. Furthermore, the resistance of the working
class to the lengthening of the working day grew rapidly. For all
these reasons the employers had to seek another way of tapping
to the fullest extent the working powers of the individual
worker.
After the forties, we notice a shortening of the working day
and the employers’ consequent effort to intensify the exertions of
the workers per hour. The employers discovered that it was
possible to get more out of the worker in a ten-hour day than in
a twelve-hour day if the machinery was run more quickly, if
each worker had to tend more machines, and, sometimes, if the
production process as a whole was arranged in a better way.
This period lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century.
To-day, in a certain sense, the employers have combined their
earlier and their more recent methods. The intensity of work is
continuously being increased, and this is possible because to-day
the employers no longer care whether a worker’s strength is
drained to such a degree that, after five or ten years, his working
powers are definitely impaired. In a sense, the old methods,
applied towards the workers’ children at the beginning of the
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igOO TO 1941 171
nineteenth century, are applied to-day to the adult workers. In
the beginning of the nineteenth century employers either did not
realize or did not care that the children working in their factories
would not be able to work ten years hence with the same capacity
and intensity as adult workers, because their health was already,
during their childhood, seriously impaired. To-day, the employers
realize very well that the intensity of work in many occupations
may impair seriously the health of the workers, or at least de¬
crease their working capacity. But to-day, because of the high
rate of unemployment the employers feel sure that they can
always get a fresh supply of workers, either from young people or
from occupations where the working speed has not yet reached
such a rate. The employers are no longer concerned to preserve
the full working capacity of a worker for, let us say, thirty years.
They do not care if the full working capacity is exhausted after
ten years. In some industries, such as the automobile industry,
the pace can be kept by the great majority of the workers only
for five years.* After that these workers have to drift to lower
paid occupations, or remain unemployed because other em¬
ployers do not employ such obviously unfit types.
The process of exhaustion of the working capacity of the
American people has been quickened recently to such a degree
that shortly only rapidly increasing productivity, based on
technical and organizational progress, will make possible any
substantial increase in production. While, on the one hand,
unemployment has a tendency to increase, on the other, the
working capacity of the American people tends to decrease,
because the working capacity of the individual worker is ex¬
hausted so quickly. Though the intensity of work per hour is
higher than ever—if we seek to estimate the volume of work
done by the individual worker during his whole life, it is perhaps
less to-day than twenty years ago. The American working class
and its powers to produce will slowly but surely be destroyed if
the present tendency is allowed to continue. The worker’s life
tends more and more to be composed of a short period of years,
during which he produces with unprecedented intensity, and of
a long period during which he works at a considerably reduced
* Automobile workers testified to the existence of this time limit as early
as in 1928-1929.
172 A SHORT HISTORY OP LABOUR CONDITIONS
rate of speed, often interrupted by illness, and at a much lower
wage.
The tragedy of this second period in the worker’s life is all the
greater since the subjective intensity of his work is probably at
least as high as during the former period. In spite of his impaired
health he is constantly driven to give the utmost of his working
power and though this utmost is considerably lower than it was
before, it requires as much personal effort on his part or more.
Thus, the worker’s life consists of a continuous effort to give all
his strength in order to keep a job, in order to get some sort of
wage, rather than be scrapped as a useless member of industrial
society.
It is, therefore, no longer merely a question of “decent working
and living conditions”; nor a question solely of improving or
checking the deterioration of the standards of work and life of
the American working, class. For, as things now stand, the
American worker is doomed to a living death, to a few years of
hell with an enormous amount of work done per hour, and then
to many years of impaired health and poor work, done under
great physical strain and for the most meagre reward. It is,
therefore, one of the foremost tasks of the trade unions to oppose
the continuous pressure on the workers to increase their
working pace, and to endeavour to decrease the intensity of
work.
F. Accidents and Health
There are few countries in which accident statistics for the
twentieth century are so unsatisfactory as in the United States.
Since social legislation, of which accident compensation is an
important feature, has lagged considerably in that country, the
meagre general accident statistics available up to the end of the
twenties are unreliable, and therefore of no value to us. Since,
furthermore, accidents are greatly influenced by the general
trend of business, declining during depression and increasing
rapidly with the upswing of business, even the relatively good
statistics for the last few years are of little value in estimating
whether accidents are on the increase or declining.
Really reliable statistics for a longer period are available
only for the coal industry. And here, too, not all are of equal
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igOO TO 1 94 1 173
significance. The best statistics are those pertaining to fatal
accidents, for these can be suppressed much less easily than
non-fatal accidents which in some cases may be thought worth
while reporting while, in other cases, although they are of the
same character and severity they are pot reported.
The accident rate should be computed per hour of work or, as
the technical expression has it, per hour of exposure. If the
accident rate decreases per 1,000 employed by 20 per cent, and
if at the same time the number of hours worked per employee
has declined by 25 per cent, then obviously the accident rate has
nof declined but has increased. Unfortunately, even in the coal
industry, the best expression of the accident rate, that computed
on the basis of hours of exposure, can be computed only for
recent years. For former years we must be satisfied with statistics
per 1,000 employed.
DEATH RATE IN
Tears
1878-1885
1885-1897
1897-1908
1908-1914
1911-1914
COAL MINES, 1878-1914*
Rate per 1,000 Employed
2-8
2-7
3*4
3-6
3*5
DEATH
RATE IN COAL MINES, 1911-1941!
Tears
1911-1914
i9 I 5“ I 92i
1922-1933
I 933“" I 94 I
Rate per Million Hours of Exposure
1-83
i-66
1-87
i-66
Both sets of statistics show that the fatal accident rate had, if
anything, a rising tendency during the last sixty years. At first
sight this must seem improbable. There can be no doubt that
safety measures during the last sixty years have improved con¬
siderably. During the last sixty years, partly through social
legislation, partly through measures which the organized workers
have forced upon the employers, safety precautions in the mines
have improved to an extraordinary extent.
But it would be wrong simply to look at the safety devices. It
* Cf. U.S. Bureau of Mines, Bulletin 115.
t Cf. Handbook of Labor Statistics , published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Bulletin 462.
174 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
would be the same as looking at the machines in a factory and
at their output and concluding from this that the purchasing
power of the workers must have increased immensely. While, on
the one hand, the safety measures have increased in number and
efficiency, on the other, the intensity of work has also been
increased to such an extent that the improvement in safety
measures has been counter-balanced. The miners are continu¬
ously being driven to work harder. The consequence is that, in
spite of the progress in safety technique and its application, the
fatal accident rate in the mines has increased. This has an
important lesson for the workers. Success in one field must not
blind us to failure in another. More and better safety measures
must not blind us to the pernicious effects of increased intensity
of work. The move for greater safety in the pits has only a minor
value if it is not combined with a drive for reducing the intensity
of work, for increasing productivity through technical progress
and better organization rather than through driving the miners
to the point of exhaustion.
The development of the fatal accident rate in mines is a grim
object lesson as to what the increased intensity of work really
implies.
Unfortunately as far as other industries are concerned, no
reliable statistics, covering at least two trade cycles, are avail¬
able.
It is nevertheless important to get some conception of the
extent of industrial injuries. This we can do by recourse to some
extracts from the report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics on
“Industrial Injuries in the United States during 1939.”*
“About 1,600,000 persons in industry were killed or injured
during 1939, according to estimates of the United States Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Of the estimated 16,400 fatalities or per¬
manent total disabilities, 15,000 involved employed workers and
1,400 self-employed workers and proprietors. About 109,400*
persons, employed and self-employed, suffered some partial but
permanent impairment, and another 1,477,700 were temporarily
but totally disabled.”
How serious these 1 \ millions temporarily total disablements
were, is made clear by the following statement:
* Monthly Labor Review , July, 1940.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igOO TO 1941 175
“In 1939, the average time loss per injury in manufacturing
was 106 days.”
One and a half million people killed or injured in industry
during one single year! And those who were injured were totally
disabled for one hundred days on the average! The terrible toll
exacted chiefly by increased intensity of work is strikingly illus¬
trated by these figures!
Even more scanty is our information on the development of
health conditions. Here we have no statistics at all; furthermore,
there is not even certainty as to what kind of statistics should be
collected in order to discover how the health of the people has
developed.
Some more or less reliable statistics relating to the causes of
death are available. If the general death rate is found to be
declining, as it does, it is generally regarded as an indication of
improving health conditions. The same holds true if it is found
that deaths from specific causes are declining. The general con¬
clusion drawn from such statistics is that a specific disease is on
the decline and that, therefore, the health of the people has
improved in this particular respect.
This manner of assessing the health of the people is, however,
utterly wrong. It is in fact not a study of health but of death. An
example will show how misleading such statistics are. Let us
assume that, in a family there are six children, three suffer from
tuberculosis, and all three die at an early age. In a later genera¬
tion, there are again six children in a family and all six.have
tuberculosis. Because of the progress of the treatment of tuber¬
culosis all six suffer throughout their whole lives from this
disease or its effects, but they are kept alive until the age of
fifty or sixty when they die through some other illness, which
their tuberculosis-weakened body could not resist. In the first
case, the health statistics will show that three people died an
early death from tuberculosis; in the second they will show that
none of the children died of tuberculosis, but all six of them died
in late middle age. An astonishing improvement in the health of
the family: official statisticians will exclaim. But there really was
no improvement; on the contrary, the second case shows a
serious deterioration in the state of health. There are six cases of
tuberculosis against three in the former case, and, while the fatal
176 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
risk has lessened, and no member of the family dies until fifty
years of age, the health conditions are really worse. Assuming
that, in the first case, the children die at the age of sixteen, and
in the second case, they live on to an average of fifty-five years,
and that tuberculosis sets in at the age of fifteen, we have in the
first case three years of tuberculosis (three times one year) and in
the second case two hundred and forty years (six times forty
years). Health conditions have not improved but are eighty
times worse. Official statistics, however, based only on mortality
would show that instead of three, none die, and that health
conditions have improved infinitely.
For this reason it is impossible to give any statistical account of
changes in health conditions in the United States. As long as we
have only death statistics, and do not know how many people
are suffering from which illness and for how long—or at least as
long as it is not known how many people are compelled to keep
away from work because of sickness, and for how many days—
so long will it be impossible to get a picture of the changing state
of health in the United States. However, a beginning in this
direction has been made by the extraordinarily interesting
National Health Survey of 1935-1936, with which we shall deal
in the next chapter.
One more factor must be taken into consideration. Health
does not consist solely in the absence of disease. It also has much
to do with the state of the nervous system. There are no statistics
available concerning this aspect of the health problem. But we
do not need any statistics in order to measure changes in this
category. No physician would dare say that the nervous condi¬
tion of the workers is better to-day than, let us say, forty years
ago. There is no doubt that the strain which the worker to-day
undergoes during his intense work in the factories, on the rail¬
roads, in the mines, and so on, has increased considerably. And
there is little doubt that the worker has not been able to obtain
the means to stand up to this increased strain with the same
resilience as at the end of the nineteenth century. In this respect
health conditions have deteriorated considerably.
We can thus conclude our most unsatisfactory survey of
changes in health conditions during the period under review
with the following summing up ? we have no data to judge the
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1 94 1 1 77
changes in the frequency and duration of the more important
diseases affecting the health of the workers; nor concerning the
increasing industrial strain and its effects on the nervous system
of the workers. But we know that in this respect health conditions
have deteriorated in the twentieth century.
G. Social Insurance
While Germany, Great Britain and many other European
countries had introduced social legislation twenty and more
years back, the United States gave the worker hardly a pretence
of social security. The ruling class had carefully fostered the
notion of “a free country with unlimited possibilities for every¬
body to get on.” This really was the experience and ideology of
the merchant adventurers, the convicts and the “lost sons of
respectable families” who had come over and had often suc¬
ceeded in gaining riches in this country. When we recall labour
conditions which we have described here and the appalling
effects which the cyclical crises had on the living and working
conditions of the workers, we realize that this tale of unlimited
possibilities for everybody is ridiculous.
But the effect of this propaganda was so great that, until the
last crisis, even the trade unions were under its spell and did not
strive to secure the enactment of State and Federal measures for
economic security.
The effect of the last crisis was deep-rooted. The misery of the
workers and salaried employees was so great and widespread
that trade union opinion as well as that of the general public,
changed radically. The Roosevelt government, pressed by trade
unions and public opinion in general—which of course was not
shared by the big monopolists—introduced a considerable
number of measures to ameliorate social security conditions.
The extent of the change which has taken place can best be
measured if we compare the system of social legislation in 1928
with that in 1938.
In 1928 there was no unemployment insurance. About 8,000
workers were covered by special unemployment provisions by
nine companies. In six States, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
vol. n. M
178 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, legislative
proposals waited, often many years, for acceptance. No State
actually had an unemployment insurance system in application.
Trade union unemployment insurance schemes covered no more
than 100,000 members in 1934. Unemployment insurance was,
therefore, virtually non-existent.
Health insurance was unknown in any State, though a
number of trade unions had sick-benefit schemes. It is doubtful
whether more than 1 or 2 per cent of the workers were covered
by sick benefit schemes.
By 1928, old age pensions schemes had been introduced in six
States and one Territory (Colorado, Kentucky, Maryland, Mon¬
tana, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Alaska). The laws,, however, were
formulated so loosely and left so many loopholes that scarcely
more than 1,000 people received old age State pensions. The
trade unions gave to some of their members pensions, but it is
doubtful whether all in all more than ten to fifteen thousand
people were in receipt of’State or trade union old age pensions.
A similar number or perhaps less, were in receipt of old age
pensions under company superannuation schemes.
Somewhat different was the position of those who were injured
through accidents at work. Here also the attitude of the trade
unions was different. They fought vigorously for adequate com¬
pensation of the workers for accidents received during employ¬
ment. Their attitude towards accident compensation led to the
enactment of laws in numerous States. The marked difference in
the provisions for the worker affected by an accident and the
worker affected by unemployment reveals the great shortcomings
of the American trade union movement as regards social pro¬
tection for the worker. If the trade union movement had taken
up the fight for unemployment or health insurance with the
energy and ability it had applied to securing protection for the
injured worker, the lot of the unemployed during the last crisis
would have been much better. Again and again we find the fact
verified: the degree of the deterioration of the workers’ position
under capitalism depends to a large extent upon the effectiveness
of their organizations. Whenever the trade unions fail to perform
their task, or the rank and file fail to urge this task on the leader¬
ship if necessary, the workers must suffer more severely. Strong
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1941 179
trade unions, consisting of a politically conscious membership
and led effectively by officials who realize that their job is to
lead the workers in their fight for better working and labour
conditions are among the most important weapons in the hands
of tjie masses against the oppressors.
The first State compensation acts which were not declared
unconstitutional were all enacted in 1911 (by California, Illinois,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Ohio, Washington and Wisconsin); they had been preceded by a
federal law covering a comparatively small number of govern¬
ment employees (1908). By the end of the twenties all States had
accident compensation laws with the exception of Arkansas,
Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina and South Carolina. In
many of the States, however, the acts covered only a very re¬
stricted number of workers. Only in 12 States were industrial
diseases included; only 7 States provided for permanent pay¬
ment in cases of permanent partial disability of the worker; only
7 States provided for compensation to the wife until her re¬
marriage or death, in the case of the husband’s death; and only
17 States provided permanent compensation in the event of
permanent total disability. All in all, little more than half the
workers were covered by accident compensation acts and con¬
siderably less than half were covered effectively. Before the crisis
of 1929-1933 social insurance schemes in the United States were
extremely inadequate in their scope and affected only a very few
of those who should have been protected against social insecurity.
If the worker was unemployed he generally had as his only
resource the few savings which he might have been able to put
by, and when these were, if at all existent, quickly exhausted,
the only hope of the “free and independent” worker, who had
“unlimited possibilities” at his disposal, was begging and charity.
The old and worn-out worker rarely received any kind of pen¬
sion, his savings had usually been spent during the crisis which
preceded his final dismissal from work. The average age of
dismissal has changed in the course of the present century from a
little over 60 to, often, a little over 40. The large number of the
continuously unemployed made it natural for preference to be
given to the younger workers and the increased intensity of work
often made it impossible for older workers to keep pace with the
180 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
younger ones. If his children did not support him, his only
chance was the almshouse or poor farm. Such institutions have
been vividly described in a book by Harry Carroll Evans, pub¬
lished in 1926 by a group of fraternal organizations. Social
Security in America , issued by the Social Security Board, sum¬
marizes Mr. Evans’ study as follows:*
“Insufficient and unfit food, filth, and unhealthful discomfort
characterized most of them. Even in institutions with sanitary
and physically suitable buildings, it was found that feeble¬
minded, diseased, and defective inmates were frequently housed
with the dependent aged.”
Finally, if the worker was injured by accident, there was often
no possibility of securing any compensation, and he would be
condemned to a living death in consequence.
The crisis brought great changes. During the crisis itself a
number of States introduced measures to alleviate the social
insecurity of the worker. But this movement was only a begin¬
ning as compared with what followed under the Roosevelt
administration. Often in collaboration with the trade union
movement, always urged on by widespread progressive opinion,
the government worked out a number of schemes to alleviate the
effects of social insecurity, and finally in 1935 established a
Social Security Board. The chief schemes launched for improving
social security were unemployment insurance and old age
pensions.
The Federal Social Security Act of 1935 provides for unem¬
ployment insurance. It “leaves to the States the option and
initiative of passing unemployment compensation laws, permits
the States wide latitude with regard to the type of system they
establish, and offers encouragement and inducement to the
States to meet certain minimum requirements which limit
Federal approval to those State systems which provide actual
compensation as distinct from mere relief. When the Social
Security Board has approved a State law, the State becomes
eligible for grants from the Federal Government for the adminis¬
trative expenses of the State unemployment compensation
system. Except for these requirements, the States will have
* Social Security in America , published for the Committee on Economic
Security by the Social Security Board, Washington, 1937, p. 156.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1941 l8l
freedom to set up any unemployment compensation system they
wish, without restriction from the Federal Government.”*
It is obvious from this that a very important beginning was
made—but only a beginning. The amount paid out is, as far as
available statistics show, very low—and workers have no right to
unemployment benefit for the whole unemployment period, the
period of receipt being shorter than in other countries. Then he
is thrown back on to private or public relief. Thus the period of
security of support during unemployment is very short. It is
obvious that labour, after this initial success, must follow it up
with strenuous efforts to improve the unemployment insurance
system, to secure higher rates of benefit, and to achieve pro¬
visions which secure benefit for the whole period of unemploy¬
ment, irrespective of its length.
As to old age security, the Federal Social Security Act provides
federal aid to States and a federal system of old-age pensions for
superannuated workers. “The first measure is designed to give
immediate aid to aged individuals and to assist the States in the
care of old people who are ineligible for Federal emergency
relief and who are not employable on work projects. The second
is a preventive measure which aims to reduce the extent of
future dependency among the aged and to assure a worker that
the years of employment during his working life will entitle him
to a life income.”|
The number of people receiving State old age assistance was
in 1941 about 2 \ millions. The benefit payments are often ex¬
tremely low, and for the most part are insufficient even to cover
the expenses of a minimum cost-of-living existence.
No provision in the present social insurance system is made
for general sickness insurance.
Accident compensation benefit has somewhat improved in
recent years, but is far from satisfactory; and many of the defects
mentioned in our survey of the situation in 1928, have survived
the last crisis and the Roosevelt administrations.
To sum up, the introduction and improvements of social
security measures have increased considerably during the Roose-
* Social Security in America , published* for the Committee on Economic
Security by the Social Security Board, Washington, 1937, p. 105.
t Ibid., p. 217.
1 82 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
velt administration, 1933-1941. Seldom in the history of any
capitalist country has progress been delayed so long and then
come so quickly. But it would be dangerous to overlook the very
serious shortcomings of the present legislation. The fight for
social security of the American worker has really only just
begun.* And since 1938 little progress has been made!
H. Summary of Labour Conditions
There have been several and abrupt changes in labour con¬
ditions during the twentieth century. Up to the first world war,
wages remained stable, productivity increased and so did the
intensity of work, unemployment was comparatively high, and
social legislation was almost absent. During this period labour
conditions undoubtedly deteriorated.
Post-war conditions up to the end of the twenties were charac¬
terized by rapidly increasing purchasing power, high unemploy¬
ment, great intensification of work, considerable increase in the
productivity of labour, and again an almost complete absence of
social legislation. It is probable that if these factors are balanced
one against the other, labour conditions will be found to have
improved. Then followed the intense crisis beginning in 1929.
During the last fourteen years wages first declined rapidly, pur¬
chasing power dropped steeply, entailing terrible suffering,
unemployment increased rapidly, the intensity of work probably
continued to increase and productivity rose; in short, labour
conditions deteriorated very much. In recent years, however,
they began to improve again, and this in more respects than is
usual during a trade upswing. At the same time, some elements
showed unusually little improvement. The purchasing power of
the workers rose. The intensity of work increased. Social security
legislation made rapid strides, while, on the other hand, the
absorption of the unemployed made comparatively little pro¬
gress. On the whole, labour conditions in recent years, since the
end of the crisis in 1933, have improved.
* Beside social security legislation, steadily improving but far from being
efficient, child labour laws, laws r^ating to industrial diseases, improved
factory legislation, and a very desultory and scarcely effective campaign for
better housing conditions should be mentioned as achievements of labour.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO I94I 183
If we compare the last period under review, from 1897 to
1941, as a whole, with the preceding period beginning after the
Civil War and ending with the nineteenth century, we can say,
that labour conditions among the industrial working population
have probably improved slightly. On the whole, the purchasing
power of the workers has probably risen slightly more than the
intensification of the working process required; the rise was
probably large enough even to absorb the losses due to increased
unemployment and short-time. The introduction of large-scale
social insurance during the final years of the period under
review helped to improve labour conditions.
This slight increase in the improvement of labour conditions
of industrial workers was due, on the one hand, to the fact that
the ruling class was more than able to balance the advantages
gained by industrial labour through the increased exploitation of
the agricultural worker and farmer, and by the indirect exploita¬
tion of the Central European and Central and South American
workers through the export of capital. The very small advance
apparently made by the American industrial worker (confined to
the 1914-1918 war and post-war period) was accompanied by
the rapid enrichment of the ruling class and a serious deteriora¬
tion of working and living conditions among the American
agricultural workers and farmers and the Central European
agricultural and industrial workers. Living conditions of all
workers, under the domination of American capital, taken to¬
gether, have, therefore, on the average, deteriorated.
In conclusion we give one table which shows that in spite of
the slight advance made by the American industrial worker, his
relative position deteriorated considerably.*
The relative position of the American industrial worker has
deteriorated very considerably during the last seventy years, f
* The data for real wages are taken from the preceding pages of this book.
Industrial production per American was computed from the table “United
States Industrial Production” in Investigation of Concentration of Economic
Power, Seventy-Fifth Congress, Part 1, p. 200. The figures for recent years
were corrected according to the new computations by the Federal Reserve
Board and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The relative position
per worker was calculated by dividing the index of production per American
into the index of real wage per worker.
t For a more detailed discussion of the meaning of the relative position of
the worker, of relative or social wages, cf. pp. 190?. of this book.
184 A SHORT HISTORY OP LABOUR CONDITIONS
Perhaps it is best to conclude this survey of the development of
labour conditions in the United States by pointing to the rapid
deterioration in the relative position of the American industrial
worker; a reminder of the fact that, even if his position has
improved a little as far as his absolute living conditions are con¬
cerned, his relative position is getting worse: the rich are getting
richer and richer, and the abyss between the two classes becomes
greater and greater in the course of time. A reminder also of the
fact that there are heavy tasks ahead of labour, far surpassing
that of slightly improving the absolute position of the industrial
group only; tasks pertaining to the whole of the working class
and its relation to the ruling class.
THE RELATIVE POSITION OF THE AMERICAN WORKER
(1900 — 100)
Tears
Real Wage per
Worker
Production per
American
Relative Position
per Worker
1868-1878
87
46
189
1878-1885
92
62
148
1885-1897
IOI
81
125
1897-1908
1908-1914
IOI
113
89
102
134
76
1915-1921
112
156
72
1922-1933
122
170
7i
I. Labour’s Fight for Better Working Conditions
During the period under review the organized labour move¬
ment in the United States was dominated by the American
Federation of Labor and its policies. There was the political
movement of the Socialist party, but its influence on the labour
movement, even at the best of times, has been comparatively
slight. There was the revolutionary trade union movement of
the I.W.W. which at times attained strong influence in some
areas but never on a national scale. And in post-war years there
has been the Communist party, whose influence until very
recently has been relatively small. An important development,
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.), was started
in 1935 -
Whatever the merits or faults of the American Federation of
Labor, nobody can deny that, until very recently, it was the only
spokesman for labour which had a national following.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igOO TO 1941 185
The membership of the A.F. of L. grew from 1264,825 in 1897,
the first year of the period under review, to 4,078,740 in 1920.
There were years of slight regression, or of only slight growth, but
on the whole the membership grew and so did its influence. But
even in 1920 —its peak point of membership and influence—less
than 20 per cent of the workers and salaried employees capable
of organization belonged to the A.F. of L. Twenty per cent can
mean Very much if the organization is representative of the whole
working class and exerts effective leadership. But the Federation
never represented the whole working class in its composition,
ahd it rarely acted as the vanguard of the working class as a
whole. It represented chiefly the interests of the skilled workers
and acted as the business agent of this particular section. Until
about 1920 it accomplished this quite effectively, that is, as
effectively as was possible under prevailing conditions.
After 1920 a tendency which had for long been noted finally
became openly operative and radically changed the structure of
the working class: the privileged worker was finally dethroned.
Scientific management, dilution of labour and the re-organiza-
tion of the production process in almost every branch of industry
finally broke down the privileged position of the skilled worker.
In this way the basis was destroyed upon which the efficient
organization of skilled workers had been built up, and the Ameri¬
can Federation of Labor began to crumble. Company unions—
creations of the employers—sprang up. From over 4 million
members in 1920, the Federation became an organization with
little more than 2 millions in 1933. Since then, owing partly to a
change in the composition of its membership and partly, in a
way, to a change in policy, it grew again to about 3^ million
members in 1936, and, in spite of the break-away of some unions
forming the C.I.O., the membership was 4J millions in. 1941.
Through its system of Federal Unions, which had existed
earlier, but which was enlarged considerably in recent years, the
Federation attached to itself a considerable number of workers
on an industrial basis instead of the crSTt basis hitherto pre¬
vailing. In the textile and mining industries the craft basis was
never effective and it would, therefore, not be true to say that
the Federation was simply and purely a craft organization. But
it is also true that, though a not inconsiderable section of the
1 86 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
membership of the Federation was organized on industrial lines,
this section belonged to only a few industries, while the large
majority of industries covered by the Federation were organized
on the craft basis; and the determining factor in the policies of
the Federation was the craft outlook. How strong this craft
orientation was is obvious from the fact that the Federal Labor
Unions were nothing but a way out of the following difficulty:
the Federation was being strongly urged by certain local groups
of workers to organize them; on the other hand, the Federation
had to avoid the almost immediate dissolution of such local
organization through forcing the workers belonging to it to apply
for membership in a number of different craft unions, because the
workers wanted to belong to the same union. With the upswing
of the labour movement following the crisis of 1929 -1933, some
members of the leadership of the American Federation of Labor
realized that full advantage could only be taken of this great
opportunity if large numbers of the workers, especially those in
the mass production industries, were organized on an industrial
basis. The chief protagonists of this movement for stronger
industrial organization were, quite naturally, the leaders of
those trade unions which were already organized on an industrial
basis, chiefly the leaders of the textile (clothing) and mining
unions. In the discussions which took place the craft union leaders
who, up to then, had always dictated the policy of the A.F. of L.
succeeded in carrying the day. The supporters of industrial
organization, however, declared they would go on with their
plans. The Committee for Industrial Organization was formed
(first within the A.F. of L.) under the leadership of John L.
Lewis, the president of the miners 5 union. Thus in the following
years we haye the sorry spectacle of two trade union central
organisations. The history of the following years has fully justified
the point of view of those who advocate industrial organization,
for the C.I.O. succeeded where the A.F. of L. had failed, and
millions of workers have been organized in industries which the
A.F. of L. has hardly touched. But this, while excellent in itself,
cannot be the end of this issue. There can be no doubt, and there
should be no doubt, that the position of organized labour in the
United States would be infinitely stronger if the A.F. of L. and
the C.I.O. joined forces, thus uniting the trade union movement.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1941 187
Every worker, every trade unionist, every member of one of the
political labour parties, in the United States should strive in
every way to promote unity in the trade union movement.
Before concluding this short survey of the organizational
structure of the labour movement of the nation, it is necessary
to point out that the great organizing successes of the two large
trade union bodies was partly due in recent years to the National
Labor Relations Board, a government agency, created, under
mass pressure, for safeguarding the workers against the em¬
ployer’s discrimination and other forms of oppression, and
securing freedom of trade union organization. It testifies to the
influence a strong trade union movement can develop that this
institution was established and has functioned in the interest of
labour. Hundreds of thousands of workers have been protected
by it from victimization, and thousands have been recompensed
where such victimization has taken place.
In studying the efforts of the American Federation of Labor to
secure better working conditions, it is of interest to note the great
difference between its original theory and its practice. While in
practice the American Federation of Labor was a conservative
labour organization concerned chiefly with the interests of
skilled workers, its theoretical statements were generally radical
and it also had developed by far the most progressive programme,
by far the best formulated theory for the struggle for better
wages.
It is almost a grotesque experience to read the preamble to the
Constitution of the American Federation of Labor, and then to
look at its record. The preamble begins:
“Whereas, A struggle is going on in all the nations of the
civilized world between the oppressors and the oppressed of all
countries, a struggle between the capitalist and the laborer,
which grows in intensity from year to year, and will work disas¬
trous results to the toiling millions if they are not combined for
mutual protection and benefit...”
The practice of the A.F. of L., however, was based on the
principle that there is no class war, that # labour’s position is
constantly improving, and (especially during the twenties) that
the scope of the A.F. of L. was the promotion of co-operation
between the oppressors and the oppressed.
iB8 a short history of labour conditions
However, similar discrepancies could also be observed in
other countries. But what does not exist elsewhere is the spectacle
of a conservative labour organization which evolves a theory of
wages which, if put into effect, would revolutionize the country.
Because of the rapid increases in prices during the world war
the plea that wages should rise correspondingly with prices again
became universal. It had been partially forgotten because of the
relative stability of prices; looking over the history of labour in
the United States, as well as in Europe, we find this demand
cropping up again and again, only to be forgotten when prices
become relatively stable. The remarkable fact, therefore, is not
that it reappeared, but that it has remained to stay after the
rapid rise of prices during the world war. In most countries cost
of living indices are now published at regular intervals and
trade unions vigilantly compare the movement of wages with
that of the cost of living.
At the same time a second demand, closely related to the
foregoing, also gained prominence: the workers should be
guaranteed a minimum wage which would ensure a decent
existence. Neither this nor the former demand originated in the
United States. In this respect, the American trade union move¬
ment was simply keeping up to date, though few countries have
as progressive a piece of legislation as the Wagner Act of 1938,
providing for minimum wages and maximum hours.
But while the other trade union movements did not go further,
the American trade union movement made rapid theoretical
progress on these demands and developed a whole philosophy of
wages which is of great interest to the whole labour movement
and has received far too little attention.
The first step beyond the demand that wages keep pace at
least with rising prices, and for a decent minimum standard of
living, was the development of the theory that high wages were
good for the community as a whole. In brief, this theory was as
follows: If wages are high the purchasing power of the workers is
also high. High purchasing power of the workers means bigger
sales for the retailers % who thus benefit together with the workers.
The high purchasing power of the workers means generally
greater sales possibilities, and therefore, greater production.
High purchasing power of the workers, therefore, benefits the
%
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, igoo TO 1941 189
industrial life of the whole nation. Furthermore, high purchasing
power of the workers not only benefits generally the economic
life of the nation; it also makes crises impossible. For, if the
workers can buy a constant or increasing number of com¬
modities, how can there be a crisis? Therefore, the problems of
capitalist economy can only be solved by high wages, by the
high purchasing power of the workers. * If the employers would
only realize that high wages would redound to their own benefit,
they would co-operate in the matter. It would be obvious to
them that their own interests coincided with those of the workers.
Then paradise on earth would be within sight and the advance
towards this paradise could start at once.
This theory of high wages has been propounded in hundreds of
articles in the American labour press; it has been taken up by a
number of bourgeois economists, and at the end of the twenties
it spread from the United States to the Continent where it found
considerable support among trade unionists of various countries,
especially in Germany.
Curiously enough, this theory also found support among
American employers. Foremost among them was Mr. Ford,
whose anti-trade union attitude was notorious. But if we remem¬
ber what kind of products Mr. Ford is interested in, we realize
at once why he is in favour of an increased standard of life for
the American worker. The more the workers raise their standard
of existence, the more will they be able to buy automobiles. A
general raising of the standard of living would increase Mr.
Ford’s sales enormously; his production, his capital would rise
steeply, and he would get richer and stronger. There were not a
few other employers in the same position as Mr. Ford.
Thus it happened that the theory of high wages gained numer¬
ous adherents in America and other countries. Since, moreover,
many believed that high wages were already being paid, this
philosophy caused many to congratulate themselves on living in
the United States where high wages removed the possibility of
crisis and made continual progress and eternal industrial peace
not only possible but inevitable!
* The chief argument against this thepry is that a crisis is caused by over¬
production, and that high wages could not prevent over-production of capital
goods and the general anarchy of economic relations under capitalism, that
is crises and unemployment, etc.
190 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
But the demand for high wages and for high purchasing power
was not all. At the Atlantic City Convention of the American
Federation of Labor in 1925, Mr. John P. Frey, now President of
the Metal Trades Department of the A.F. of L., carried this
demand one very important step further.
“Social inequality, industrial instability and injustice must
increase unless the workers’ real wages, the purchasing power of
their wages . . . are progressed in proportion to man’s increasing
power of production.”
This is indeed progress, and very rapid progress, in the develop¬
ment of a wages policy. From the demand for higher wages to
that for higher real wages, and then to that for stability of social
wages (as they were to be called later) is enormous progress.
The new wage policy inaugurated by the Atlantic City Con¬
vention meant that the worker should share fully in the progress
of the nation, that his relative position in society, which had
deteriorated rapidly, should cease to deteriorate, that his wages
should not only remain stable as regards price changes (keeping
real wages stable) but as regards changes in the quantity of
production (keeping social or relative wages stable).
We will illustrate this new demand by a simple example. Let
us assume that, on the first of the year, the worker earned 100
dollars per month, that production was 100 and that prices also
were 100. At the end of the year wages have risen to 110 dollars,
and prices have gone up by 10 per cent; that is, real wages have
remained stable, for money wages have gone up as much as
prices. But at the same time production has also risen by 10 per
cent (assuming a stable population during the year: production
also has risen by 10 per cent per head of the population). If real
wages remain stable, the worker can buy at the end of the year
only as much as at the beginning of the year, and the increase in
the amount of products produced must fall into the hands of
others than the workers. The absolute position of the worker has
not changed, he can buy at ihe end of the year just as much as
at the beginning of the year ; but his share in the national product
has declined, for while the quantity he can purchase has not
changed, the quantity which has been produced has increased
by 10 per cent per head of the population. The new wage policy
of the A.F. of L. demanded that the wages of the workers should
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1941 19I
not only increase as prices increased, that is, in the above example
by 10 per cent, but that they should increase in relation to both
prices and production, that is, by 10 per cent and again by 10
per cent.
It is obvious that this demand goes much further than any
other wage demands hitherto made. It is obvious that this is a
very far-reaching demand indeed, because it implies stopping
the rich from getting relatively richer. It would at least stabilize
the worker’s position in society and he would be able to increase
hi$ absolute position in correspondence with the general increase
of wealth. And, furthermore, from the demand of stable social
wages to the demand of increasing social wages is only a small
step; it would amount to the gradual expropriation of the
employers by the workers. *
Little more than a year after this demand had been made by
the American Federation of Labor, and the Atlantic City Con¬
vention had accepted it, the American Federation of Labor
established a Research Division, the first publications of which
dealt with the problem of social wages.
The American Federation of Labor began the publication of
a Research Series, the first pamphlet of which was a declaration
by President William Green dealing at some length with the new
wage policy of the Federation. In this declaration, the A.F. of L.
went beyond that of the Atlantic City Convention in so far as it
now included the last logical step in the formulation of such a
wage policy. It declaresf that:
“it no longer strives merely for higher money wages; it no longer
strives merely for higher real wages; it strives for higher social
wages, for wages which increase as measured by prices and
productivity.”
An increase in social wages means that an increasing propor¬
tion of the nation’s product goes to the workers. It means abso¬
lute and relative improvement of the worker’s position instead of
* The reader of this discussion of the wage policy of the A.F. of L. must
always keep in mind that the wage policy must form part of the general
labour policy and that the most “revolutionary’* wage policy without a
general progressive and resolute policy of labour is condemned to failure.
f See Organised Labor's Modern Wage Policy , p. 21.
192 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
the absolute and relative deterioration which has so far taken
place.
The Research Division of the A.F. of L. at once took up this
new wage policy, and published some pamphlets showing the
development of the relative position of labour and of social
wages. Finally, it computed a monthly index of social wages, the
first ever to be published.
Soon afterwards the world crisis set in. Labour had to exert
every effort to keep real wages up. The German trade unions
which had closely followed this development of wage policy were
destroyed in 1933, and to-day, apart from the United States, this
progress in wage policy has been forgotten. Curiously enough,
even in the United States, none of the progressive labour organi¬
zations has taken it up.* The A.F. of L., too, seems to have for¬
gotten about it. And yet it is the most progressive wage policy
(theoretically) developed by labour under capitalism. That wages
should increase not only more than prices but also more than
the volume of production, that they should end the absolute
deterioration of labour’s position as well as the relative impover¬
ishment of labour, that wages should secure an ever increasing
proportion of the nation’s wealth to labour—what a progressive
step is this! In fact, it is the last word in wage policy under
capitalism, because no more progressive policy under capitalism
could be developed, and also because realization would mean
the end of capitalism. The forcing through of such a wage policy,
could, of course, only be the result of a general and great advance
of the progressive forces on all or most of the important issues of
the labour movement.
It seems highly desirable, therefore, that the organizations of
labour revive this wage policy as promulgated by the A.F. of L.
in 1925 and in 1927, and study carefully its implications and
importance for the labour movement as a whole.
As far as labour’s fight for shorter hours of work is concerned,
the first twenty years of the period under review were occupied
with the propagation of the eight-hour day. This fight, by 1913,
was probably successful for the majority of the workers,
thus securing a reduction of the normal working time of over
* Recently the excellent Labor Notes of the Labor Research Association
have begun to publish from time to time statistics of Relative Wages.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 194 1 193
10 per cent, as compared with the end of the nineteenth
century.
The arguments advanced by labour in favour of shortening the
working day have changed considerably. Forgotten was the
philosophy of Ira Steward who based his whole plan for im¬
proving general labour conditions on a shortening of the working
week. But many of the older arguments, used a hundred years
ago, cropped up again, and indeed had lost nothing in effective¬
ness.
One argument used by Samuel Gompers, late president of the
American Federation of Labor, was that the eight-hour day was
a “citizenship measure. 55 An eight-hour day would permit the
worker to fulfil his duties as a citizen; it would help him to
become a more intelligent voter, a more responsible member of
the community, a better family man, a greater asset to the
nation.
This argument appealed to liberal opinion and to a progressive
section of the Church and similar institutions. *
An attempt to enlist the agreement of the employers was the
argument that shortening the hours of work meant increasing
productivity; an argument which we encountered long ago but
which now received much attention in the literature of the
labour movement. In the American Federationist , the official publi¬
cation of the American Federation of Labor, we find this argu¬
ment repeated again and again, and the number of studies on
this subject by liberal students of labour problems grew rapidly.
One of the first to give much attention to this problem was
Ethelbert Stewart, who later became Commissioner of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Before we discuss another argument in favour of the shorter
working week, it is of interest to study an attempt by the em¬
ployers to discredit labour’s fight for a shorter working week.
The Metal Trades Review (August, 1917) published an article
called “The Pretense of the Eight-Hour Day . 55 In this article
the spokesman for the employers said in brief:
The agitation of the American Federation of Labor for the
eight-hour day does not really aim at shorter hours of work, but
higher wages. The eight-hour day demand was always coupled
* Cf. for instance, Interchurch World Movement , Report on the Steel Strike of 1919 •
VOL. n. N
194 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
by organized labour with the demand for overtime pay, if more
than eight hours were worked. This demand was justified by the
allegation, that, if no overtime rates were paid, the employers
would not k&ep their agreements but work the workers longer;
there must be some kind of penalty for working longer; therefore
overtime rates, from the ninth hour on, were necessary.
The American Federation of Labor, therefore, and the workers
for whom an eight-hour day agreement is demanded or has been
obtained do not really want to work only eight hours; what they
really want is to work more than eight hours and earn overtime
rates, so that they get higher weekly earnings than previously for
the same working time. Moreover, labour has recklessly proffered
the additional argument that through shorter hours an improve¬
ment in health conditions would result. But health would suffer
as much from ten hours’ work if overtime rates were paid, as
before.
This latter plea is obviously wrong, since overtime rates mean
more wages and higher purchasing power; higher purchasing
power means that the worker can eat better, obtain better
medical care, and so on. As to the first part of the argument it is
partially true that wages are so low that workers are often com¬
pelled to work longer in order to earn a little more pay All the
more reason to advocate every means, including a shortening of
the normal working week, which might increase the purchasing
power of the worker. On the whole, the employers’ argument is
incorrect, for the working period has actually decreased con¬
siderably. But it is obvious that overtime work is more usual
and widespread to-day than, let us say, a hundred years ago.
For if the normal workday is from 14 to 16 hours the amount of
overtime is considerably smaller than if one works from eight to
nine hours.
The third important argument brought forward by labour in
favour of a shorter working week is that it would help to lessen
unemployment. It is astonishing to find this argument officially
expressed as early as in 1887. In December of that year Mr.
Gompers explained:
“That so long as there is one man who seeks employment and
cannot obtain it, the hours of labor are too long.”
This argument has, in the course of time, become the most
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1900 TO 1941 195
prominent one, and by the time when labour began to fight for
the 40-hour and 35-hour working week it had become almost the
only one. The extent of unemployment, of which organized
labour became conscious since only about 1927, brought this
argument so much to the fore that since the end of the twenties
it was often the only one to be heard when the working day was
discussed. For instance, the Report of the Executive Council of
the American Federation of Labor to the 1936 Convention in
Tampa stated: *
“The shorter work-week and the six-hour day furnish the real
solution to the insistent problem of unemployment. It is the
responsibility that private industry must accept in order to give
the necessary balance to economic expansion . . . Shortening of
the hours of work is the correct answer to the problem we are
facing to-day.’ 5
This argument for shorter hours of work has been used so
generally and conspicuously that it merits the most careful
attention. It is all the more important because it is the only
means, with the exception of emergency measure proposals, by
which American trade unions in the twenties and thirties sought
to fight unemployment.
At first sight, this argument makes a sound impression. If a
hundred workers are unemployed and another hundred workers
work 10 hours a day each, it -would be ideal if, instead, 200
workers worked 5 hours a day—and, of course, each of them
would get the same daily wage as the first 100 workers working
10 hours a day. But this example does not really meet the case.
We mtist choose another and a better one. Let us assume that
water is pouring into a room through a hole in the ceiling.
Somebody proposes that a beautiful vase be placed on the floor
below the hole. This would make the room more pleasant and
stop the floor being made wet. But does the vase really help? No,
for in a short time the vase is filled with water and will overflow
and the floor will get wet again.
It is just the same with reduced hours of work as a remedy for
unemployment. Reduced hours of work are an excellent thing to
fight for, of course with no reduction in pay. They mean more
leisure, better health, more pleasure out of life, and often are the
* Report of the Proceedings, p. 144.
196 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
only safeguard against physical breakdown because of the hiph
intensity of work. But shorter hours of work are not the right
remedy for unemployment. Of course, they may contribute to a
decline of unemployment for a short time, just as the vase will
stop the water for a short time from flowing over the floor. But
the only real remedy against flooding is to stop up the hole in the
ceiling, and the only real remedy for unemployment is to attack
its cause. It cannot be maintained that unemployment is caused
by over-long hours of work. Unemployment has increased while
hours of work have decreased. It is desirable that hours of work
should be lower than they are to-day. But to consider them
responsible for unemployment is incorrect.
We have shown before in this chapter* the reason for the
increase of unemployment and its permanently high level. It is
connected with the fact that production has increased consider¬
ably less than productivity. The solution for the problem of high
unemployment can, under present circumstances, be found only
in a rapid increase of production. Production, however, can be
increased rapidly only if purchasing power increases at a similar
rate.
What then should organized labour demand, in order to do
away with unemployment? It should demand that purchasing
power be given to the masses of the people so that they may
be able to buy an increasing amount of goods. Unemployment
must be decreased by means of an increase of wages and
salaries, of the income of teachers, small shopkeepers, and so on.
To combat unemployment with the increased purchasing
power of the masses is the right path for labour to folloy/; for
this improves the living conditions of the workers and all others.
Combating unemployment only by shortening the hours of
work would introduce the danger of sharing the production of
the same number of products among a greater number of workers
without the total product increasing, or increasing to the extent
required by the needs of the people. Combating unemployment
by increasing the purchasing power of the masses will bring
employment to many and, at the same time, increase their
production, so that more and more products can be consumed
per head of the population.
* See pp. 141 f.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, I9OO TO 1 94 1 1 97
This is no new idea. In part it underlies the theory of high
wages, and also the under-consumption theories. But as long as
we realize that we cannot use it as a means of eliminating the
cyclical crises, and we only use it as the best means under present
conditions of reducing unemployment, whether production is on
the upswing or on the downswing, it will not disappoint us, but
will bring relief to millions of unemployed and a better life for
those employed.
Before concluding this short survey of labour’s fight for better
working conditions, we will look at the fighting record itself, at
labour’s strike record.
Strike statistics for the period under review are rather poor.
The satisfactory work done by the Commissioner of Labor at the
beginning of the eighties was interrupted so soon that the strike
statistics given in the preceding chapter do not go farther than
1905. Between 1905 and 1915 no strike statistics would be avail¬
able but for the estimates of Mr. Griffin which are based on very
thorough research work. * Since 1916 better statistics are available
again.
The total number of strikers and locked-out workers per year was:
NUMBER OF STRIKERS AND LOCKED-OUT WORKERS, 1897 to 1941
1897
416,154
1912
972,000
1927
329^939
1898
263,219
i 9 G
997,000
1928
314,210
1899
431,889
i 9 r 4
627,000
1929
288,572
1900
567,719
1915
907,000
1930
182,975
1901
563,843
i 9 I 6
I > 599 > 9 1 7
1931
341,817
1902
691,507
I 9 U
1,227,254
1932
324,210
1903
787,834
1918
1,239,989
1933
1,168,272
1904
573,815
1919
4,160,348
1934
1,466,695
1905
302,434
1920
1,463,054
1935
1,117,213
1906
383,000
1921
1,099,247
1938
788,648
1907
502,000
1922
1,612,562
1937
1,860,621
1908
209,000
1923
756,584
1938
688,376
1909
452,000
1924
654,641
1939
1,170,962
1910
824,000
1925
428,416
1940
576,988
1911
373,000
1926
329 5 592
1941
2,364,297
The number of strikers has fluctuated considerably during the
period under review. Naturally it increased because the number
of workers as a whole increased. But the fluctuations are not to
be explained by changes in the actual number of workers.
* Cf. Strikes, A Study in Quantitative Economics , by John J. Griffin.
1 98 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
It is remarkable that, in contrast to the European countries,
strike activity was high all through the war years. The high peak
in the strike history of the American worker was the year 1919,
when over 4,000,000 workers were on strike at one time or
another. This was the year after the war, when the workers in
the whole capitalist world were striking for better working and
living conditions, for the fulfilment of the promises which the
ruling class had made to them during the war. How the masses
of the people were betrayed, and the militant groups beaten and
suppressed is a story to be told elsewhere.
A short statistical history of what followed is presented by the
strike statistics of the following years. By 1920 there was already
a rapid decline in strike activity. Then followed the crisis of 1921
when strike activity again declined. In 1922, we have a short¬
lived increase following the crisis. Since 1922 strike activity
declined rapidly and soon reached record low levels in modern
labour history. In 1930 only 183,000 workers struck, less than
one-twentieth of the 1919 figure.
The policy of the American Federation of Labor, culminating
in its avowed goal of co-operation between labour and capital,
has had a most adverse effect upon the resistant and combative
power of labour. When the crisis came, labour was out of train¬
ing, so to speak; there were no leaders on a national scale, and
only a few on a local scale, who knew how to lead labour in a
fighting movement against wage cuts and other attempts to
worsenlabour conditions. Hardly any other labour movement in the
capitalist world showed as little fight as did the American labour
movement when the ruling class attempted to place the entire
burden of the crisis of 1929-1933 on the shoulders of the workers.
The situation changed completely when American economy
(like that of other countries) began to emerge from the crisis.
When, after their frightful hardships, the workers exerted pres¬
sure upon the trade Union bureaucracy, when communists gained
influence and liberal progressives found their way to labour, when
the Roosevelt administration began to a certain extent to bend
to the desires of the masses and when the idea of social insurance
became more acceptable to organized labour strike activity
among the organized workers began to grow as an expression of
all these social movements.
THE DECAY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM. 190O TO 1941 199
A new spirit began to pervade the American labour movement.
A spirit of resistance, and a desire for solidarity and organiza¬
tion. If we look for the causes of strikes during the years from
1927 to 1941 this leaps to our notice at once.
The two chief aims of strikes nowadays are better wages and
hours and the right to organize. The percentage distribution of
these causes has been as follows: *
OF ALL STRIKES THE CHIEF ISSUE WAS, 1927 to 1941
{Percentage of Workers involved)
Tear
Hours and Wages
Union Organization
1927
73
14
1928
43
3°
1929
36
38
1930
40
42
i93i
45
34
1932
72
22
1933
48
4i
1934
23
52
1935
60
26
1936
35
5i
1937
22
60
1938
37
33
1939
30
54
I 94°
4 1
33
*94*
47
32
With the increasing drive for union organization, especially
during the last few years, the right to organize has come to the
forefront as a strike issue. From 1927 to 1933, question of
union organization only once—in 1930—played a greater role
than wages and hours. From 1934 to 1941 union organization
was the chief issue in four out of eight years.
The American labour movement has had a new awakening.
Everywhere, new forces are stirring, and, as a result of this,
labour has forged ahead during the last seven years. But such
awakening forces have often been suppressed, if they were not.
united. The chief task for American labour to-day is to join all
its forces into one strong trade union organization and one
strong political party. Only if these two conditions are fulfilled
will American labour be able to lead the American people into
a better future, devoid of exploitation and suppression, a future
which will bring wellbeing and happiness, material and spiritual
progress to the masses of the American people.
* Monthly Labor Review , May 1940, and Statistical Abstract , 1943.
CHAPTER V
CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR
In preceding chapters we have traced the history of labour
conditions in the United States since the later decades of the
eighteenth century. We have dealt chiefly with factors which can
be measured statistically, and which, in addition, can be ob¬
served over a certain period. Only rarely have we stopped to
draw a picture of conditions at a certain stage, taking into
account certain facts with which we were not provided from
year to year.
In this chapter I want to survey briefly some important aspects
of the life of the American worker which may help to complete
the picture which the American scene presents before the United
States entered the present war.
A. Wages and the Minimum Health and Decency Budget
For over one hundred years we have followed the ups and
downs of money and real wages, and very occasionally we have
compared the amount of wages which the worker finds in his
pay envelope with what it costs to feed himself and his family.
Such comparisons were necessarily very crude, since the material
available was poor. It is possible, however, to make a more
careful comparison for recent years. This is possible chiefly
because of the useful work in this direction done by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, by the Bureau of Home Economics,
by the Works Progress Administration, and by the Labor
Research Association. In 1919, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
published a Minimum Health and Decency Budget , setting forth the
minimum of food, clothing, housing and other necessities for a
family of five for one year. Even at that time, this budget was
regarded by many experts as insufficient. If we take into account
only changes in the cost of living, this budget is to-day more
inadequate than in 1919, because the intensity of work has
increased considerably, as the worker now expends more physical
and nervous energy than twenty years ago. If we make use of the
CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR
201
data by the Labor Research Association we can be sure, there¬
fore, that we are under-estimating rather than over-estimating,
the sum needed by the worker to keep himself and family in
health and decency.*
MINIMUM HEALTH AND DECENCY BUDGET
Tear
Dollars
1929
, 2.348
1933
'.756
1937
2 >°59
1940
2,000
What was the worker’s average income in those years? The
Labor Research Association! has published the following data:
MONEY INCOME PER MEMBER OF THE WORKING POPULATION
Tear
Dollars
1929
1,361
1933
739
1937
1 ,075
1940
1,094
The difference between the two sets of figures is striking; the
gap reveals the low wage level, the low standard of living, of the
American worker. Low as compared with what a government
agency regards as desirable f in order to keep a family on a
minimum standard of health and decency. The actual average
income, in percentages of the minimum required, is as follows:
1929
58
1933
42
1937
52
1940
55
Even in 1940, when real wages and the real standard of living
reached the highest post-crisis level, conditions were worse than
in 1929.
These results are corroborated fully by another investigation,
made some years ago by the National Resources Committee.!
* I used the 1929 figure computed by the Labor Research Association and
brought it up-to-date with the revised cost of living index of the National
Industrial Conference Board,
t Labor Notes, July, 1941 .
t Consumer Incomes in the United States,
202
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
This study contains a most interesting table* giving ihe annual
income of workers’ families (not on relief) by income levels
(1935-1936):
Annual Income Groups Per cent of Families
Dollars
Under 250
250- 500
500- 750
750-1,000 «
1,000-1,250
1,250-1,500
1,500-1,750
1,750-2,000
2,000 and over
in Receipt of Income
3 -o
7’5
12*0
16*2
16*2
12*7
9*8
7*4
15-2
In 1935-1936 the health and decency minimum budget
amounted to about 1,950 dollars. According to this table only
about one-sixth of all families received this minimum or more;
that is, only one-sixth received enough to raise a family of five
on a level compatible with health and decency.
But this table tells us more. The Works Progress Adminis¬
tration computed an emergency level for a family of four only,
that is with two children, f The maintenance of this emergency
level in March, 1935, required 903 dollars. According to the
above table, then, about one-third of all families—not on relief
but working for employers—did not reach this level.
A second level, called the maintenance level, computed by the
same government agency, amounting to 1,261 dollars in March,
1935, was attained by less than one-half of all non-relief workers’
families.
All the data at our disposal lead to only one interpretation:
the majority of American workers have an income too low to
meet even the maintenance level computed by government
agencies, which the workers themselves regard as quite inade¬
quate.
Another investigation by the Bureau of Labor Statistics based
on the Bureau’s survey of money disbursements of employed
* Consumer Incomes in the United States , Table 12, p. 27.
t Margaret L. Stecker, Quantity Budgets for Basic Maintenance and Emergency
Standards of Living. Research Bulletin , Series I, No. 21, Division of Social Research,
Works Progress Administration, 1936.
CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR
203
wage earners and clerical workers, and dealing more specifically
with food expenditure of white and Negro workers, comes, for
the period i934“ ! 93^j t0 the following conclusion:*
“A calculation of the proportion of families spending enough
to buy the ‘low-cost food diet’ of the Bureau of Home Economics
indicates that 75 per cent of the white families and 32 per cent of
the Negro families made such expenditure.”
A table showing the results of the investigation in more detail
gives the following proportion of families not buying a sufficient
diet :*f
PROPORTION OF FAMILIES BUYING AN INSUFFICIENT DIET
BY COLOUR OF FAMILY AND BY REGION
White: Per cent
North Atlantic .. .. .. 57
East North Central .. .. 60
East South Central .. .. 46
Pacific .. .. .. .. 40
Negro:
South .. .. .. .. 64
It is true that not all families buy an insufficient diet because
they do not have enough money to spend. A small proportion
could perhaps buy a sufficient diet, but do not do so because they
are not educated in food values. The reason for their lack of
knowledge, however, is the same as that for the inability of others
to buy a sufficient amount of food. As was stated at the National
Nutrition Conference in 1941: “Under-nourishment and ignor¬
ance are twins born of the same mother—poverty.” The fact
remains indisputable, therefore, that the incomes of a consider¬
able proportion of American working-class families are not
sufficient to buy enough decent food, to keep them in
health.
A second important fact which this table reveals is that condi¬
tions among Negroes are worse than among white people. This
is not only due to the fact that wages in the South—to which this
investigation of Negro dietary standards pertains—are generally
lower than in other parts of the United States. It is due also to
the fact that, in the same job and in the same place, Negro
workers are paid less than white workers, and furthermore, to the
* Monthly Labor Review, August, 1940, p. 263. t Ibid., p. 265.
204 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
fact that the Negro worker has not the same access as the white
to the better paid occupations.
The same holds true of women. Women are paid considerably
less than men. Though no specific investigations of a compre¬
hensive nature have been made, one can assert, without a
shadow of doubt, that independent women workers, with or
without dependents, live at a lower standard than do men of the
same categories.
Similar differences, in relation to the minimum required for
health and decency or to any other standard of living, can be
observed between skilled and unskilled workers, and, to a smaller
degree, between organized and unorganized workers.
One may therefore conclude this general survey by stating that
the majority of American workers do not receive a wage which
permits them to live a decent life, and that this majority is
largely composed of Negroes, women workers, and semi-skilled
and unskilled workers.
If we realize, that the American worker is unanimously re¬
garded as the best-paid worker in any big capitalist country, this
statement is a searing indictment not only of conditions in the
United States, but in the whole capitalist world. It is, in fact, a
most stern indictment of capitalism itself.
The enormity of these conditions appears greater when we
realize that they prevail in a community where a select minority
of individuals, the employing and rentier class, live generally on
a very high level.
Mordecai Ezekiel, one of the most able statisticians in the
United States, recently made a most interesting computation of
the distribution of the national product.* He says that the
upper-income quarter of the population consumes “very much
more than their pro rata share of all the good things the nation
produces.” This top quarter consumes 40 per cent of the food
and almost 55 per cent of the clothing. One quarter consume
more than half! The lowest quarter—that is, those receiving
635 dollars per year and less—consume only one-eighth of the
nation’s food and one-thirteenth of the nation’s clothing!
It is only natural that, under such conditions, with the majority
of the people receiving a considerably smaller income than even
* See Planning for America f by George B. Galloway and Associates.
CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR 205
government authorities regard as necessary, the general nutri¬
tion standard of the people must be very low and health con¬
ditions poor. This is obvious from the facts previously given
and can be additionally illustrated by some material recently
collected.
B. Nutrition and General Health Conditions
In May, 1941, the first National Nutrition Conference for
Defence met in Washington. From this conference emerged a
rough picture of the nation’s nutrition. The picture revealed was
as follows:
Over a third of the people of the United States, about 45
million, live on a diet which cannot be considered adequate even
from a conservative point of view. These 45 million are under¬
paid and over-taxed to the point of slow starvation.
More than 40 per cent of the American people, almost 55
million, are not getting enough food and the right kind of food
to maintain full health and vigour.
Even when measured by lower standards than the labour
movement would subscribe to to-day, only about one quarter of
the population enjoy a really proper diet.
Thus, from the viewpoint of food consumption alone, 55
million Americans are below the standard laid down as a mini¬
mum by government agencies. This does not mean that only
55 million Americans live below the general minimum standard,
because, while millions may attain the minimum food standard,
they may be below the standard of clothing.
It is not possible to give even a rough survey of national con¬
ditions as to clothing. But we can get some insight, at least, into
the nation’s housing standards. A considerable amount of
material on this subject has been made available recently,
though little of general significance.
The best and shortest introduction to the housing problem for
our purpose is the New York Report to the Government and the
Legislature by the State Superintendent of Housing* which
contains the following significant tables :f
* Legislative Document, 1940, No. 70.
t Quoted from Monthly Labor Review , May, 1940.
206 a short history of labour conditions
PER CENT OF FAMILIES IN IMMEDIATE NEED OF HOUSING
Total cities of 10,000 population and over .. .. 28*1
New York City .34*1
Up-State:
6 cities of 100,000 population and over .. .. 14*3
6 cities of 50,000 to 100,000 population ., .. 14*7
10 cities of 25,000 to 50,000 population .. .. 10*3
45 cities of 10,000 to 25,000 population .. .. 15*6
This table is important and interesting for several reasons.
Firstly, because it shows that in the biggest city in the country
more than one-third of the families live under housing conditions
which make an immediate change necessary. Secondly, because
it shows that housing conditions vary considerably, but irregu¬
larly, among cities of various sizes. We note that housing condi¬
tions do not improve steadily as the towns are smaller.
Of course, housing conditions are not identical in all States of
the Union. New York is not fully representative of all other
States. But a not inconsiderable percentage of the people of the
United States live in the State of New York, and also New York
in recent decades has been relatively progressive as compared
with other large cities though terribly backward as measured by
standards of decent human needs. Furthermore, for some of
these facts we have corroborative evidence from other, relatively
comprehensive surveys. Mr. Sydney Maslen in a short survey of
housing conditions* comes to the conclusion: “There would
seem to be proportionally as many ill-housed persons on the
farms and in villages as there are in cities in the United States.
Studies of the United States Department of Agriculture showed
that some 3,000,000 farm dwellings failed to meet minimum
standards of health and comfort.” If we assume that there are
only five persons for each farm dwelling, we arrive, for the
farming population alone, at a figure of 15 million people who
are housed even below what is officially regarded as the minimum
standard. It would not be surprising if we found that almost as
many people are living below the minimum housing standard as
are below the minimum food standard. And those who have so
little food that they are practically starving find their counter-
* See Social Work Year Book , 1941. Russel Sage Foundation, sixth issue,
pp. 243 f.
CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR
1207
part in that section of the population whose housing conditions
are described by Maslen as follows:
“It is estimated that there are 125,000 migratory families with
about half a million children camping in primitive conditions,
getting their drinking water out of irrigation ditches, and living
without sanitary conveniences.”
Finally, it is useful to quote some figures from the Census of
Housing for 1940. Unfortunately, they do not give precise infor¬
mation on the state of over-crowding and the percentage of the
people living below what is regarded as a minimum or a desir¬
able standard of housing. But the data available give a rough
indication of some aspects of the housing situation. According to
the Census the number of dwelling units in need of major repairs
in 1940 was:
6,413,727 or 18-3 per cent of all units reported.
If we subdivide them by areas, we find that 11*5 per cent of all
units in urban areas needed major repairs, 21*4 per cent In
rural non-farm areas, and 33*9 per cent in rural farm areas.
Conditions on the farms were worse. If we study lighting condi¬
tions, we find that over one-fifth of all dwelling units in the
United States still had to use lamps instead of gas or electric
lighting; in the farm areas the percentage of lamp-lit dwelling
units reached two-thirds; 67-4 per cent to be exact.
Nobody can estimate what percentage of those who live below
the minimum housing standard are living above the minimum
food standard. Their number is surely not very great because
the cause fQr both deficiencies is the same: poverty. But their
number need not be very small either, because for most of the
poor—and especially for hard-working wage earners—food must
take first place, so that they may keep their jobs, maintain the
intensity of their labour. Many workers, therefore, in their
expenditure, pay more attention to food than to improvement in
their housing. For this reason, it would not be surprising if the
total number of 55 million people living below the food minimum
were swollen by 10 million more who live above the food but
' below the housing minimum. That is, food and housing together
may account for half the people of the United States living at a
standard which does not guarantee a minimum of health and
decency.
208
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
Too little food, bad housing, poor clothing, keep the people in
ill health. Until the National Health Survey, undertaken for the
period 1935-1936, our knowledge of health conditions in the
United States was as poor as that for other countries. This survey,
however, enables us to get an insight into some aspects of the
state of health of the nation. The decisive figures (unfortunately
only for those two years) are: for every death occurring during
one year there are on the average sixteen cases of illness which
disable the sick person for a week or longer. We see how im¬
mensely important reliable sickness figures are, and how unim¬
portant death figures are for the measurement of health condi¬
tions; and we note also what a large number of people are
suffering from serious sickness. Every day during the winter
there are at least 6,000,000 people in. the United States who
are unable to attend their work because of illness or injury.
And if we assilme an average illness of five days, we arrive at
the conclusion that, on the average, every American is so ill
during the three winter months that he has to stop work for
some days.
But this is only a small part of the important revelations made
by the survey. Of even greater importance is the fact that health
conditions fluctuate considerably with income, and those who
earn least suffer most from ill-health. And of those who suffer
most the workers form the largest group. *
According to the survey about 2 per cent of the workers are
disabled by illness. This means that about half a million workers
are disabled by illness every day in the year. If we realize, how¬
ever, that this investigation was undertaken during a period of*
high unemployment, and that, because of the danger of losing
their jobs, many sick workers stayed at work, we can estimate the
number as considerably higher.
These figures refer only to employed workers. Among the
unemployed, the percentage disabled because of illness is twice
as high. While of 1,000 employed workers 19-5 are disabled by
illness, among unemployed workers the figure is 39*5. From this
we can conclude that the lower the income the higher the per-*
* All figures in the following paragraphs are for white families only and
are taken from The National Health Survey , Preliminary Reports , Sickness and
Medical Care Series , Bulletin No. 7.
CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR
209
centage of illness among workers. The following table gives the
figures in more detail.
NUMBER OF WORKERS DISABLED BY ILLNESS
Groups of Workers
All Workers ..
Employed ..
Unemployed
Work Relief
Seeking Work .
{Per Thousand)
Income under
%i i ooo
32 *8
23*6
44*2
28*3
55*8
Income $/,ooo
tO % 2)000
17*0
15*8
3 i -7
3 i *9
Income $2 >000
and over
17*8
170
32*1
32*4
The first thing we notice is the increase in illness due to unem¬
ployment. Again, unemployed families on relief-work are better
off than unemployed families not on relief work. The second
thing we notice is that health conditions improve rapidly as
income increases. The fact that workers with an income of over
$2,000 seem to be slightly less well off as regards health than
those earning $1,000 to $2,000 may be ascribed to either of the
following two causes: It may simply not be true; the statistics
for this group of workers may not be representative, a suspicion
which has a basis in the fact that the number of workers investi¬
gated in the highest income group is very small indeed. Or, as one
commentator on my manuscript explains it: “I should not be at
all surprised if the health conditions of the $1,000 to $2,000 class
was better than that of the income class of workers having over
$2,000, for the following two reasons: first, because most families
with incomes between $1,000 and $2,000 can get free clinical
care in the large cities, while the better paid workers probably
have to pay for such care, and, as a result, tend not to be so well
attended medically; and, second, few workers with incomes
over $2,000 earn enough to pay for really good medical
care.”
The second explanation refers to the large cities only, and I
think that on the whole the first explanation is the better
one.
Another most interesting factor, corroborating our observa¬
tions, is brought out in the investigation of illness among unem¬
ployed workers belonging to various groups. The workers who
before unemployment had an income of $1,000 to $2,000 are
vol. 11. o
210 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
less affected by illness than those who before they became
unemployed had an income of $1,000 and less. This can partly
be explained by the fact that workers of the higher income group
could bring over into their period of unemployment more savings
than could the lower income group. It can be assumed also that
the health of these workers, even if they spend during unemploy¬
ment only the same amount as the lower paid workers, would be
generally better, because, with the relatively higher income they
had before they became unemployed, they had built up a
greater resistance to illness.
Therefore, we can now assert, with more detail and qualifica¬
tion, that, other conditions being equal, health improves in
accordance with improvement in income, or is related to the
former income, in so far as it has built up physical resistance.
The survey gives another interesting table showing the distri¬
bution of illness among the various social and occupational groups
of workers:
NUMBER OF WORKERS DISABLED BY ILLNESS
(Per Thousand)
Occupational Class All Workers Employed Unemployed
Skilled workers and foremen .. 22 ■ 8 17*0 40 4
Semi-skilled workers .. .. 24*6 19*6 42*3
Unskilled workers .. .. .. 36*0 31-2 43*5
The higher the occupational level, the higher the income, the
lower the percentage of sickness. We find the lowest level of
illness among skilled workers in employment; the highest,
among unemployed unskilled workers.
As soon as workers become unemployed the rate of sickness
increases rapidly. The rate is higher among skilled unemployed
than among the unskilled employed; and the difference of the
sickness rate between skilled and unskilled unemployed workers
is smaller than that between skilled unemployed and unskilled
employed workers.
We see that the sickness rate is strongly influenced by the
development of unemployment, and we can realize what it
means for the masses of the workers in terms of health that
unemployment in recent decades has been so much higher than
before.
CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR
211
The sensation at the National Nutrition Conference was pro¬
vided in a speech by General Louis B. Hershey, Deputy Director
of the Selective Service System. Often in the history of the last
hundred years, military circles have played a not inconsiderable
part in demanding better living and working conditions for the
masses; not because they have a more highly developed social
conscience, but because they are dissatisfied with recruiting
material. General Hershey gave a very high percentage of
rejection because of physical unfitness—a higher figure than that
for 1917-1918, which also was a period of large-scale recruiting.
It is, of course, difficult to compare recruiting figures and the
standard of health of the recruits if the standards are not exactly
the same. But it remains a fact that, in 1917-1918, less than one-
third of the Army recruits were turned down for physical defects,
while in 1941 the number of rejects averaged 43 per cent. As
General Hershey said, after someone had called his attention to
the difficulties of comparison between to-day and 25 years ago:
“The fact remains that while we may be no worse now than
24 years ago we seem certainly to be no better. . . . We are
physically in a condition of which we nationally should be
thoroughly ashamed.”
“We should be thoroughly ashamed”—a very clear statement
from one who cannot be accused of “leftist humanitarianism.”
It can be supplemented by a similar statement by one of the
greatest medical authorities in a more specific field. Dr. Arthur
Hastings Merritt, a past president of the American Dental
Association, said that the incidence of tooth decay is as bad as it
was one hundred years ago.*
This statement is of great significance for two reasons. The
one is that the dental health of the people has not improved in
the past hundred years. The second is the following: We all know
that dentistry has in no country made such progress as in the
United States. We all know that dental care (among the well-to-
do) plays a greater role there than in most other countries. And
yet the dental condition of the people has not improved.
This is a similar case to that of accident conditions after the
invention of the Davy lamp in Britain. The Davy lamp elimi¬
nated many causes of explosions—and yet accidents in the mines
* Quoted in Time , November 10, 1941.
212
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
increased: because the employers drove the workers all the
harder, and the advantages which the Davy lamp brought were
quickly converted into profits for the employers, while the
miners, because of the increased intensity of work, not only
gained no advantage but suffered definite disadvantages. Simi¬
larly, the development of safety measures in American factories
has been considerable in recent decades—and yet the parallel
development of accidents shows no improvement.
We see, therefore, that it is wrong to draw conclusions from
one set of developments only. Dental science has made much
progress. The death rate has gone down. Real wages have in¬
creased. Hours of work have become shorter. This is one side of
the picture. The other side is often overlooked, although it is
usually not only of equal, but even of greater, importance.
And this was all the more important to-day, when the United
States entered the war against Fascism. It is well to remember
to-day what President Roosevelt said on the occasion of the
National Nutrition Conference on May 27, 1941 :
“Fighting men of our armed forces, workers in industry, the
families of these workers, every man and woman in America,
must have nourishing food. If people are under-nourished, they
cannot be efficient in producing what we need in our united
drive for dynamic strength. 55
CHAPTER VI
THE WAR AND AFTER
With the entry of the United States into the war in 1941 many
labour problems, while remaining the same in essence, had to be
tackled in a different way. The first and foremost task of labour
was to beat its arch-enemy, German Fascism. Everything else had
to be subordinated to this purpose, and fortunately American
labour found itself allied in this fight with a considerable part of
the bourgeoisie and, of course, with the Government.
.The successful waging of this war against Fascism, however,
required that labour had every opportunity to go all out in this
fight, and that the forces of progress were not hampered by
hesitant or reactionary forces.
Labour wished to give its best in the production of weapons of
war. For this it was necessary that anti-trade union employers
were kept in check and that labour had increasing freedom to
display initiative in increasing production and improving pro¬
duction processes. For this purpose, labour laid great stress on the
introduction of joint production committees of workers and
management, whose task it was to secure the greatest possible
collaboration of both parties in the drive for increased produc¬
tion. For, as Philip van Gelder, the Secretary-Treasurer of the
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of
America, expressed it: * ,
“The production drive is getting to be the most important
activity of our Union. This is as it should be, because there is
absolutely nothing more important to every member of this
Union, as an individual, and to the membership as a whole
collectively, than the successful prosecution of the war.
In order to increase production as much as possible, to secure
the greatest number of the best quality of weapons for the arme
forces of the United Nations, labour had to see to it the best
use was being made of all available labour, especially that the
great number of unemployed be found work as quickly as possible;
* Quoted from Labor Notes, July, 1942. published by the Labor Research
Association.
214 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
that the wages of labour were such that they gave the strength
and health required for the war work; that the hours of work
were such that, on the one hand, the nation’s labour power was
used to the full, and that, at the same time, it was not so exhausted
that evil consequences resulted for output; and also that the
organizations of labour, especially the trade unions, were un¬
hampered in their activities, and were given full scope in their
drive for an effective production.
These tasks (and there were many others of a similar kind)
show that by prosecuting the war, by increasing the war effort of
the Nation, labour was doing its best to fight Fascism and also to
improve the status of labour. This does not mean that labour
used the occasion of the war to improve its living conditions at
the expense of the war needs, while the workers of other countries
were living at a standard which had been considerably reduced.
It means that labour was serving the Nation, the cause of pro¬
gress, and the war effort by making its voice heard to an increas¬
ing degree. For labour, naturally, represents the most progressive
part of the nation; and the war could be won quickly and
Fascism beaten thoroughly, only if the progressive sections of
society played an increasing part.
In his fine speech on May 8, 1942, Mr. Wallace, Vice-President
of the United States, said:
“Everywhere the common people are on the march. . . . The
people are on the march towards even fuller freedom that the
most fortunate people of the world have hitherto enjoyed.”
But this march forward of the common people is not always an
easy one. Vice-President Wallace also said:
“The international cartels that serve American greed and the
German will to power must go. . . . We must especially prepare to
stifle fifth columnists in the United States who will try, not merely
to sabotage our war plants, but, infinitely more important, our
minds.”
Leading the way—and at the same time fighting the vested
interests and fifth columnists who were and are obstacles on this
way—leading the common people forward, first into battle for
victory over Fascism and then for a new world: such was the
task of labour in 1941.
THE WAR AND AFTER
215
Labour has had a considerable success. German Fascism and
the Japanese aggressor have been beaten. German Fascism is
being eradicated. The German war potential has been diminished
very considerably within a short time after the signing of the
unconditional surrender. The foreign enemies of labour, though
still in existence everywhere, and in some countries still very
powerful, definitely present a smaller danger to-day than before
the war.
How are conditions at home? How far has labour succeeded in
gaining ground against the enemies of progress at home? Firstly,
it must be emphasized that it is not possible to divide, as if they
existed in completely different and unrelated spheres, the enemies
of progress in our midst and those in foreign countries. The
crushing of German Fascism, of Italian Fascism, of reaction in a
number of Eastern European countries, the advance which the
progressive forces in Western Europe have made, the defeat of
the Japanese aggressor—all this has weakened reaction at home.
Furthermore, in the course of this just fight against reaction
abroad, a fight in which for various motives most groups of the
ruling class, including very reactionary ones, joined in some way,
the ruling class was forced to make concessions to progress at
home. Just as an angel cannot eat with the devil without losing
some’ of his innocence, so—in the opposite way—a reactionary
cannot take part in a just war without making some concessions
to progress at home.
These concessions, of course, were not made voluntarily. They
were forced by labour and other progressive strata of society
upon reaction. They were forced upon reaction not by extortion,
but by the lead which the progressive classes and groups took in
the fight against the enemy abroad; by their intelligent leader¬
ship in the fight for progress everywhere; and, finally, by objec¬
tive circumstances connected with the waging of modern war.
Modern war requires the mobilization of the nation’s labour
force for production at home and for the armed forces. According
to official computations* the civilian labour force remained
practically stable between 1940 and 1942; declined by one
million in 1943, by a further million in 1944 an< ^ was during
war months in 1945 by about two million smaller than in 194°*
* By the Bureau of the Census.
216
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
At the same time the armed forces increased from £ a million in
1940, and i\ million in 1941 to about 12 million in the course of
the war. That is, the number of persons in the armed and civilian
labour force rose during the war by about 10 million. At the
same time, a considerable change took place within the civilian
labour force by the absorption of the unemployed into the work
process and by a considerable influx of women. The following
table gives a short survey of the development of the civilian
labour force :*
CIVILIAN LABOUR FORCE, 1940 to 1945
(. Millions)
Men
Women
Total Labour
Total Labour Force
Year
in Labour Force
Force
Employed Unemployed
J 94 °t
41-0
13*3
54*2
46*9
7*3
I 94 I
40-5
13-6
54 *i
49 * 1
5 *o
1942
39'6
14*9
54*5
52-1
2*4
1943
36-1
US
53'5
52-4
1 -o
1944
34'8
178
52-6
5 1 ‘8
o-8
1945 +
339
18-0
5 1 ‘9
5 1 *°
0-9
Apart from the general mobilization of manpower, the influx of
women seems very considerable indeed. On the average, about
4J million women were mobilized for the civilian labour force, to
which must be added some hundred thousands for the forces. As
the number of men in the civilian labour force declined, because
of the draft for the armed forces, the percentage of women in the
civilian labour force rose even more rapidly than their absolute
number. While in 1940 only about a quarter of all civilian
workers were women, the percentage rose in the course of time
to about one-third—less than in Britain and in Germany—yet a
remarkable achievement as compared with the pre-war years.
By 1944, the terms civilian labour force and employed civilian
labour force had practically become identical. Unemployment
had disappeared—for the first time since the war of 1917-18.
Here we have one of the most important factors which contrib¬
uted to an improved position of labour, and which helped to
* See, Survey of Current Business , currently.
f March to December only. The figures for the total labour force are slightly
higher than those published by the American Federation of Labor while those
for unemployment are lower. The percentage of unemployment, however, is
somewhat higher than the weighted average of the A.F. of L.
t January to June.
THE WAR AND AFTER
217
eliminate many of the evils which characterized the preceding
years. Few had to go hungry because they did not find work.
And the great mass of the workers were not living under the
constant menace of unemployment which previously had been so
effectively used by the employers to keep the standard of living
of the workers down. * The decline in unemployment, indeed its
virtual disappearance, also meant that the many millions of
Americans—far more than 20 million in the years before the
war—who were practically destitute because the breadwinner of
the family was jobless, experienced a considerable rise in their
standard of living. Those who before the war lived on the lowest
income level, hungry, ill-clad, and most poorly housed, experi¬
enced a considerable rise in their status.
If, at the same time, we bear in mind that this rise in their
standard of living—which considerably affected the average
standard of living in the United States—took place during a just
war, a war in the interests of the people, then we realize to the
full the fundamental importance of this fact in evaluating the
conditions of the workers during the war.
While there cannot be the slightest doubt that the standard of
living of a considerable portion of the people of the United
States has risen during the war, the majority of the workers—
many of those who were not unemployed before the war—
experienced a drop. If, for instance, we study the development of
wages in manufacturing industries, we find that money wages
increased as follows :f
AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES,
I 94 1 TO I945
Tear
Dollars
Year
Dollars
I 94 1
29-58
1944
46-09
1942
36-65
1945 +
46-96
1943
43-16
* For this reason, capitalist reaction, ably represented, for instance, by
Senator Taft, opposed all through 1945 the idea of full employment. Full
employment would deprive the employers of their decisive weapon in the
fight against labour. On the basis of unemployment it is infinitely easier^ to
lower the standard of living of the workers. An excellent article on the position
of the employers in this respect was written by I. F. Stone, “Capitalism and
Full Employment,” The Nation, September 1, 1945.
t Figures of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
4 January to June.
220 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
no progress was made. The agricultural figures are not conclu¬
sive as they refer to productivity per worker; it would not seem
improbable that hours of work increased at least slightly during
the war, productivity per hour, thus remaining at best stable
between 1942 and 1944.
If we now try to arrive at a general conclusion concerning the
development of productivity per man-hour, we may argue as
follows: Productivity in the armament industries and in ship¬
building increased very considerably. Productivity in all other
manufacturing industries, had, on the whole, a tendency to
decline—a development which we also find in other countries,
as well as in the previous war. As during the war the number of
workers engaged on the production of armaments rose sharply,
and made up the vast majority of manufacturing workers, we
may conclude: In manufacturing industries average produc¬
tivity rose considerably throughout the war. In mining produc¬
tivity increased slightly, mainly because of the clear rise in
bituminous coal mining. In agriculture productivity probably
remained about stable after a rise in 1942. In production as a
whole, taking all branches together, productivity showed a rise
over the war years. As part of this rise was undoubtedly due to an
increase in the intensity of work, to more exertion by the indi¬
vidual worker per hour of work, the food and other requirements
per man-hour rose—if the worker was to keep his standard of
living stable.
Perhaps it is useful to conclude the remarks on the standard of
living of the workers with a quotation from Labor's Monthly
Survey (published by the American Federation of Labor), of
August, 1944:
“War Labor Board figures . . . show that in all American"
industry to-day, including manufacturing, trade, mining, utilities,
service and all other private industry (but not farm labor or
government employees), only 8 per cent of the workers have
wage rates of $1.30 an hour or more, and about 10 per cent get
$1.27 or more—enough to support their families in health and
efficiency. And about 60 per cent or nearly two-thirds have less
than 86 c. an hour, the minimum necessary for a bare sub¬
sistence living level.”
There are, however, many further aspects of the conditions of
THE WAR AND AFTER
221
the worker which deteriorated. In order to keep real wages at
least on the level indicated above, the workers had to fight many
a strike, in spite of their eagerness to continue work in the interest
of the war effort. Utterly reactionary employers forced the
workers again and again to resort to the strike weapon. Without
the wage increases gained by the workers, they would not have
been able to keep productivity at the levels indicated above.
STRIKE ACTIVITY DURING THE WAR, 1942 to 1944
Strike Causes (Workers Involved ,
Percentage)
Striking Workers Strike Hours and Hours , Wages , Union
^ it r. t it r t •... r\ _• _•
Year
Number
Per cent
Man-Days
Wages
Union Organi- Organi¬
of Employed
zation zation
1942
839.961
2*8
4 ^ 82,557
50
12 10
1943
1.981.279
6*9
I 3 > 5 °°> 5 2 9
62
3 ?
1944
2,115,637
7-0
8,721,079
38
3 16
The table is very revealing in many respects. The number of
striking workers was low in 1942 ! during the course of the war,
however, it rose considerably; since 1920, the figures for 1943
and 1944 were surpassed only by the 1941 figure. Even more
interesting are the causes for the strikes. Between 193d ar *d 1 939
hours.and wages as cause for strikes had fluctuated between 22
and 37 per cent; in 1940 and 1941 they had increased to 41 and
47 per cent; a further rapid rise occurred during the first two
war years. Union Organization, on the other hand, caused more
than 50 per cent of all strikes in 1936, 1937 an d 1 939 5 ' n I 93 ^>
1940 and 1941 it accounted for about one-third of all strikes.
During the first two war years there was little trouble about
union organization. Only in 1944 did this problem give rise to an
increasing number of strikes, though the percentage remained
low as compared with the years preceding the war.
Both trends are significant. The increase in the percentage ot
strikes caused by grievances as regards hours of work and wages
shows that even in a just war, class differences cannot e over
come to such a degree that reactionary employers do not try to
get the utmost out of labour. And the decline in urnon organiza¬
tion as a cause of strikes shows that labour’s position was strong
enough during the war to make thorough union organization no
longer such an issue of conflict, and testifies to the acquiescence
222
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
—at least temporarily—of the employers in the existence of large-
scale union organization.
Unfortunately, we do not have conclusive figures on the
degree of union organization during the war. But there is no
doubt that the number of organized workers as well as the per¬
centage of organization increased considerably. We can estimate
the total trade union, membership for 1941 at about 10 million,
composed mainly of million members of the A.F. of L., about
the same figure for the C.I.O., and above £ million in the railroad
brotherhoods. Tn 1945 the total figure had reached the record
number of perhaps 14 million. Of special significance is the
increase in female members. The total number of women in
trade unions in 1939 was around 0 *8 million. By 1944, the figure
had increased to 3 million. Just as sharp was the rise in negro
trade union membership. At the end of the thirties less than a
quarter million negroes were members of trade unions. By 1942
the half million mark was reached. In 1945 the figure had risen
to about one million.
Labour has gained in strength. The workers are better organ¬
ized in trade unions. With the sharpening of the issues in the
course of the war and now during the transition period, the pro¬
gressive forces are consolidating their views and policy. Reaction,
which had never been dormant, believes that the time has now
come to “make good for lost time” during the war and to correct
the “unfortunate mistakes” of the Roosevelt administration.
Labour is strong but it will have to fight most strenuously to
forge ahead.
The main goal of labour can be compressed into three words:
Peace and Prosperity. The outlines of the peace policy have
already emerged clearly during the war: a policy directed to¬
wards maintenance and deepening of the great alliance of the
United Nations. The outline of a policy of prosperity is less clear,
yet equally urgent. While it will be impossible to achieve and
maintain prosperity without peace, it will be equally impossible
to enjoy peace without real prosperity.
The two main tasks for the next few years will be to maintain
full employment and to convert a large part of armament pro-
THE WAR AND AFTER 223
duction to civilian production in such a way that the people
fully benefit from the changeover.
If full employment could be created during the war, full
employment must be maintained during peace. At the same
time, all the safeguards against possible maladjustments must be
strengthened. Social security legislation and measures have made
practically no progress during the war, and although consider¬
able progress was made before the war, the United States are
still far behind many other countries in scope and efficiency with
regard to social insurance. To mention only two important
points. In the Social Security Tear Book for 1942 we read: “On an
average day, some 7 million persons in the United States are
incapacitated for work or their other usual pursuits. * Of these,
2 * 5 to 3 -o million would be, but for their disability, in the active
labour force. The annual wage loss from disability may be esti¬
mated at $3 billion or more. This figure may be contrasted with
the estimated total of some half billion dollars paid in 1942 to
disabled persons under various public programmes, including
predominantly the veterans 5 programme and workmen’s com¬
pensation. . . . The United States, moreover, is far behind many
countries in Europe and South America in providing methods
for paying the cost of medical care on a social insurance
basis. 5 5 f
And as with health and protection against the effects of other
disabilities than sickness, so with old age: “Broad as is the scope
of the Federal program under the Social Security Act, it fails to
give the protection of old-age and survivors 5 insurance to a large
part of the working population. 55 !
Closely connected with the problem of social insurance is that
of child and juvenile labour which have increased so much
during the war. According to a study made by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, J the employment of juveniles has developed as
follows during the war: “Census figures for 1940 and estimates
based on Census sample surveys since that date show an increase
from about 1,000,000 in 1940 to nearly 3,000,000 in April, 1944,
* The Social Security Year Book for 1943, p. 23, estimates that “half of these
disabilities were of more than 6 months’ duration.”
•f Pp. 3-4.
{ Monthly Labor Review, April, 1945.
224 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
in the number of young workers 14 through 17 years of age.
During the summer months of 1943 and 1944 the number
approached 5,000,000.”
It would obviously be desirable to reduce the number of
juveniles and children at work to definitely smaller proportions
and to provide for a standard of living of their parents which will
allow them to keep them longer at school so that they will enter
their occupational life much better trained than they did during
the war years. (Between 1940 and 1944 the number of school
children aged 14 to 19 had declined from 9*2 to 7-9 million.)*
A full employment policy very definitely does not include an
over-employment policy for children and juveniles.
Full employment can, however, only be maintained if there is
full production. Full production, in turn, if it is not to lead
quickly to overproduction, can be maintained only if there is full
consumption. Full consumption, in turn, is dependent upon full
purchasing power of the masses of the people. And as wages and
salaries are the main item in the purchasing power of the masses,
and as, furthermore, practically all other elements of mass pur¬
chasing power, such as the income of the small independent
craftsman, the shopkeeper, the professional classes, the large
number of small and medium business men, and, not least, the
farmers, are in turn dependent on the effective purchasing power
of the workers, everything will depend upon the real income
development of the workers. Any policy designed to lower real
wages must lead to disaster. Every step forward made by the
workers will not only lead to a betterment of conditions for
themselves, but will give support and help to raise the standard of
living of the other large strata of society. It is this fact which
makes so important for the whole of the people of the United
States the development of real wages and the general standard of
labour. It is this close interconnection with and dependence of
the welfare of the community as a whole upon the workers’
standard of living which makes the development of labour con¬
ditions in the next few years the measuring gauge for progress of
the whole American people.
* Monthly Labor Review, January, 1945.
APPENDIX
ACCIDENTS AND THE TRADE CYCLE
We know that many aspects of the working and living conditions
of the wage earners are greatly influenced by the general trend
of business. Some time ago,* Max D. Kossoris made a most
interesting investigation into the relations between “Industrial
Injuries and the Business Cycle.” He investigated the develop¬
ment of industrial injury frequency rates and employment for a
considerable number of manufacturing industries during the
years 1929 to 1935. The result of a comparison between the
development of employment and accident frequency was that,
during the crisis of 1929 to 1932, with falling employment, the
accident rate fell too. The reasons which Mr. Kossoris gives for
this parallel development of employment and accident frequency
are:
“1. As the depression deepened, labor forces were curtailed,
with those most recently added laid off first. This generally left
employed workers with long years of service and, usually, those
of the ^killed or semi-skilled types which management wanted to
retain as a nucleus for subsequent expansion. Such workers
generally were thoroughly familiar with job hazards and had
developed safety habits which were carried from job to job. As a
result, there were fewer disabling injuries per million hours
worked, and the frequency rate decreased.
“2. In the early stages of depression, lay-offs tended to lag
behind reductions in operation, with the result that the total
number of man-hours worked exceeded those which would
ordinarily have been required. Coupled with decreased numbers
of injuries, attributable to a general slowing down in operating
tempo, the swollen man-hours total resulted in a lowering of the
frequency rate.
“3. As business conditions became worse, management shifted
toward use of the most efficient equipment, which generally
meant the most modern equipment. Such equipment, as a
general rule, was also the safest. This factor in itself would be
* Monthly Labor Review, March, 1938.
P
vol. n.
226 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
sufficient to reduce the frequency rate. Coupled with a more
skilled and safety conscious labor force, it was still more effective.
“4. As the depression deepened, the number of reported dis¬
abilities not exceeding one week decreased out of proportion to
the general decrease in industrial injuries generally. As will be
pointed out later, there is a strong probability that many minor
injuries, which under normal conditions would have caused
disabilities ranging from one to three days, were not reported
by workers. As a result, the number of disabling injuries which
entered into the calculation of the frequency rate was depressed.”
As to the general tendency which Mr. Kossoris finds during
the period of increasing trade activity: an increase in employ¬
ment and in the frequency rates of injury, he naturally deduces
the causes for these relations from the analysis given above:
4 ‘From these explanations (for the development during the
crisis) it can also be readily understood why the frequency rate
should have risen as employment increased.” But the frequency
rate did not increase during the whole period of increasing
employment and Mr. Kossoris analyses this in more detail:
“With the first decided increase in employment, the frequency
rate rises sharply, apparently because of the return to jobs of
new or rehired former employees.
“Subsequent increases in employment are accompanied by less
decided increases in the frequency rate.
“As employment tends to approach a plateau, the frequency
rate turns downward, apparently because of the increasing skill
and development of safety habits—and perhaps a greater feeling
of security in the job—of workers hired or rehired during the
preceding year.”
An investigation into individual manufacturing industries gave
the following result of the relation between the trend of employ¬
ment and injury frequency:
“In three industries, the trends of frequency rates and the
employment index either moved in the same direction or closely
followed the entire group pattern. In twelve more, the degree of
relationship was not so marked, but nevertheless close. In ten
industries the relationship was fairly close, but still definitely
apparent. In four industries, however, there appeared to be no
relationship at all.”
ACCIDENTS AND THE TRADE CYC LE 227
I do not think that, on the basis of the material given by Mr.
Kossoris, one can arrive at the same conclusion. According to
the evidence presented by Mr. Kossoris—and it is most valuable
—one must, I think, come to the conclusion that, for the years
1929 to 1935 at least, there is no definite relation between injury
frequency rates and employment.
A close study of the general development will show that there
really is no relation between accident frequency and employ¬
ment :
ACCIDENT FREQUENCY AND EMPLOYMENT, 19*9-1935
( Z 9 S 3 ~~ J 9 2 5 *» IQ o )
Tear
Employment
Deaths
Frequency Rate
Permanent Temporary
Disabilities Disabilities
General
Rate
1929
102-2
0-15
1-38
22-45
23-98
193°
86-o
0-17
1-41
21-50
23-08
1931
70-0
015
1-30
17-40
18-85
1932
58-4
0*17
1 ‘45
I 7’93
r 9*55
1933
65-4
o-14
1 ‘39
20-64
22-17
1934
76-9
o-17
1 -64
20-83
22-62
1935
81 *4
0-15
1 '54
19-60
21 -46
During the years under review, employment made six moves.
The death frequency rate moved twice in the same direction
(instead of six times as a perfect correlation would require); the
frequency rate of permanent disabilities moved also only twice in
the same direction; the temporary disability rate and the general
rate moved four times in the same direction.
As far as the death rate and the permanent disability rate are
concerned, there is really no relation at all, or rather, there is the
contrary relation to the temporary disability rate as regards the
degree of frequency and the degree of employment.
T^hat does not invalidate the reasons for certain moves and
tendencies of the frequency rate of injuries which Mr. Kossoris
has mentioned. It simply means that there are other factors
determining the development and the relations between injuries
and employment than solely those mentioned by Mr. Kossoris.
One factor which disturbs the picture is mentioned by Mr.
Kossoris himself: the fact that, during a depression, workers are
inclined to go to work with injuries which, in times when their
228
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
jobs were somewhat safer, would rightly be regarded by them a
temporary disability to work. This fact makes all general dis
ability figures unreliable. A fact which Mr. Kossoris has not
mentioned is that, during the depression, the drive for increasing
intensity of work continues and is often even increased, with the
result that there is in one respect at least a tendency towards
increased frequency of accidents during the crisis.
In my opinion, the best way to discover whether there is any
relation between employment and injury frequency is to restrict
the investigation to the frequency of deaths by accident, possibly
including also a review of the relations between employment and
permanent disabilities. And, furthermore, it is necessary to cover
a much greater number of years than Mr. Kossoris has done.
Unfortunately, statistics for the United States were until
recently of such poor quality that it is possible to investigate only
the coal industry in this manner, and here only for the death
frequency. One might object that the coal industry is a very un¬
fortunate one for such an investigation, since some of its biggest
disasters, with a considerable number of fatal accidents, are due
to causes which have nothing to do with the economic develop¬
ment and the trend of trade. But as the following tables will
show, this is not the case. On the contrary, only the inclusion of
those disasters which seem to be due to accident or fate or chance
enables us to get a correct picture of the situation. For the major
disasters in the coal industry are also connected with the general
trend of business, and with the removal of crises, also these
disasters could be eliminated. For reasons which will become
obvious later on, I have divided the period which we shall
review into two phases, the one comprising the years from 1890
to 1918, and the other the years from 1919 to 1939. We shall
now study in detail the development of employment, and fatal
accidents during the first period. (See Table on p. 229).
These figures are accurate only to a somewhat limited degree.
I propose, therefore, if employment or injury frequency move
down or up by 3 per cent or less, to term this stability. If we then
investigate the movements of employment we find that
it increased 15 times;
it remained stable 9 times;
it declined 4 times.
ACCIDENTS AND THE
TRADE CYCLE
229
EMPLOYMENT AND FATAL ACCIDENTS IN COAL-MINING.*
I. 189O TO 1918
Employment Reduced to
Year
300 Day Workers f Common Accidents i
Total Accidents
Thousand
Per thousand 300 Day Workers
1890
229
3*12
3*5°
1891
239
3-66
4*3°
1892
243
3-67
4’4 2
1893
243
3’79
4’°3
1894
222
4-14
4*5°
1895
249
3*88
4-68
1896
244
4-07
4-62
1897
239
4-06
4-27
1898
253
4i5
4-28
1899
292
4*09
4*4°
1900
3*9
3-99
4*87
1901
350
4i3
4‘54
1902
342
3'9i
5i5
1903
4i3
4*15
4-72
i-9°4
398
450
5-17
1905
444
4*42
5* ! 4
1906
439
4‘33
4-87
1907
520
4*50
625
1908
441
4-76
554
1909
49 1
4*33
5*35
iQio
532
4-40
5-30
1911
534
4-17
4-97
I9!2
542
4-01
4-46
1913
593
3-90
4-70
1914
527
4*05
4*66
1915
512
3’9i
4’44
1916
566
3.66
3*94
1917
835
3*83
4* 25
1918
655
3-86
3*94
While employment increased 15 times, total accidents during
the same years increased 6 times and remained stable 4 times.
While employment remained stable 9 times, total accidents in
the identical years remained stable twice, increased once and
declined 6 times.
* Based on material given in the Bulletins of the Bureau of Mines, dealing
with coal mine accidents.
t Figures for 1890 to 1905 computed by myself on the basis of data on
employment and days worked per year given in the above-mentioned bulletins.
$ Computed on the basis of data given for common and general fatal
accidents given in the above-mentioned bulletins. A “common” accident is
one causing less than five deaths.
230 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
While employment declined 4 times, total accidents in the
identical years declined once and remained stable once.
In the 19 years in which we find a definite increase and decline
of employment we find 7 years in which we have a parallel
movement of the frequency of total accidents. During the first
10 years of the period under review (1891-1900), we find that
employment and total accidents move in the same direction
5 times, and that for a further 4 times they do not at least move
in opposite directions (one being stable and the other increasing
or declining). During the second 10 years under review (1901-
1910), we find that employment and total accidents move twice
in the same direction, and that for a further 5 times they do not
at least move in opposite directions. During the following 8 years
under review (1911-1918), we find that employment and total
accidents move twice in the same direction and that a further
3 times they at least do not move in opposite directions.
From this we may draw the conclusion that there exists a
definite relation in the movements of employment and total
accidents; that the rate of accidents has a tendency to increase
with increasing employment and to decline with declining em¬
ployment.* We are also entitled to draw the further conclusion
that this relation, in the course of the years under review, has
become slacker. During the first ten years under review therp is
only one in which employment and accidents move in opposite
directions. During the second decade there are three years in
which they move in opposite directions. And during the last
eight years there are three in which they move in opposite
directions. For this last period we have considerably better
statistics at our disposal than those given above: statistics of the
actual number of hours worked and of the accidents per hour of
exposure. (See Table on p. 231.)
Of the seven moves which employment made only two were
accompanied by parallel moves of accident frequency while three
further moves were at least not contrary to that of employment.
Before we conclude this survey of the years 1890 to 1918 we
must take one factor into account which Mr. Kossoris has
* I am dealing here only with “the correlation of concurrent deviations”
and, since the figures are too rough, I cannot investigate the coefficient of
correlation taking into account not only the direction but also the size of the
deviation.
ACCIDENTS AND THE TRADE CYCLE
231
EMPLOYMENT AND FATAL ACCIDENTS IN COAL-MINING*
II. I91I TO 1918
Year
1,000 Million Hours
Fatal Accidents per Million Hours
of Employment
Total
Common
1911
1,302
2*04
i‘7i
1912
L423
1-70
1 *53
1913
L549
1 *8o
1 '49
L378
1-78
i*55
1915
1 >339
1-69
i*49
1916
1 >453
1 *53
1-42
1917
1 >576
1-71
1 ‘54
1918
1,600
t *6i
1-58
pointed , out: “as employment tends to approach a plateau, the
frequency rate turns downward.” Thus, we see, that Mr. Kos-
soris quite rightly does not claim an absolute parallelity of these
movements. There is a certain phase when accidents must tend
to decline while employment remains relatively stable. We are,
therefore, justified in saying that in all cases in which employ¬
ment changes by about 3 per cent and less, after having increased
for some time, and in which the frequency rate of accidents
declines, this is in agreement with the theory developed by Mr.
Kossoris. If we review the period under review with this modifi¬
cation, then we find:
7 years of full agreement between 1891 and 1900
2 years of partial agreement between 1891 and 1900
3 years of full agreement between 1901 and 1910
2 years of partial agreement between 1901 and 1910
4 years of full agreement between 1911 and 1918*f*
1 year of partial agreement between 1911 and I9i8f
By partial agreement we now understand years in which
employment changed by 3 per cent or less and the frequency
rate declined, or years in which the frequency rate changed by
3 per cent or less while employment increased.
This summary of the movements shows a close relationship for
the last decade of the nineteenth century, and a not inconsider-
* Based on material given in the Bulletins of the Bureau of Mines. The
figures for common accidents were computed by myself on the basis of the
absolute accident figures given in the above-mentioned Bulletins.
f Based on statistics of hours of exposure.
232 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
able slackening of the relationship in the beginning of the
present century.
Before we can come to more definite conclusions we must now
study the development in the following period:
EMPLOYMENT AND FATAL ACCIDENTS IN COAL-MINING*
III. igig TO 1939
1,000 Million Hours Fatal Accidents per Million Hours
Tear
of Employment
Total
Common
1919
I > 3°9
1-77
1*61
1920
M 5 1
i ‘57
1-52
1921
1,146
1-74
1' 7 i
1922
980
203
1 * 75
1923
•.356
1*82
1 -6o
1924
1,207
1 ‘99
1 -6i
1925
1,160
i *93
1-70
1926
L 353
i-86.
1 *6o
1927
L219
1-83 '
1-70
1928
1,136
1-92
1*63
1929
1,169
1-87
1 *64
1930
1,003
2-06
1 83
1931
804
I -82
i -75
1932
636
1-90
1*67
1933
719
I -48
1 '47
1934
769
i *59
1-56
1935
733
1-70
1-65
1936
826
1 *62
i *57
1937
811
i -74
1 -62
1938
621
i- 7 8
i *64
1939
678
i -59
i -55
We see at once that it is hopeless here to try to find the same
kind of relation between the development of employment and
accident frequency as we did, to a certain degree, for the pre¬
ceding years. In fact, the former relation has been destroyed to
such a degree that the question arises whether a new kind of
relation between these two factors has not been established.
If we try to establish the former relation, we find that this is
possible only for three years out of twenty-one. That is, the rules
* The man-hours worked are taken from the above-mentioned Bulletins of
the Bureau of Mines. The accident frequency statistics are taken from the
Handbook of Labor Statistics and various issues of the Monthly Labor Review of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, The data on common accidents have been
computed by myself on the basis of the absolute figures given in the Bulletins
of the Bureau of Mines.
ACCIDENTS AND THE TRADE CY CLE
233
established by Mr. Kossoris do not apply at all to conditions in
the coal industry after the war, as far as fatal accidents are
concerned.
In fact, one can say that the opposite of what his rules imply,
and the opposite of what held true for the first two decades of
this century, is now the case. We find that a decline of employ¬
ment is almost invariably accompanied by an increase in the
rate of fatal accidents and vice versa.
In twelve years which show a clear decline of employment the
fatal accident frequency rate rose eight times, while it remained
about stable three times. Only once did it move in a direction
not expected according to the reversed rules.
In seven years which show a clear increase of employment, the
fatal accident frequency rate declined six times and moved only
once in a direction not expected (according to the reversed
rules).
In two years employment remained about stable; in one of
them the fatal accident frequency rate also remained stable.
How is it possible to explain the change in the relation of fatal
accident frequency and employment which has taken place in
post-war years? From all that we know of former years, far back
in the nineteenth century, it seems probable that the relation we
found for the decades preceding the world war 1914-1918 was
also valid during the nineteenth century. The question we have
to answer, then, is: why has the relation between fatal accident
rate and employment, which was valid probably for the whole
period of industrial capitalism, changed in recent decades? I
think that the explanation lies in the emergence of one factor of
supreme importance: the intensity of work.
During the crisis, when profits undoubtedly have a downward
trend, the employers try to stem this decline by increasing the
intensity of work more drastically than formerly and more
drastically than during a period of increasing trade. During a
crisis the workers nowadays are driven harder then ever, and
much harder than during the preceding period of increasing
business activity. This tends, of course, to strengthen the ten¬
dency towards an increasing accident rate.
Why were the workers not driven harder during a crisis in
former periods? There is one fact which may explain this to a
234 A SHORT HISTORY OP LABOUR CONDITIONS
certain extent. In former periods the skilled worker was regarded
as an asset which ought to be retained as long as possible. Em¬
ployers were reluctant to dismiss their best worke^, hoping to
keep them through the crisis so that when business began to pick
up they had them ready to start at once. With the decline in the
position of the skilled worker, especially after the previous world
war, the employers ruthlessly cut down their working force, and
the more leisurely pace of work—formerly not unusual during a
crisis with a relatively large staff of skilled workers—changed to
frenzied haste. The workers now were in greater fear of losing
their jobs than during the period of increasing business activity,
and were in a much weaker position when desirous of resisting
the constant increase in the intensity of work which was de¬
manded from them. Thus, it came about that accident frequency
rose during periods of declining employment.
These changes in the relation between employment and fatal
accident frequency raise a considerable number of interesting
questions. The first and most important is: does it hold true only
for the coal mining industry or for industry as a whole? If we
look back at the figures which Mr. Kossoris computed for indus¬
try as a whole we find, that for four out of six years, from 1929
to 1935, this relation holds true for industry as a whole. This does
not seem to be very good correlation. But if we look at the years
during which it does not work out, we find that these are the
same two years as those during which the relation does not work
in the coal industry either. This makes it not improbable that the
tendencies observed in coal mining apply also to industry as a
whole. Because of lack of sufficient material, however, we are
unable to say definitely that the development of relations be¬
tween employment and fatal accident frequency has been the
same in industry as a whole as in coal mining.
A second question of importance is: do fatal accident and
injury rates move in the same direction? From all statistics avail¬
able we can draw the conclusion that in general the fatal accident
rate and the permanent disability rate do move in the same
direction. At the same time we know that this does not apply to
the published general injury rate. But it is more than probable
that the apparent divergence between the general injury rate
and the permanent disability and fatal accident rate is due to
235
ACCIDENTS AND THE TRADE CYCLE
the fact that, under especially poor conditions, workers are
especially disinclined to miss their work because of an injury,
fearing dismissal or the wage loss.
A third question is: how far does the American experience
apply to other countries? Similar investigations in other coun¬
tries are not unlikely to show similar developments.
Finally, there is the important question: to what extent
do changes in the rate of exploitation within the trade cycle
vary to-day from the pattern found in the nineteenth century
and on up to the first world war? Does the change in the relation
between accident rate and employment indicate a similar and
more fundamental change in the sequence of changes in the rate
of exploitation within the trade cycle?
To many of these questions future investigations may provide
us with a satisfactory answer. I hope that, after I have studied
the conditions of labour in a number of other countries, I shall
be able in Volume VII to give definite answers to some of these
questions raised. It would, of course, be best if I needed simply
to refer the reader to the writings of others who, in the mean¬
time, will have taken up these problems and have solved them
satisfactorily.
* * * *
Since the above had been written, Mr. Kossoris has continued
his study of accidents in manufacturing industries. The table on
page 236 gives the results of,his investigations.*
Let us first look at the development of the various injury rates.
The most reliable, as I have explained above, are those for death
and permanent disability. How do the others measure up to this
rate? The general injury rate moves during the period under
review four times in the opposite direction of that of the fatal
injury rate; by that I mean not about stability of the one while
the other moves either up or down, but a decided movement in
opposite directions. In three further cases one rate remains stable
while the other moves sharply upwards or downwards. That is,
we have a vague parallelity of movement in 8 out of 15 cases.
From this we can draw the not very surprising conclusion,
* Monthly Labor Review , September, 1942. The figures on man-hours are
computed from Monthly Labor Review , September, 1940, and Statistical Abstract,
I 943*
236 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
already mentioned above, that the development of injuries in
general and of fatal injuries is by no means similar—not dis¬
similar in reality, but, for reasons indicated above, dissimilar in
the statistics.
INDEXES OF INJURY FREQUENCY RATES IN MANUFACTURING,
BY EXTENT OF DISABILITY, AND INDEX OF MAN-HOURS
WORKED, 1926 to 1941
(1926 = 100)
Injury Frequency Rates by Extent of Disability
Death and
Tear
Man-Hours
All Injuries
Permanent
Permanent
Temporary
Total
Partial
Total
1926
100
100
100
100
100
1927
97
94
107
96
93
1928
97
93
107
105
93
1929
102
99
93
109
99
1930
85
98
107
111
95
I 93 i
89
78
93
103
77
1932
54
81
107
114
79
1933
59
92
86
110
9 i
1934
63
94
107
128
92
1935
70
88
93
121
86
1936
82
86
86
”5
84
1937
■89
86
86
122
84
1938
67
72
7 i
79
68
1939
77
73
7 i
81
74
1940
84
75
7 i
85
76
* 94 *
110
86
80
94
86
If we now compare the development of the most reliable set of
data, that is of fatal and permanent total injuries, with that of
employment (man-hours worked), then we find the following:
RELATIVE MOVEMENT OF FATAL AND PERMANENT TOTAL
INJURIES AND MAN-HOURS WORKED, 1926 to 1941
Tears
Injuries
Man-Hours
Tears
Injuries
Man-Hours
1926-1927
up
down
* 934-1935
down
up
1927-1928
stable
stable
1935-1936
down
up
1928-1929
down
up
1936-1937
stable
up
1 929-1 93 °
• UP
down
1937-1938
down
down
' 93 <>- l 93 l
down
down
1938-1939
stable
up
* 93 1-1 932
up
down
•939-194°
stable
up
1932-1933
down
up
1940-1941
up
up
* 933-1934
up
up
Our table comprises 15 changes. In seven cases we find that
man-hours worked and the injury rate move in opposite direc-
ACCIDENTS AND THE TRADE CYCLE
237
tions. In three further cases one series is stable while the other
moves very decidedly up or down. Only in one-third of the cases
do they move in the same direction. This makes it not improbable
that our above surmise that conditions in manufacturing are not
fundamentally different from those in coal-mining is correct.
Mr. Kossoris in a letter to me, after the first edition of this
volume had been published, expressed his doubts whether the
frequency rate of deaths is a fair criterion of accident frequency
in general. But the only reason he can give for his doubts is that
the death rate moves erratically, and without regard to the
trends of other injuries. The point, however, is which of the two
sets of injury rates moves erratically, and whether, as I believe,
the other accident rates are not too much influenced by the
factors mentioned above to give a true picture of the development
of the general accident rate. In fact, the data given above for the
coal industry as well as for manufacturing as a whole indicate
that in general the death rate does not move erratically at all,
but fits fairly well into a pattern which, admittedly different
from what one generally would expect, nevertheless, makes
sense. For these reasons, I would be disinclined to dismiss the
questions raised above and the problems dealt with in this
appendix, as originating from the use of unrepresentative statistics
such as the fatal injury frequency rate. We still have too little
material to come to definite conclusions. But more studies of the
kind undertaken by Mr. Kossoris, and attempted here in this
appendix, may soon shed more light into this important field of
labour conditions.
INDEX
. 1 .—INDEX OF TABLES
Pages
Accidents
Coal Mines
1878-1897
110
1878-1914
i 73
1911-1941
173
Manufacturing
and Employment
1926-1941
236
General
227
Coal Mines
1890-1918
229
1911-1918
231
i 9 I 9~ I 939
232
and Man-Hours Worked
1926-1941
236
Capital
Invested in Manufacturing Industries by
Geographic Regions
1850-1900
101, 102
Invested in Foreign Countries
I 9 I 4 “ I 94 I
130
Cost of Living
1791-1840
21, 22
1841-1860
49
1860-1897
81 •
I ^ 97 ~ I 94 I
i 5 2
Employment
Actual Employment
1889-1897
94
I 9 2 9 -I 94 I
140
Labour Supply
1889-1897
94
1897-1926
139
Occupied Persons
General
i 9 2 9 -I 94 I
140
1940-1945
216
By Groups
1900-1930
132
in Philadelphia
1814-1816
3 2 ^
Men and Women
1900-1940
136
1940-1945
216
Specific Groups
Manufacturing
1860-1900
75
1889-1897
94
1899-1939
133
by Geographic Regions
1850-1900
IOI, 102
75 , 76
by Sex
1860-1900
1899-1939
136
Children
1860-1900
75
i 899- ! 939
136
Producers and “Overhead”
1909-1935
134
Production and Marketing
1870-1930
*35
Professional
1870-1930
*35
INDEX
239
Employment —continued
Railways
Salaried Employees
General
Manufacturing
Foreign Trade
Hours oi Work
General
Building
Manufacturing
Unionized and Non-Unionized
Mining
Unskilled Labour
Immigration
Industrial Mergers
Minimum Health and Decency Budget
Production
Manufacturing
General
by Geographic Regions in European
Countries
Mining
Productivity
Agriculture
Blast Furnaces
Cotton
'Grain Mills
Leather
Manufacturing
Mining
Paper and Pulp
Railroads
Rayon
Street Railways
Pages
1889-1897
94
1870-1940
! 34
1899-1 939
133
1821-1940
129
1830-1860
45
1860-1880
89, 90
1890-1897
9 i
1897-1932
147
1890-1897
92
1890-1897
92
I 94 I_I 945
218
1890-1900
92
1890-1897
92
1890-1897
92
1820-1840
30
1851-1900
105
1890-1904
125
1929-1940
201
182 7--1863
59
1827-1941
128
1868-1941
128
1899-1939
127
1850-1900
IOI, 102
1827-1941
128
I 94 I ~ I 944
219
1860-1879
97
I 94 I “ I 944
219
1941-1944
219
I 94 I-I 944
219
1827-1897
99
1889-1897
100
1827-1941
162
1897-1941
163, 164
1920-1941
165
1827-1897
99
1889-1897
100
1827-194 1
162
1920-1941
165
I 94 I-I 944
219
I 94 I ~ I 944
219
1889-1897
100
1920-1941
165
I 94 I “ I 944
219
1890-1897
100
240 A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
Pages
Productivity — continued
Telephone Communications
1920-1941
165
Tobacco
1941-1944
219
Various Industries
1839-65—1894-97
99
Woollen and Worsted Goods
1941-1944
219
Short Time (Part Time) Work
I 9 H-I 939
!44
Strikes
General Data
1881-1897
121
1897-1941
197
1942-1944
221
Chief Issues
1927-1941
199
1942-1944
221
Unemployment
General
1889-1897
94
1897-1927
137-139
1928-1930
140
1929-1941
140
I 94 I -1944
216
Building
1897-1927
137, ' 3 s
1928-1930
140
Manufacturing and Transport
1897-1927
' 37 , '38
Metal
1928-1930
140
Mining
1897-1927
' 37 , '38
Printing
1928-1930
140
Wages
Money Wages
General
Rates
1791-1840
21, 22
1841-1860
43
1860-1897
79 - 8 i
1897-1933
148
Earnings
•897-194'
150
(including unemployed)
'897-194'
i 5 L 152
Hourly Wages
1840-1860
43
1897-1940
146
Building
1791-1840
21
1840-1860
47
1860-1897
79,80
Carpenters
1791-1840
20
Clothing Makers
1811-1840
20, 21
Cotton Mill Operatives
1821-1840
20
Glass Makers
1821-1840
20, 21
1840-1860
47
1860-1897
85
Iron and Steel
1840-1860
47
1860-1897
85
Labour Aristocracy
1868-1897
83
1897-1939
156
Labourers
1791-1840
20, 21
1840-1860
47
1860-1897
79> 80
INDEX
241
W ages —continued
Manufacturing
Masons
Massachusetts
Mass of Workers
Men’s
Metal Workers
Millwrights
Mining
Painters
Printers
Ship and Boat Building
Shoemakers
Southern Workers
Textiles
Transportation
Women’s
Wooden Goods Makers
Woollen Mill Operatives
Real Wages
General
Building
Labour Aristocracy
Manufacturing
Mass of Workers
Mining
Transportation
Relative (Social) Wages
Wholesale Prices
Pagei
1860-1897
79> 80
1897-1941
*49
I 94 I-, 945
217
180I-I84O
20
1791-1840
20, 21
I868-I897
83
* 897-1939
156
I86O-I897
87, 88
1899 -I 94 1
*59
I8H-I84O
20, 21
I84O-I86O
47
I86O-I897
85
1791-1840
20
I84O-I86O
47
I86O-I897
79> 80
i897-* 94 *
*49
1801-1840
20
1811-1840
20, 21
1840-1860
47
1860-1897
85
1811-1840
20, 21
1791-1840
20
1880
103
i 899"*939
158
i 79*-*840
21
1840-1860
47
1860-1897
85
1840-1860
47
1860-1897
79> 80
*897-194*
H 9 nn
1860-1897
87, 88
* 899 ~* 94 *
*49
1801-1840
20, 21
1840-1860
47
1860-1897
85
1821-1840
20
* 79 I ~* 84 °
21, 22
1841-1860
49
1860-1897
8l
* 897 -* 94 *
* 53 , *54
i 79 *'* 94 *
* 54 , *55
1859-1897
82
1 9 1 4 — * 9 21
*57
*859-1897
82
* 9 * 4 -* 9 2 *
*57
1859-1897
82
1859-1897
82
1868-1933
184
1791-1840
21
VOL II
242
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
II.—INDEX OF NAMES
(PERSONS, PLACES, PEOPLES)
Abbott, E., 25
Adam, H., 13
Alabama, 91
Alaska, 178
Allegheny, 64
Amenia, N.Y., 93
Andrews, J. B., 115
Arkansas, 179
Austria, 71, 105
Baley, S., 55
Barger, H., 162
Barr, R., 13
Beecher, H. W., 107
Belknap, T., 107
Berle, A. A., 126
Bezanson, A., 21
Bishop, J. L., 48
Bogart, E. L., 40
Bolles, S., 107
Boston, 55, 63, 86, 109, 116
Brissenden, P., 159, 162
Bristed, J., 36
Bromwell, W. J., 62
Brownson, O. A., 55
Brundige, C. V. N., 55
Buckingham, W. A., 107
California, 41, 52, 90, 91, 120, 179
Canada, 29, 115
Caswell, 107
Channing, E., 13
Chapman, R. A., 107
Chase, S. P., 107
Chicago, 86
China, 120
Chinese, see China
Chiopce Mills, 56, 57
Cincinnati, 86
Colorado, 91, hi, 178
Commons, J. R., 28, 29, 37
Connecticut, 41,44,46,60, 79,84,87,
89, 9 <>> 94 > *77
Converse, P. D., 135
Cuba, 101
Cummings, R. O., 51
Danville, Penn., 64
Dixon, J., 107
Douglas, A., 13
Douglas, P. H., 78, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86,
9*. 92, 94 . 95 . IO °. > 37 . * 3 8 . ' 39 .
147 . * 5 °. ' 53 . l6a
Downing, J., 12
Dunn, R. W., 168
Edwards, A. M., 133
Emerson, R. W., 13
Engels, F., 11, 131
England, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19,65, 109
English, see England
Evans, H. C., 180
Ezekiel, M., 204
Fitchburg, Mass., 64
Fletcher, 106
Florida, 179
Ford, H. 189
Ford, J., 11
Foster, Le Baron R., 162
Foster, L. S., 107
France, 18, {9, 71, 124
Frey, J. P., 190
Galloway, G. B., 204
Garland, H., 13
Gelder, P. van, 213
Georgia, 89, 90
Germany, 10, 12, 25, 38, 71, 105, 124,
138, 141, 142, 143, 177,214,215,
216
Gompers, S., 193, 194
Gray, R. D., 21
Great Britain, 23, 25, 38, 42, 45, 58,
66, 71, 105, 124, 130, 131, 132,
138, 140, 142, 163, 177,216
Greeley, H., 32, 50
Green, W., 191
Griffin, J. J., 197
Griffin, M., 114
Haiti, 101
Hamilton, A., 18
Hardy, J., 168
Harlan, J., 107
Hershey, L. B., 211
Hinman, 107
INDEX
243
Hofmann, J. G., 12
Hussey, M., 21
Illinois, 41, 78, 85, 89, 90, 91, hi,
. 1r 9 > 179
Indiana, 91
Iowa, 90
Ireland, 62, 105
Italy, 105, 215
Japan, 215
Jenckes, F. L., 168
Jennison, F. T., 138, 150
Kansas, 90, 179
Keenan, H. F., 13
Kentucky, 178
Kerr, O. C., 12
Kossoris, M. D., 225, 226, 227, 228,
230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 237
Kuczynski, J., 10, 12, 22, 23, 24, 25,
28, 35, 38, 66, 83, 129, 142, 155
Lenin, W. I., 124, 125, 131, 135
Lewis, J. L., 186
Liberia, 101
Lousiana, 90, 91
Lowell, Mass., 28, 39, 53, 54, 55, 57,
64
Macaulay, T. B., 25
Machar, A. M., 13
Maine, 52, 87, 91
Makin, R. L., 13
Marx, K., 12, 31, 70
Maryland, 46, 79, 90, 91, 178
Maslen, S., 206, 207
Massachusetts, 20, 38, 44, 46, 60, 78,
79, 84, 86, 87, 120, 121, 177, 179
McNeill, G. E., 114
Means, G. C., 126
Merritt, A. H., 211
Michigan, 90, 91
Millis, A. H., 92
Minnesota, 178
Mississippi, 179
Missouri, 90, 91, 106, 119
Mitchell, D. W., 31
. Mitchell, W. C., 78, 79, 84, 86
Montana, 178
Montgomery, R. E., 92
Morgan, J. P., 73
Mulhall, M. G., 71
Murray, C. A., 30
Murray, P., 218
Nevada, 178, 179
New England, 28, 38, 41, 101, 166
New Hampshire, 46, 52, 87, 89, 90,
179
New Haven, 28
New Jersey, 41, 44, 46, 52, 60, 86, 89,
9 °> 179
New York (City), 11, 12, 32, 50, 51,
63, 68, 115, 206
New York (State), 41, 44, 46, ^2, 79,
84, 86, 89-91, 96, 119, 178, 205, b
206
I North Carolina, 89, 90, 91, 179
Ohio, 52, 84, 86, 89, 90, 179
Oliver, H. K., 114
Overton, G., 13
Pearson, F. A., 21, 58
Pennsylvania, 46, 52, 60, 78, 79, 84,
85, 86, 90, hi, 121, 178
Perkins, H. A., 107
Persons, W. M., 162
Phelps, E. S., 13
Philadelphia, 24, 31, 32, 37, 86
Philippines, 101
Pittsburgh, 32, 64
Portland, 12
Posner, H. L., 164
I Prussia, 19
Rautenstrauch, W., 134
Rhode Island, 52, 60, 84, 89, 90
Rochester, A., 126
Roosevelt, F. D., 131, 160, 177, 180,
181, 198, 212, 222
Russia, 105
San Francisco, 86
Schnorr, S. H., 162
Snyder, C., 78
South Carolina, 89, 90, 179
Soviet Union, 129
Sprague, 107
Stecker, M. L., 202
Stewart, E., 193
Stewart, I., 117, 193
Stoker, H. M., 21
Stone, 107
Stone, I. F., 217
Sumner, Ch., 40, 42, 107
Taylor, F. W., 168
Tennessee, 89, 90
Thomas, R. J., 218
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
244
Tilton, T., 107
Trollope, A., 57, 58
Troy, N. Y., 93
Tucker, J., 16
Tucker, R. S., 9, 21,
Turner, F. J., 30 .
Twain, M., 13
Virginia, 41, 90, 91
, Wallace, H. A., 214
Ward, A., 12
Ware, N., 32, 35, 56.
Warren, G. F., 21, 5!
49
65
Warville, B. de, 17
Washington (State), 179
Watkins, M. W., 125
Weeks, J. D., 78, 79, 84, 95, 96
Weintraub, D., 164
Welles, G., 107
Whelpton, P. K., 19, 58
Whitman, W., 13
Wilson, H., 107
Wisconsin, 91, 119, 178, 179
Worcester, Mass., 93
Wright, C. D., 20
Youngstown, Ohio, 93
INDEX
245
III.—GENERAL INDEX
Absolute Deterioration, 12, 34, 114,
192 <
Accidents, 13, no, 112, 172, 174, 175,
180,211,212,225-237
and Intensity of Work, 112, 172,
175, 212, 228, 233
Legislation, hi, 172, 178, 179, 181
in Mines, no, 173, 174, 228-234
Safety Measures, 173, 174, 211,212
and the Trade Cycle, 225-237
Agriculture, 40, 70, 71, 183, 206, 207
Employment, 132, 137
Productivity, 219, 220
and the Trade Cycle, 225-237
Wages, 46, 153, 154
Aldrich Report on Wholesale Prices,
Wages and Transportation, 45,
. 58.59,78,89,91
American Emigrant Company of
New York, 106, 107
American Federationist , 139, 144, 193
American Federation of Labor, 115,
120, 137, 138, 139, 161, 184,
185, 186, 187, 190, 191, 192,
*93, JW* *95 > i 98 j 216, 220,
222
American Wool and Cotton Reporter , 168
Apprentices, 25, 34, 37, 61, 66, 68
Armaments, 18, 129
Automobile Industry, 118, 126, 167,
169, 171, 184
Blacklisting, 101
Boston Quarterly Review , 55
Boycott Movements, 123
Building, 19, 42, 75, 134
Employment, 19, 75
Hours of Work, 92, 120
Wages, 21, 46-48, 50, 79, 80, 82,
155
Unemployment, 32, i 37~ I 39
Bureau of Home Economics, 200, 203
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 43, 45, 46,
50, 78, 144,145,161, 162, 165,
* 73 > * 74 , * 93 , 200 > 202 > 2i8 >
219, 223
Canals, 41, 42, 72
Carpenters, 37
Cartels, 125, 126, 214
Children, 101
Employment, 10, 24, 25, 28, 34,60,
61, 65, 66, 75-77, 108, 135,
136, 223,224
Health, 28, 34, 109, 170, 171
Hours of Work, 25, 26, 34, 52, 60,
108
Intensity of Work, 108
Strikes, 33
Wages, 24, 34, 60
Civil War, 13, 56, 70, 103, 105, 112,
166, 183
Closed Shop, 68
Colonial Labour, 101-105
Colonies, 15, 16, 17, 131, 132
Communist Party, 184
Company Unions, 185
Concentration of Capital, 127
Congress of Industrial Organizations
(C.I.O.), 161, 184, 185, 186,
218, 222
Cost of Living, 9, 20, 21, 22, 49, 81,
112, 152, 188, 200, 218
Cotton Industry, 18, 41, 72
Employment, 19, 32, 41, 77, 93
Hours of Work, 44, 90
Investments, 41
Wages, 20, 46, 84, 87, 104
Craftsmen, 68
Crisis, 13, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 42, 61,
73, 74, 100,127,129,130,131,
140, 141, 148, 153, 154, 165
177, 180, 182, 189, 192, 197,
198, 225, 226, 228, 233, 234
Daily Tribune , 44, 50, 51
Death Rate, 53, 54, 55 > 5^, 109, 176,
208, 212
Eight-Hour Day, 116-120, 122, 192,
193 , 194 v c
Employment, 40, 94, 134, 135,
140, 196, 223,224
and Accidents, 225-237
Agriculture, 132, 137
minaing, 19,75 . *
Children, 24, 25, 28, 34, 60, 61, 65,
66, 75, 76, 77 , 108, * 35 , * 36 ,
223, 224
Cotton Industry, 19, 32, 44, 77 , 93
246 A SHORT HISTORY OF
Employment —continued
by Geographic Divisions, 101, 102
Insecurity of, 28, 29, 34, 94, 95
Iron and Steel Industry, 32, 93
Machine Production, 19
Manufacturing, 19, 42, 75, 94, 132,
133, 136
Mining, 19, 75, 132
Paper Manufacture, 32
Potteries, 32
Printing, 32, 68, 76, 140
Railroads, 94
Salaried Employees, 132, 133, 134
Textile Industry, 76, 77
Transportation, 19, 75, 132
Women, 24, 25, 29, 60, 61, 65, 75,
76, 77. I 35 _I 37> 216
Woollen Industry, 19, 32, 93
^Exploitation, 10, 13, 34, 56, 106, 163,
170, 183
Methods of, 13, 20, 34, 35, 56, 57,
74 > 95 } 99
Primitive, 15 ff., 34, 35
Export of Capital, 130
Farmers, 30, 183, 224
Fascism, 38, 212, 213, 214, 215
Finance Capitalism, 124, 126, 134
Food, 50, 51, 143, 194 } 2 °2, 203, 205,
206, 207, 208, 219, 220
Foreign Trade, 15, 42, 73, 129
Glass Industry, Wages, 20, 21, 46-48,
85, 86
Health. 13, 26-28, 51 > 5 2 , 53 > 54 > 55 }
56,66, 105, 108, 175, 176, 177,
i95» 205, 207, 208, 209, 210,
214, 223
Children, 28, 34, 109, 170, 171
Dental Conditions, 211
and Income Groups, 208-210
Insurance, 178, 181
and Intensity of Work, hi, 169-
17a, 176,177,196
and Unemployment, 208-210
Women, 28, 53, 54
Heavy Industry, 10
Hours of Work, 10, 25, 26, 27, 34, 44,
45> §1} 5 2 > 53} 58, 57} 59> 61,
65, 66, 67, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92,
100, 101, 112, 116, 117, 118,
141, 147, 167, 170, 192, 193,
194, 212, 214, 225
LABOUR CONDITIONS
Hours of Work —continued
Building, 92, 120
Children, 25, 26, 34, 52, 60, 108
and Health, 116, 194
in Iron and Steel, 96
Labourers, 92
and Labour Supply, 116
Manufacturing, 92, 95, 96, 218
Mining, 92 1
and Unemployment, 141-144,194-
197
and Wages, 116
Women, 26, 34, 57
Housing, 11, 63, 64, 65, 105, 108, 109,
112, 205-208
Immigration, Immigrants, 30, 31, 63,
76, 105-107
Changed Character of Immigra¬
tion, 61, 62
Housing of, 63, 64
and Trade Unions, 120
used against Labour, 62, 66, 106,
107
Income, 201, 202
(See also Wages)
Imperialism, 125, 128, 141, 142, 143
Industrial Workers of the World
(I.W.W.), 184
Intensity of Work, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59,
61, 66, 95, 96, 98, 112, 143,
155, 161, 166, 167, 168, 169,
170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 179}
182, 183, 200, 212, 218, 219,
220, 228, 233, 234
and Accidents, 112, 172, 175, 212,
228,233
Children, 108
and Food, 112, 169
and Health, m, 169, 172
Investments, 18
in Cotton Industry, 41
by Geographic Divisions, 101, 102
in Manufacturing Industries, 72
in Mining, 74
Iron and Steel Industry, 18, 72, 84
Employment, 32, 93
Hours of Work, 96
Production, 18, 97
Productivity, 96-98, 141
Wages, 46-48, 50, 85
Journeymen, 12, 25, 37
INDEX
Journal of the American Statistical Associa¬
tion, 58
Journal, Lowell, Mass., 64
Knights of Labour, 115, 119
Labour Aristocracy, 84, 155
Labourers, 11
Hours of Work, 92
Wages, 20, 46-48, 50, 79, 80
Labor Research Association, 192, 200,
201,213
Labour Supply, 94,139, 215, 216
Lock-outs, 121, 122, 197
Machinists , and Blacksmiths’ Union,
116
Manufacturing Industries, 17, 18, 19,
28,31,40,41,71,72,73,84,
95,102,127,225,235,236,237
Employment, 19, 42, 75, 94, 132,
133, 136
Hours of Work, 92, 95, 96, 218
Investments, 72
Production, 126-128
Productivity, 11, 58, 99, 100, 162-
165.219.220
Wages, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 149, 150,
217, 218, 220
Mergers, Industrial, 125, 126
Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of
Labor, 20, 29, 38, 57, 58, 60,
108, 114
Metal Industry—
Employment, 76, 140
Wages, 20, 21, 46-48, 50
Metal Trades Review , 193
Minimum Health and Decency Bud¬
get, 200-205, 207
Mining Industry, 10, 19, 42, 74, 185,
186
Accidents, no, 173, 174, 228-234
Employment, 19, 75, 132
Hours of Work, 44, 92
Investments, 74
Production, 126, 128
Productivity, n, 58, 99, 100, 162,
164.165.219.220
Strikes, 122
Wages, 46-48, 50, 79, 80, 82, 149,
150, 220
Missouri Democrat , 106
Monopoly, Monopolism, 13, 124,125,
126, 128, 142, 143, 166, 177
247
Monthly Labor Review , 133, 145, 152,
162, 174, 199, 203, 205, 223,
224, 225, 232, 235
Nation, 217
National Bureau of Economic Re¬
search, 183
National Financial Weekly, 21
National Health Survey, 208
National Industrial ConferenceBoard,
r 44> *59, 160, 201
National Labor Relations Board, 187
National Labor Union, 115, 120
National Nutrition Conference, 205,
211,212
National Resources Committee, 201
National Trades Union, 28, 30, 115
Negro Workers, 104, 105, 106, 114,
160, 203, 204
New York Commercial Advertiser , 32
North American Review, 12
Nutrition, 203, 205
Old Age Pensions, 178, 180, 181, 223
Overtime, 44, 92, 148, 194
Prices, 48, 188, 190, 191, 192
Retail, 9, 21, 78, 153
Wholesale, 21, 33
Printing, 68
Employment, 32, 68, 76, 140
Wages, 20, 21, 46 -48, 50, 85
Prisoners, 25, 34, 60, 66, 68
Production, 41, 129, 130, 141, 142,
143, 163, 164, 165, 166, 184,
189, 190, 191, 192,'196, 197 ,
213, 214, 224
by Geographic Divisions, 101, 102
Index of, 59, 128
of Iron, 18, 97
Manufacturing, 126, 127, 128
Methods of, 10, 11, 34
Mining. 126, 128
Productivity, 10,13? 59 ^ 7 > 95 > 9 ®»
100, 141, 142, 143, 161, 163,
164, 165, 166, 167, 182, 191,
i93> *96, 219, 220
Agriculture, 219, 220
in Iron and Steel Industry, 96, 97,
98, 141
in Manufacturing, n, 58, 99, 100,
162, 163, 164, 165, 219, 220
in Mining, 11,58,99,100,162,164,
165, 219, 220
A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS
248
Productivity —continued
Railroads, 100, 164, 165
Street Railways, 100
Textiles, 141, 219
Public Utilities, 126, 149, 150, 220
Railroad Brotherhoods, 115
Railroads, 41, 42, 73, 124, 131
Employment, 94
Hours of Work, 44
Productivity, 100, 164, 165
Wages, 46, 78, 79
Review of Economic Statistics , 162
Safety Measures, 173, 174, 211, 212
Salaried Employees, 135
Scientific Management, 168, 185
Servants, 11
Seven Years* War, 16
Shipping, 42, 73
Short-Time, 92, 144, 145, 148, 183
Skilled Workers, 29, 83, 84, 88, 160,
166, 185, 204, 210, 234
Slavery, 70, 105
Socialist Party, 184
Social Legislation, 177, 179, 181, 182,
183, 198,223
Social Security Board, 180
Standard of Living, 31, 33, 34 . 35 . 84,
74, 106, 112, 116, 117, 118,
120, 155, 188, 189, 201, 204,
217, 218, 220, 224
Strikes, 36, 112, 121-123, 197-199.
221
and Children, 38
and Hoprs of Work, 37, 119, 199,
221
and Intensity of Work, 56
for Union Organization, 199, 221
Miners, 122
and Wages, 36, 37, 199
and Women, 38
Sweat-Shops, 26, 34, 44, 76, 114
Textile Industry, 10, 18, 84, 166, 185,
186
Employment, 76, 77
Investments, 18
Productivity, 141, 219
Wages, 20, 21, 23,46-48,85, 86, 88
Time, 211
Trade Unions, 36, 68, 69, 83, 92, 112,
115, 161, 172, 177, 178, 179,
180, 184-199, 214, 222
Transportation, 18,19,41, 42, 73,126
Employment, 19, 75, 132
Wages, 46-48, 50, 79, 80, 82, 149,
150
Truck System, 59, 60, 66, 68
Trusts, 41, 126
Tuberculosis, 53, 55, 109, no, 175
Unemployment, 31,32,33, 34, 36, 61,
93. 94. 95. ^2, 137, 138, 140,
141-145, 151, 152, 171, 182,
183, 196, 197, 208, 209, 216,
217, 234
Building, 32, 137, 138, 139
Insurance, 177-181
Manufacturing, 137, 138, 139
Mining, 137, 138, 139
Transportation, 137, 138, 139
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers, 213
Unskilled Workers, 29,83,84,88,160,
204, 210
Voice of Industry , 56, 57, 64
Wages, 20, 21, 24, 34,43, 77, 101,116,
117, 118, 145, 148, 152, 182,
188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194,
198, 197. 214. 224
Agriculture, 46, 153, 154
Bricklayers, 46, 50
Building, 21, 46, 47, 48, 50, 79, 80,
82
Carpenters, 20, 46, 50
Children, 24, 34, 60
Clothing, 50
Cotton Industry, 104
Daily, 46, 47, 48, 50, 61
Engineers, 50
by Geographic Divisions, 103, 158
Glass Industry, 20, 21, 46, 47, 48,
85, 86
Hod Carriers, 46, 50
Hourly, 43, 46, 146, 159
Index of, 9, 21, 47
Iron and Steel, 46, 47, 48, 50, 85
Labour Aristocracy, 83,84,88,145,
155. 158, 157.180
Labourers, 20,46,47,48,50, 79,80
Machinists, 20, 46, 50
Manufacturing, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86,
149, 150, 217, 218) 220
INDEX
249
Wages —continued
Masons, 20, 46, 50
Metal Industry, 20, 21, 46, 47, 48,
5 °.
Millwrights, 20, 50
Mining, 46, 47, 48, 50, 79, 80, 82,
149, 150,220
Money, 21, 22, 48, 49, 50, 79, 80,
81, 84, 145, 149-152, 191,
200,217,218
Painters, 20, 46, 50
Plasterers, 50
Plumbers, 50
Printing, 20, 21, 46, 47, 48, 50, 85
Real, 10, 21, 22, 23, 48, 49, 65, 66,
81-84, 112, 143, 145, 153-155,
156, 157, 161, 169, 183, 184,
i9°> i9 ! > *92, 200, 201, 212,
218, 219, 221, 224
Relative, 145, 183, 184, 190, 191,
192
Shipbuilders, 20, 21
Shoemakers, 20
Southern Workers, 101-104, 157,
158, 160
Wages —continued
Textiles, 20, 21, 23, 46, 47, 48, 85,
86, 88
Transportation, 46, 47, 48, 50, 79,
80, 82, 149, 150
Women, 34,60, 86,87,88,145,157,
158-160
Woodworkers, 20, 21, 46, 47, 48,
85,86
Wagner Act, 188
Women, 96, 204
Employment, 24, 25, 29, 60, 61, 65,
75 - 77 , I 35 ~ I 37 , 216
Health, 28, 53, 54, 56
Intensity of Work, 27, 28
Strikes, 38
Wages, 34,60,86-88, 145, 157-160
Woodworkers, 20, 44, 46-48, 79, 85,
86, 155
Wages, 20, 21, 46-48, 85, 86
Woollen Goods Industry, 20, 21, 41,
44, 46, 84, 87, 90
Employment, 19, 32, 93
Works Progress Administration, 200,
202
m?r Tisftar stwrft j^ra*? -
L.B.S. National Academy of Administration, Library
MUSSOORIE
US <F?TU> fJT^rf%cT giffe ^ ^Tfw JRSt | I
This book is to be returned on the date last stamped
four*
Date
^rre^rr?
^ gw
Borrower’s
No.
frTEP
Date
wr
Borrower’s
No.
1
—
'
I
331 . 2
Kuc
if. 1$ ' w '-
ACC No.. 1Q3£?...„
^T^f.
Class No...Book No .
Author...i/. y.r.
sfHsp
Title.. Th.e..Unit 0fX . St at.es. of
J&RSZ%SSl..m .
farm forfo
j sr. j
Hat* Af kaiM
i mmt’s Nrv 1
■ SiAJiaturr.
Kuc
LIBRARY
LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI
National Academy of Administration
MUSSOORIE
Accession No.
1. Books are issued for 15 days only but
may have to be recalled earlier if urgen¬
tly required.
2. An over-due charge of 25 Paise per day per
volume will be charged.
3. Books may be renewed on request, at the
discretion of the Librarian.
4. Periodicals, Rare and Reference books may
not be issued and may be consulted only
in. the Library.
6. Books lost, defaced or injured in any way
shall have to be replaced or its double
price shall be paid by the borrower.
Live Music
Archive
Librivox
Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland
Museum of Art
Internet
Arcade
Console Living Room
Open Library
American
Libraries
TV News
Understanding
9/11